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ABSTRACT

The reaction of the first wave of English Romantic poets to the Enlightenment
scientific establishment is by this point well understood. As Blake once noted, "All that
is Valuable in Knowledge is / Superior to Demonstrative Science such as is Weighed or
Measured," a view subsequently echoed by Wordsworth: "How insecure, how baseless
in itself, / Is the Philosophy whose sway depends / On mere material instruments." Not
quite so clear, however, is the relation between these pre-eminent Romantic poets and the
Romantic scientific paradigm emerging at the turn of the nineteenth century. Both in its
mainstream version, which would become modern scientific praxis, and in its most
extreme variant, the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, Oken, et al., Romantic science
differed from its Enlightenment predecessor by positing organic metaphors over
mechanical ones, a conception of nature as process rather than product, and a historicist
rather than ahistorical view of the universe. Given this orientation, a question emerges:
Why did the first wave of English Romantic poets, Blake and Wordsworth particularly,
fail to embrace the new Romantic science as an alternative to Enlightenment science
when so many of its aspects seemed to harmonize with their personal politics and sense
of aesthetics-at least, as these beliefs are articulated in their works? Why, in fact, does
it appear that they pointedly rejected it?
Romantic science resonated with the "Spirit of the Age," but within its view of a
dynamic, evolving, and boundless universe-and the redefinition of materialism that this
view engendered-were philosophical propositions even more dangerous to these poets
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than those within its Enlightenment counterpart. What is more, there is reason to believe
that these poets had a clear sense, arrived at by the differing philosophic approaches that
defined them, where this particular scientific revolution might be headed in the century to
come-toward the production of a culture wherein science would be irrevocably
dominant, spiritual endeavors discredited, and poetry marginalized.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Science and the Spirit of the Age

The reaction of the first wave of English Romantic poets to the Enlightenment
scientific establishment is, by this time, quite clear. 1 As Blake once noted, "All that is
Valuable in Knowledge is / Superior to Demonstrative Science such as is Weighed or
Measured," a view subsequently echoed by Wordsworth: "How insecure, how baseless
in itself, / Is the Philosophy whose sway depends / On mere material instruments.,,2 Less
clear, however, is the relation between these poets and the Romantic scientific paradigm
emerging at the turn of the nineteenth century. Both in its mainstream version, which
would become modern scientific praxis, and in its most extreme variant, the
Naturphilosophie of Schelling, Oken, et al., Romantic science differed from its

Enlightenment predecessor by positing organic metaphors over mechanical ones, a
conception of nature as process rather than product, and a historicist rather than
ahistorical view of the universe. Given this orientation, a question emerges: Why did the
first wave of English Romantic poets, Blake and Wordsworth particularly, fail to embrace
the new Romantic scientific paradigm as an alternative to Enlightenment science when so
many of its aspects seemed to harmonize with their personal politics and sense of

I Since the divide between Enlightenment science and Romantic poetry is often characterized as an
ideological one, it might be useful here to define "ideology" for the purposes of this study. The defmition
advanced by Michael Ferber in The Social Vision o/William Blake is as good as any- namely, "a set of
related ideas, images, and values more or less distorted from the 'truth' ... through the impact on it of the
material interests, conscious or unconscious, of those who believe and propagate it, insofar as they are
divided from one another in classes with conflicting interests" (10).
2 Blake's annotations to The Works o/Sir Joshua Reynolds (Ed. Edmond Malone. London, 1798),209;
E659. Wordsworth's The Excursion 8.223-25.
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aesthetics-at least, as these beliefs are articulated in their works? Why did they, in fact,
by all appearances, pointedly reject this alternative?
In the last three decades, a number of scholars, among them Marilyn Gaull and
Donald Ault, have established analyses of the complex reactions of these poets to the
science of their day. Building upon the works of these analysts, this study will examine
the view that, by preserving the old system as foil rather than embracing the
revolutionary alternative, the position of these poets amounts in practical terms to the
maintenance of an opponent philosophy ofchoice-with Blake and Wordsworth, whether
consciously or not, serving in the role of loyal opposition to the Enlightenment scientific
paradigm they so vocally resist. Romantic science resonated with the "Spirit of the Age,"
but within its view of a dynamic, evolving, and boundless universe were, I will argue,
philosophical propositions even more dangerous to these poets than those within its
Enlightenment counterpart.
Marilyn Gaull, in her groundbreaking 1990 essay "Under Romantic Skies,,,3
addresses Blake and Wordsworth's response toward not only the established
Enlightenment scientific worldview, but also toward the new, philosophically distinct
strain of science emerging at the close of the eighteenth century. "During this period,"
Gaull writes, "sciences such as biology, astronomy, geology, and physics were revealing
a world so novel, a world so alien in its departure from traditional concepts of space,
matter, and time, that artists, writers, even the scientists themselves ... had considerable
trouble dealing with them" (34-35). But despite being presented with a compelling

3

The Wordsworth Circle 21.1 (1990) 34-41.
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alternative to the Enlightenment scientific paradigm, important figures in the first wave
of English Romanticism continued to support the established view, in particular its
depiction of the universe as an orderly and unchanging entity, finite in time and space,
and ultimately knowable, a view in direct conflict with the unfolding model-a model
informed by the tenets of what we would now call Romanticism4 -which proposed a
dynamic and evolving universe, one depthless in time and space, and eloquently
suggestive of the limits of human knowledge-a universe, as Gaull notes, "that
aesthetically would have won the hearts of those who cultivated the sublime" (36).
While these poets did relentlessly question the Enlightenment scientific
establishment in their works-and in large part shape its eventual popular perception by
their attacks-they also continued to affirm (and at times exaggerate) Enlightenment
science's pervasive cultural influence, maintaining it, as it were, as an opponent
philosophy against which they might define themselves-in short, presenting the old
regime as the face of all science when there was plentiful evidence that the face of
science was changing. But despite the rhetorical resistance directed toward the old
science-which with varying degrees of critical accuracy has traditionally been labeled
the "Newtonian" worldview-perhaps more actively worrisome for Blake and
Wordsworth were the intimations of the new science emerging-"Romantic" in character
and yielding, by its revealed tenets, a materialist philosophy that encompassed infinity
and eternity. It was precisely this redefinition of materialism, I would argue, that threw
Romantic science into collision with the simultaneously emerging institution that was
I would argue here for the most expansive use of the term "Romanticism" and not the set of descriptive
characters derived from Romantic creative literature alone.

4
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English Romantic poetry.
In a variety of its fundamental aspects-its transformative possibilities, its
historicism, and its acknowledgement of the inevitability of change-there was much to
recommend the Romantic scientific paradigm to the Romantic poetic sensibility. But this
was a revolution largely without partisans in poetic circles-again, at least among the
first wave of English Romantics. Following the work of Marilyn Gaull, I will argue in
this study that this omission suggests a deep philosophical resistance on the part of Blake,
Wordsworth, and their poetic contemporaries. It takes some critical reorientation to
reconcile how an otherwise open-minded, learned, and scientifically inclined individual
such as Coleridge could have been so resistant to the new science as to describe it as
"revolting" in its dissimilarity to "all our other experiences of nature" 5 ; nonetheless, this
study will present the argument that Romantic science represented an alternative "Spirit
of the Age" that the first wave of English Romantic poets consciously turned away from,
not only on philosophical grounds, but also because of pragmatic issues of exigency, their
professional rationale being that if any cultural entity were to depose the Enlightenment
scientific establishment-which, by their efforts, they had succeeded in defining as a
monument of rigidity, limitation, and oppression-then that entity should be Romantic
poetry, not another form of science that could conceivably become just as troublesome as
its predecessor.
In Visionary Physics, the landmark 1974 study which ushered in the current age
of Romantic literature and science studies, Donald Ault identifies precisely what was at
Levere, Poetry Realized 14l. Coleridge was referring in particular to Kant's nebular hypothesis of cosmic
origins.
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stake in the aforementioned cultural contest-that being nothing less than which
interpretive strategy would emerge as the authoritative "arbiter between contending world
systems ... as the mediator to which all disputes about system [would] be referred" (24).
In its analysis of this contest, this study will aim to tie together the work of leading
scholars on this question, such as Gaull and Ault, and then take the next step. Gaull, for
her part, suggests the central question regarding Blake and Wordsworth's response to
science, but-since it lies just outside the range of her thesis-does not answer it. 6 Ault
answers the question, but only in regard to physics and only for Blake. This study will
attempt to broaden the discussion to areas of the natural sciences left untouched by both
critics.
In its attempt to move beyond the innovative groundwork laid by these two
analysts, this study will draw upon the works and arguments of a host of researchers
within the field of science history and the philosophy of science, as well as literature and
science studies. Ernst Mayr's exhaustive analysis of science's history will help trace the
development of the discipline both before and after its critical juncture in Europe at the
turn of the nineteenth century, with a particular emphasis on the paradigm split unfolding
at that time. Thomas Kuhn will be recruited to provide additional insight into the change
of paradigms identified by Mayr, particularly in regard to the parallels between political
and scientific revolutions. Scholars within the field of eighteenth-century studies,

6 Gaull's thesis holds that, as analogical thinkers, the first wave of Romantic poets were unable to embrace
the evolutionary model of cosmology because it defied their attempts at analogy. Gaull's argument is well
supported and perfectly valid, but there are other equally tenable arguments. I would suggest that these
poets' rejection of concepts revealed by the new science had its grounds more in threats to their
philosophical positions than in their preferences regarding conceptual structures-that is, it was more about
matters of ideology than analogy.
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including Roy Porter and Lorraine Daston, will assist in this study's attempts to
complicate the depiction of Enlightenment science beyond the usual monolithic
stereotype established by the Romantic poets and perpetuated by later literary analysts;
these critics, I would note, at the same time will help legitimize the employment of
"Enlightenment science" as a contrasting entity to both Romantic poetry and Romantic
science once that necessary complexity has been acknowledged.
The work that Mark Lussier has done on the interface of Romanticism and the
physical sciences supports the central argument that a change was underway in the
sciences during the Romantic era, a change that Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas
Jardine argue has been largely written out of science history. Even though Cunningham
and Jardine adhere to a definition of Romantic science as it is usually and limitedly
characterized-that is to say, to the German Naturphilosophie-their critical work in
support of its contribution is nevertheless indispensable. Hans Eichner, who shares a
similarly narrow view of Romantic science, will nonetheless aid in providing an analysis
of the character and longevity of Romanticism as a cultural movement broad enough to
reach to the sciences, including his influential views on the very different legacies
Romanticism has left behind in the humanities and the sciences.
As for insights into the works of the poetic figures at the heart of this study,
literary analysts such as Stuart Peterfreund and James Averill will advance a fresh
perspective on Blake's and Wordsworth's anti-materialist rhetoric and-regardless of
these poets' differing views on the subject-their shared objections to Enlightenment
science's approach to nature. Alan Bewell and John Wyatt, among others, will

6

meanwhile contribute analyses of the Romantic poetic reaction to the revolutionary
sciences of Blake and Wordsworth's time, particularly those scientific disciplines
fundamental to Romantic science's redefinition of the natural world. As with the
aforementioned contributions of Gaull and Ault, this study, in the course of its discussion,
will attempt to create a new critical vision that moves beyond the works of all of the
analysts mentioned, with the principal aim of shedding new light on old assumptions
regarding Romantic anti-scientism, as well as revising (by way of expanding) the
traditional perceptions of what constitutes scientific Romanticism.

The Two Cultures

In From Knowledge to Wisdom, Nicholas Maxwell observes: "It never occurred
to the 'philosophers' of the Enlightenment to divorce passionate concern for the inner life
of man from the imaginative and critical exploration of the natural world being
undertaken by natural science. Romanticism created this divorce" (265). The
representatives of Romanticism that Maxwell has in mind here, I presume, are the
Romantic poets, since in the view of Romantic scientists (the German Naturphilosophen,
in particular), science and poetry did not constitute culturally distinct and antagonistic
entities, but rather interrelated philosophies within a common culture. However, the
debate regarding the "two cultures" of literature and science, the subject of C. P. Snow's
famous essay/ does bear directly upon the times in which Blake and Wordsworth wrote.
It may be considered particularly relevant to Wordsworth's experience in that he is
7 Snow's original essay appeared in New Statesman, 6 October 1956. It was elaborated upon in The Two
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge UP, 1959.
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-frequently cited in literature and science studies as a founding influence on the concept as
Snow frames it. But despite these associations, we do not find in W ordsworth
specifically, in the views he expresses in the 1802 Preface to Lyrical Ballads-the origin
of the two cultures concept; instead, the poet simply confirms the existing tensions
between the two camps. The best evidence for this assertion lies in the text of the Preface
itself. First of all, in terms of the rhetoric employed, Wordsworth does not approach the
discussed division between science and poetry as an idea that needs to be in any way
demonstrated to his astute reader; its presence is just assumed. Secondly, Wordsworth's
tone in the Preface is-ostensibly, at least--one of reconciliation between the two
factions, suggesting, once again, not only an existing split but one that has been around
long enough to require mediation. 8
While there is broad, but not universal, agreement that such a split occurred at
some point, opinions on the timing of its appearance, and whether it was ever as dire as
Snow characterizes it, range widely. William Powell Jones, in The Rhetoric a/Science,
observes that the "conflict between the visionary power of the artist and the analytical
method of the scientist did not exist ... in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, when poets greeted the advancement of Science with enthusiasm" (1).
According to Mark Greenburg, "the rift between science and literature" predates the
arrival of the Romantics, having its origins "in the early decades of the eighteenth

At the same time, it is clear from Wordsworth's tone that he considers himself to be sounding the alarm
for a cultural conflict not generally acknowledged at the time: "And if, in what I am about to say, it shall
appear to some that my labour is unnecessary, and that I am like a man fighting a battle without enemies, I
would remind such persons, that ... a practical faith in the opinions which I am wishing to establish is
almost unknown" (255). All citations from the Preface to Lyrical Ballads in this study are drawn from the
Brett and Jones edition (New York: Routledge, 1991).
8

8

century" ("Scientific Discovery" 116). Then there is Thomas Hankins' observation, in
Science and the Enlightenment, that "[b]y the nineteenth century the separation of science

from literature was almost complete" (8). Thus far, the range of opinions cited yields a
more or less clean timeline-with no split evident in 1700, the beginnings of a split
visible in the early 1700s, and the split complete by 1800. Science historian David
Knight, however, sees no split at all in 1800:
Around 1800 'science' was not opposed to 'arts'; there was nothing like
the 'Two Cultures' of C. P. Snow's famous essay. Indeed the then current
classification of subjects would have put engineering among the arts, a
useful rather than a fine art, while almost all other subj ects now taught in
university, such as chemistry, history and theology, would have been
sciences. The real division was between the realm of science, governed by
reason, and that of practice. ("Romanticism" 14)
If nonexistent in 1800, then what is the nature of the division that Wordsworth is
addressing? Knight offers no ready answer; while his essay repeatedly references
Coleridge and Davy, Wordsworth's name is conspicuously absent.
Finally, we have Snow's own somewhat vague opinions on the dating of the split.
Writing in 1959, the author identifies the separation as existent in 1900-"The two
cultures were already dangerously separate sixty years ago" (54)-and still growing-"I
believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into
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two polar groups" (46; emphasis added).9 Snow, for his part, is clearly more concerned
with the existence of the split than its dating. An advocate of cultural unity, he warns of
the danger inherent in creating opponent philosophies within culture. "The number 2 is a
very dangerous number," he writes, "that is why the dialectic is a dangerous process.
Attempts to divide anything in two ought to be regarded with much suspicion" (50).
Despite its apparent rejection of the Hegelian premise of progress through antithesiswhich is possible only through the dialectic-Snow's concept of the two cultures remains
useful for the insights it provides into culturally divisive entities and their creation of
opponent philosophies, though this does lead to some mixed conclusions regarding the
aims of Romantic poetry. For it was the anti-scientific rhetoric of the first wave of
English Romantic poets-with its characterization of an untenable scientific regime in
opposition to a restorative and liberating poetic alternative-that most strenuously
attempted and perhaps succeeded in codifying a division such as the one Snow describes
and Wordsworth's Preface ostensibly mediates.
One of science's principal appeals has always been its efficacy-its ability, when
applied, to yield practical material benefits; it has long been an appeal with the potential
to displace Western culture's reliance on other interpretive strategies. A response was
required from the arts, and it was the first wave of English Romantic poets who pioneered

Snow's thesis holds that, in the final analysis, both the sciences and the humanities suffer from limited
perspective, which might be summarized as the laboratory versus the ivory tower, with each having a
distorted view of the other. But despite all of their potential contentiousness, the two cultures, in Snow's
view, do not represent worlds in collision. That, he notes, would be interesting. Rather, they are worlds
drifting apart: "The clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures-of two galaxies, so far as
that goes-ought to produce creative chances. In the history of mental activity that has been where some of
the break-throughs came. The chances are there now. But they are there, as it were, in a vacuum, because
those in the two cultures can't talk to each other" (54).

9
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the critique of science as dehumanizing, an attack facilitated by Enlightenment science's
embrace of the mechanist metaphor. The Romantic resistance to this metaphor,
articulated by its chief poets, was unequivocal, on both human and artistic grounds
Blake's assertion that "A Machine is not a Man nor a Work of Art it is Destructive of
Humanity & of Art"JO-as well as spiritual grounds-Wordsworth's denunciation of
"presumptuous thoughts that would assign / Mechanic laws to agency divine."JJ The
charge of dehumanization was an amazingly effective claim rhetorically, one that the
discipline finds itself pressed to answer to this day. "[N]o other species does science as
much or as well as we," Carl Sagan writes in the polemically entitled The DemonHaunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, "How then can science be

'dehumanizing'?" (268). To counter the view of science as a soulless occupation, its
partisans frequently attempt to communicate the "romance" of the enterprise-their
efforts usually taking the form of sentimental paeans to its spirit of discovery, the simple
elegance of the reductionist view, and so on. Consider, for example, this excerpt from
Lewis Thomas's hugely popular Lives ofa Cell from 1974, on the topic of science as a
social enterprise:
It sometimes looks like a lonely activity, but it is as much the opposite of

lonely as human behavior can be. There is nothing so social, so
communal, so interdependent. An active field of science is like an
immense intellectual anthill; the individual almost vanishes into the mass

10
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Public Address (N39; E575).
"The Cave of Staffa: After the Crowd Had Departed" (2-3).
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of minds tumbling over each other, carrying information from place to
place. (101)
It does not require a skilled rhetorician to realize that the anthill, with its associations of

hive mentality, is precisely the wrong metaphor here, with Thomas subverting his own
argument by seconding Wordsworth's view of science as an activity that inclines the vital
individual toward anti-Romantic anonymity. 12

Romanticism's Span

The relation between Enlightenment science and Romantic poetry, at least as it is
represented by the Romantic first wave, ironically assumed the form of a scientific
model-namely, that of geo-magnetic poles. 13 The advent of Romantic science,
however, disrupted this model. It did so by undermining the characterization of science
advanced by these poets, thus throwing into question the very concept of cultural poles.
Before we will be able to define what constitutes the disruptive entity that is Romantic
science, and decide whether what is advanced here and elsewhere as Romantic science
actually belongs under the Romantic rubric, we must first address the larger question of
what defines Romanticism-an undertaking I approach in this study with the clear-eyed
understanding of the unlikelihood of complete success. In the past, such efforts at

12 Even for those whose model of the human is defmed communally rather than individually, the concept of
a group mind, with one's individuality subsumed, is still worrisome. In the 1802 Preface to Lyrical
Ballads, Wordsworth explicitly contrasts the "Man of Science" with the figure of "the Poet," the latter
being characterized as "a man pleased with his own passions and volitions" rather than those of the
collective (255-56).
13 Snow picks up on this same model when he writes, "[T]he whole of western society is increasingly being
split into two polar groups" (46).
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definition have traditionally begun-and been most contentious-in regard to literary
Romanticism, so let us begin there.
Once proposed as a movement, or even more daringly (and datedly) as a "school"
of poetic practice, literary Romanticism now requires statements of support simply to
underwrite consideration of its very existence. As early as 1924, we have Arthur
Lovejoy's argument that "the word 'romantic' has come to mean so many things that, by
itself, it means nothing," 14 a view he expanded upon in 1941 when he observed that the
"new ideas of the period were in large part heterogeneous, logically independent, and
sometimes essentially antithetic to one another in their implications." 15 The discussion in
academic circles as a result became one of "Romanticisms." Contemporary critics are no
less skeptical. As John Wyatt notes, "both 'Romanticism' and 'science' are themselves
modern constructs, largely built by those who wrote in the years after the very active
decades of cultural innovation between 1770 and 1850 (the period of Wordsworth's life)"
(4), a view supported by Marilyn Butler in Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries when
she writes that "Romanticism, in the full rich sense in which we know it, is a posthumous
movement; something different was experienced at the time" (2).
There have been dissenting voices, however: Lovejoy's argument was most
famously taken to task by Rene Wellek in "Romanticism Re-Examined," an essay
included within both the author's Concepts o/Criticism (1963) and the anthology

Romanticism Reconsidered (1963), wherein editor Northrop Frye notably gives Wellek
the last word. "I would not be understood as minimizing or ignoring national differences

14

15

"On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," PMLA 39 (1924): 232.
"The Meaning of Romanticism for the History of Ideas," Journal ofthe History ofIdeas 2 (1941): 26l.
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or forgetting that great artists created something unique and individual," Wellek
acknowledges within the course of an argument wherein he traces "the history of the
terms 'Romantic' and 'Romanticism' in order to show the large measure of agreement
about their meaning during the age in all countries," arguing that "even without the use of
the terms the consciousness of a specific change was universal at that time" (133, 108).16
Beyond Wellek's influential rebuttal, a more general and practical affirmation lies in the
fact that, even in the twenty-first century, leading scholars continue to speak unironically
about the "Romantic Period" and "Romanticism."
Thus, despite the challenges, a case can and continues to be made for the
existence of Romanticism as a break from what preceded it. But even granting that our
present perceptions of the period actually map onto something existent at the time, these
perceptions need to be qualified and informed by current critical insights. First and
foremost, as Jerome McGann reminds us in The Romantic Ideology, we must be on guard
against "an uncritical absorption [of] Romanticism's own self-representations"(1)17-in
other words, we must be conscious of Romanticism as an ideology subtly attempting to
impose its assumptions upon us. Similarly, we need to be attuned to the not-so-subtle
insights Romantic poetry occasionally offers into its own operations. For example,
Wordsworth, in closing the twelfth book of The Prelude, describes the moment he
received his charge to promote his poetic vision:
I seemed about this period to have sight

16 This change was characterized, Wellek argues, by the induction of "imagination, symbol, myth, and
organic nature ... as part of the great endeavor" (132).
17 It is interesting to note that McGann does not prohibit the absorption of Romanticism's self
representations, only that we not do so uncritically.
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Of a new world-a world, too, that was fit
To be transmitted and made visible
To other eyes, as having for its base
That whence our dignity originates,
That which both gives it being, and maintains
A balance, an ennobling interchange
Of action from within and from without:
The excellence, pure spirit, and best power,
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees.
(The Prelude 1805 12.370-79)

Never far from our awareness must be this Romantic notion of "participatory mind,"
whereby the human psyche "half-creates" the reality it perceives. With such an
awareness comes the realization that Blake and Wordsworth are in large part creating
their opponent ideology in their works-in this case, "Enlightenment science"-rather
than simply responding to it.

Romantic Science as a Romantic Entity

In that they share a common descriptor, we would assume that there is at least
some discernable overlap between the tenets of Romantic literature and Romantic
science, an overlap which might allow glimpses of the outline of Romanticism as a
general entity. And, indeed, the generally acknowledged characteristics of literary
Romanticism-which include emphases on the individual, the non-logical, the ordinary,
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and the natural-almost all have direct and significant parallels in Romantic science. 18
Literary Romanticism's orientation toward the individual and the subjective is mirrored
in Romantic science's challenges to the ideal of objectivity, particularly its highlighting
of the difficulties inherent in separating observation and explanation. The emphasis on
non-inferential reasoning as a supplement to logic dovetails with the new science's wideranging approach during the process of theory genesis, with its willingness to entertain
unconventional methods in pursuit of the resolution of persistent problems. The renewed
interest in the ordinary holds parallels with the anti-hierarchical aspects of Romantic
science, which cast aside the Great Chain of Being, replacing it with the proposition of
common descent among organisms, as well as its view of a universe probably not
specifically created with human beings in mind. Finally, literary Romanticism's focus on
a living nature 19 ties in with the new science's interest in natural processes as opposed to
just natural products, the emphasis being on organic development over static mechanical
cycles.
Because of the astounding endurance and popularity of Romantic poetryparticularly English Romantic poetry and the arguments it embodies-Romanticism
continues to be perceived as a largely anti-scientific institution. Even still, as I hope the
preceding section confirms, there exist points of commonality from which we might

18 I can think of only two exceptions: Fascination with the supernatural has no easy parallel, but it is
certainly enticing to speculate on its connections with Romantic science's acceptance of chaos and
unpredictability, as well as there being limits to human understanding. The tenet of "infinite striving,"
embodied by ambitions to knowledge, has no discernable expression in Romantic science, but it is
interesting that the most famous examples of this particular drive in Romantic literature tend to be men of
science-viz., the title characters of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and Goethe's Faust.
19 Regarding this element, Wordsworth is the exemplar; Blake, the most notably exception. This diversity
is one of the reasons this study has brought these two figures into critical conjunction.
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intimate the origins of these two differing expressions of Romanticism, origins with their
roots in the same cultural impulse.

Romantic Science as a Scientific Entity
Among its many related objectives, this study will attempt to confirm the stated
view of Romantic science as an entity conceptually distinct from the Enlightenment era
science that preceded it; it will then attempt to demonstrate how Romantic science
evidences characteristics consistent with what we now think of as modern scientific
theory and practice. But arguing that Enlightenment science and Romantic science differ
is not the same as arguing that the distinction between them is always immediately clear.
These two views of the natural world occupy a spectrum20 that Kuhn's theory of non
cumulative developmental episodes in science history serves to complicate but does not
negate. 21 There is doubtless going to be occasional ambiguity in regard to which
practitioners and works to assign to a particular tradition, and I advance the following list
with the caveat that such assignment is invariably subjective and provisional. Another
complicating consideration to be factored in is that many of the most important
innovations and discoveries within Romantic science came from visitors to the field
rather than from full-time residents such as the German Naturphilosophen. Indeed, the

For this argument, I choose the description of a spectrum (the distribution of a phenomenon) rather than a
continuum (an arbitrarily divided whole) for obvious reasons.
21 As for the fundamental question of what constitutes "science" itself: For the purposes of this study, our
working definition will be that science is a systematic approach to the study of the natural world,
incorporating investigative and analytical practices consistent with either of the aforementioned paradigms,
those practices being by turns rational, empirical, observational, experimental, generalizing, particularizing,
deductive, or inductive. This is admittedly a broad defmition, but it is one that acknowledges the
complexity and diversity of the field of human activity it hopes to describe.
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most important and enduring Romantic science was not performed by "Romantic
scientists" at all, but rather by practitioners within the eighteenth-century scientific
mainstream. In this light, Romantic science may be more properly seen as a kind of
scientific theory and practice that emerged from and existed in parallel with its
Enlightenment counterpart.
If one is to be at all credible in the advancement of such claims, then one must
name names. The following figures, in my view, represent the foundation of the
mainstream Romantic scientific paradigm, their works reflecting a radical new view of
the universe as organic, dynamic, transformative, chaotic, infinite, and timeless,22 a view
in direct opposition to the Enlightenment paradigm as it was popularly conceived.
In his Theory ofthe Earth (1795), James Hutton (1726-97) advanced a picture of
the world which conspicuously avoided any conjecture about its beginning or its end
"we find no vestige of a beginning-no prospect of an end," he wrote-effectively
separating geological science from Western theology.23 Hutton is an exemplary case of
the visiting contributor to Romantic science. Even though his view of an extended
geological past was fundamental to the evolutionary view of a slowly developing earth,
he personally subscribed to a theory of endless and mechanical geological cycles. Still,

I would distinguish between the allied terms "dynamic" and "trans formative" by characterizing changes
in conditions as the former and changes in entities as the latter.
23 In that the latter proposed defmed dates of creation and apocalypse coinciding with humanity's tenure on
this earth. Hutton's work suggested a world that had long pre-existed, and might persist long after, the
human race.
22
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the revolutionary concept of "deep time,,24 which he pioneered was contribution enough
to the new paradigm.
William Herschel (1738-1822) is another excellent example of a mainstream
scientist in service to the new paradigm. Because of both his Hanoverian patronage
under George III and his emphasis on observational over theoretical astronomy, Herschel
embodies many of our conceptions of a professional scientist of the Enlightenment era.
Yet in terms of his contri butions--clebunking the notion of fixed stars by proving that all
stars move, expanding the scale of the universe in size and age by estimates of light travel
times, and corroborating Kant's nebula hypothesis of cosmic genesis-he stands as one
of the most important contributors toward the verification of the Romantic theory of an
evolving cosmos unfolding within the context of deep time and space. It should also be
noted that when Herschel propounded these theories, he grounded them in exhaustive
observational research; thus his views on cosmological evolution had a weight they
would not have otherwise had for many colleagues. Perhaps more than any other figure,
Herschel demonstrates how the rigorous scientific methodologies of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries served to suggest, support, and eventually realize the tenets of what
would become mainstream Romantic science.
The views of chemist John Dalton (1766-1844) were fundamental in establishing
the essential materialism of this new universe of infinite time and space. Dalton's atomic

24 Coined by John McPhee in Basin and Range (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981) to describe
geological time scales. Paralleling the descriptor "deep space," it is meant to suggest a similar temporal
expanse. The term itself, of course, was not in use during the Romantic period, but the concept it frames
does originate from that time, thus its employment here.
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theory, first presented in a lecture to the Royal Institution in December 1803,25 also
incorporated the radical notion of the conservation of mass, which holds that matter-in
that it is neither created nor destroyed-is for all practical purposes eternal. 26 Within the
frame of this newly defined material universe, we may place the theories of Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804) and the Marquis Pierre Simon de Laplace (1749-1827), who
independently advanced slightly differing models of cosmological evolution. As Trevor
Levere notes:
Kant in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte [1755] assumed an initial even
distribution of individual atoms throughout space and invoked Newtonian
attractive forces to produce condensation of the atoms into stars, suns, and
planets.... Laplace's theory, presented in his Exposition du systeme du

monde (2 vols., Paris, 1796), is also evolutionary, but is limited to an
account of the solar system, postulating that the sun was originally a vast
nebula rotating slowly and contracting as it cooled by radiation. As it
contracted, it rotated faster, flinging off successive rings of matter in the
plane of its equator [, forming planets]. (Poetry Realized 142-43)
The Kant/Laplace nebular hypothesis is the cornerstone theory of Romantic cosmology,
presenting an evolutionary alternative directly challenging the steady-state universe of
Newton. In terms of science history, this is more than a little ironic in that Laplace had

They were further articulated in his New System alChemical Philosophy (1808).
In Jerusalem, Blake would appear to reject this alternative take on eternity, which poses a challenge to
the primacy of spiritual/imaginative eternity, when he attacks "Atomic Origins of Existence; denying
Eternity / By the Atheistical Epicurean Philosophy" (67.13; E220). Epicurean philosophy, here as
elsewhere, represents for Blake a perspective focused on material existence.
25
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been dutifully toiling away on the normal science 27 of the Newtonian paradigm when he
happened upon his entirely new and competing model; his researches and theories had
been the result of efforts to resolve Newton's stated concerns over cumulative
perturbations in planetary orbits eventually throwing the solar system into disorder.
Despite these intentions, Laplace embodies the first criterion Kuhn sets forth for
practitioners who initiate new paradigms in that the astronomer's attention had become
"intensely concentrated upon the crisis-provoking problem" facing the established
paradigm (144).
Shifting the emphasis from the evolving cosmos back to the evolving earth, I
would acknowledge other contributors such as Abraham Gottlob Werner (1750-1817),
the father of the neptunian theory of geology, and catastrophist Georges Cuvier (176Q
1832). Cuvier, working within a view of earth's geological history as measured in the
thousands of years, reasoned that only the timetable afforded by catastrophic events could
account for the earth's dramatic physical features. He was wrong on both counts, but
from the perspective of the emerging Romantic scientific paradigm, both he and Werner
are notable for their historical views of an earth shaped by a succession of events and
processes. As for insights into the historical processes of life on such a changing earth,
Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) and Jean Baptiste Larmarck (1744 -1829) were both on the
leading edge of the biology of their day, and both supported the belief that changes in the
environment (as revealed by the geological record) could induce changes in organisms,
even though they had no clue as to the actual mechanism. Erasmus Darwin, like his
As defined by Kuhn, the research conducted by practitioners within a given paradigm; it traditionally
serves to shore up the paradigm and expand its application.
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famous descendant, had a keen and abiding interest in the question of biological
origins-the difference being that what the grandfather entertained as intellectual
curiosity the grandson succeeded in structuring as workable science. Still, the elder
Darwin's speculations were not without their influence: In The Temple o/Nature (1803),
he offers a theory of evolution that clearly foreshadows that of his grandson, wherein he
attempts to demonstrate the relation of all living things as part of a family tree reaching
back to the origin of life itself:
Organic life beneath the shoreless waves
Was born and nurs'd in ocean's pearly caves;
First forms minute, unseen by spheric glass, .
Move on the mud, or pierce the watery mass;
These, as successive generations bloom,
New powers acquire and larger limbs assume;
Whence countless groups of vegetation spring,
And breathing realms of fin and feet and wing. (295-302)
Lamarck, meanwhile, is nearly (and unfairly) more famous for his errors-for example,
the theory that new characteristics can arise simply out of need-than for his general and
accurate insights into the fossil record's testament to the reality of species change.
Among the constituent elements of the revised view of nature proposed by the
Romantic scientific paradigm, it was biological evolution that would emerge as the most
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contentious as the nineteenth century unfolded, particularly for the Victorians?8 Spirited
debate continues over whether or not these notions, which reached fruition with the 1859
publication of Origin ofSpecies, had their genesis in Romantic science. Compelling
evidence by a number of contemporary scholars, to be examined in detail in Chapter
Two, suggests that it did and laments the lack of inquiry by intervening generations into
these connections. As Hermione de Almeida notes,
The Victorian period-and Victorian literature and culture- have always
had, certainly for obvious reasons, a large and ongoing body of
multidisciplinary work devoted to the subject of Darwinian evolutionary
theory. No such comparable inquiry or sustained interest exists for the
romantic era and its literature .... This is the case even though the subject
and speculations on evolutionary life by English and European natural
historians were at least as pertinent and significant to the culture of
romantic Britain and, though diffuse, far more varied and various, than
they were to Victorian Britain. ("Triumph of Life Sciences" 131)
De Almeida then proceeds to identify the probable cause for this discrepancy: "The
genius and originality of romantic evolutionists have not been recognized by the
generations of scholars who have followed them. Perhaps this is because of the
aggressive proselytizing of the Victorian Darwinians who looked to the historic past with
the intention of finding only Charles Darwin" (133). For these and other reasons, our
While notions of biological evolution were troubling to the Romantic poets, particularly as they extended
to the origins of our own species, such considerations were still somewhat nascent. More pressing for the
Romantic poets, I would argue, was the context that cosmological and biological evolution require- the
"unfathomable depths" (to use Herschel's phrase) of time and space that provided the innumerable venues
and unlimited calendar for evolution's operations- rather than the concept of evolution itself.
28
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present institutionalized history of Romanticism and its relations with science, whether
intentionally revisionist (as de Almeida suggests) or not, is incomplete and distorted. It
creates difficulties for the accurate analysis of history, both literary and scientific, but it is
not entirely surprising-not in a climate in which Romantic thought is so completely
identified with non-scientific ends that modem science has sought to distance itself from
that aspect of its origins, or where Romanticism, perhaps as a result, has come to be
considered almost exclusively a literary phenomenon. Redressing this received account
will be one of the principal aims of this study.
I would here again clarify the following: Romantic science as it is conceived in
this study is not scientific practice that simply happened to be temporally concurrent with
the Romantic movement. It is science informed-but not overwhelmed-by the
fundamental tenets of Romantic thought. This last distinction is important. I would also
strenuously reiterate that the German expression of Romantic science-Naturphilosophie
-is not synonymous with Romantic science; it is merely one manifestation of it. In
critical circles, this synecdoche has led to some persistent and pervasive generalizations.
In their place, I would propose a more nuanced set of characterizations for describing this
crucial shift in scientific perspective. To that end, in this study I will adhere to the
following nomenclature and would advocate its adoption in future studies: When
discussing the more important and enduring variation of scientific theory and practice
that the revolutionary new Romantic paradigm produced-incorporating the concepts of
organicism, deep time and space, and historical process-I would suggest the use of the
descriptor "mainstream Romantic science." When referring to the more offbeat and
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colorful continental variation that took those defining concepts to extremes, the term
"Naturphilosophie" is most appropriate. Finally, when referring to these two varieties'
common origins, or their shared principles, then and only then would I endorse the
generic descriptor "Romantic science."

Scientific Revolution and Its Political Parallels

To state it unequivocally, Romantic science as it is defined in this study-not the
science of the Enlightenment era-is the direct conceptual antecedent of contemporary
science. Further, Romantic science is not simply Enlightenment science with an infusion
of Romantic thought; there is a clear paradigmatic shift, along the lines outlined by
Thomas Kuhn in The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. In his influential and
controversial study of science history, Kuhn, drawing parallels between the political
realm and the scientific, notes that in "both political and scientific development the sense
of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution," adding that both
varieties are "inaugurated by a growing sense ... that existing institutions have ceased
adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment" (92). Since both species of
revolution seek to change existing institutions "in ways that those institutions themselves
prohibit," their success, Kuhn observes, "necessitates the partial relinquishment of one set
of institutions in favor of another, and in the interim, society is not fully governed by
institutions at all" (93). This is as good a description as any of the volatile times, both
politically and scientifically, in which Blake and Wordsworth wrote-a volatility that
yielded differing and defining responses from these poets, the character of which will be
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addressed in Chapters Three and Four.
I should note here, however, that some analysts have begun to question the longstanding political assumptions central to popular conceptions of the Romantic period,
particularly whether Romanticism can continue to be considered as aligned with
revolution. Marilyn Butler, for one, has written extensively on the complex differences
between political revolution and other forms (particularly literary) and has brought to
light the historical argument that identifies the French Revolution as an outgrowth of, not
a reaction to, the French Enlightenment. 29 As Butler notes,
The German writers who first called themselves Romantics were not
supporters of the French Revolution at all. They were, on the whole,
German patriots, who increasingly came to approve of the involvement of
the various German states in the war against republican France. . .. In
both France and England during these decades, it was the classical or
antique style that was commonly linked with republicanism. (4-5)
Interestingly, Butler concludes that "it is much easier to connect the first wave of
European Romanticism with the conservative cause than with radicalism" (Butler 5). We
must here, of course, be sensitive to the differing national strains of both Romanticism
and the Enlightenment, but, still, Butler's remarks are provocative in the parallel they
evoke with Blake and Wordsworth's seeming attachment to aspects of the established
scientific regime. Overall, however, none of this is enough to discount the fact that the
recognized tenets of English literary Romanticism, cited earlier in this chapter, almost all
These views are outlined in Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries, in which Butler's thesis concerns the
social context (versus the artistic isolation) of Romantic poetry.
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incorporate some aspect of radical change from the preceding eighteenth-century status
quo. 30
Ultimately, the status of scientific Romanticism as revolution or counter
revolution is as complicated as that of literary Romanticism, in part because, as history
teaches, the Romantic conception of the universe as an organic entity was not so much an
innovation as it was a return (with modifications) to the strictly classical view-a view
which Enlightenment science, in an earlier paradigm shift, had itself overthrown. As
Ernst Mayr writes, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
Greek concept of the universe as an organism (with a soul) was ...
replaced by that of the universe as a machine kept going by a set of laws.
The gradual acceptance of the new way of thinking [was] referred to as the
mechanization of the world picture .... [God] still was the first cause for
everything that exists, but subsequent to creation all natural processes
were regulated by 'secondary causes,' exemplified by general laws. (313)
In concluding this section of the introduction, I would argue that the characterization of
Romanticism in general-and Romantic science, specifically-as either revolution or
reaction is of less import than the resulting outcome of paradigm change. This is not to
say, however, that the political analogy thus far invoked should be undervalued. On the
contrary, in light of the analogy'S usefulness in conceptualizing social systems in change,
For example, literary Romanticism's subjective, first-person approach to the world countered the
preceding age's ideal of an objective, consensus view. Its interest in the ordinary constitutes an
unmistakably clear expression of the democratic impulse, as well as a response to entrenched notions of
hierarchy. The embrace of supernatural elements, with its gleeful subversion of natural laws, represents an
endorsement of the unorthodox, which is frequently decoded as a challenge to social norms. Its sense of
what has been called "infinite striving" represents a similar challenge to conventionally conceived notions
of social and human limits.
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this study will continue to follow Kuhn's lead in drawing parallels between the ongoing
scientific shift at the turn of the nineteenth century and concurrent events within the
political sphere,31 but it will strive to do so always with a clear understanding of the
limits of such an analogy.

Overview of Chapters within the Study
Setting the Context: Establishment of Scientific Culture at the Turn of the
Nineteenth Century (Chapter Two)
It is impossible to talk about Romanticism without reference to the

Enlightenment, particularly Enlightenment science. It is the contrasting context, the
historical foil against which any approach to conceptualizing Romanticism (in any of its
aspects) must take place. Unlike some analyses of the past, this study will attempt to
refrain from trying to fit all of eighteenth-century science into a tidy and unflattering
monolithic history. As an institution, Enlightenment science possessed an astonishing
range of diversity, which this chapter will attempt to reflect. A pressing question this
chapter will raise, and which the two chapters following it will attempt to answer, is:
Were Blake and Wordsworth at all guilty of misrepresentation in constructing their cases
against science (and in support of their own poetic programs) or were they faithfully
reproducing the institution as they understood it and experienced it?
One example: It could be convincingly argued that, as the idea of a steady-state world increasingly came
into question in both the political and natural sciences, the awareness of historical processes long associated
with politics was transferred to the scientific sphere. At that point, natural history became just that: not a
record of nature's tenure under timeless and universal laws, but rather an account of its developmental
episodes, with one set of temporal and local conditions yielding to another, a view we would today call the
historicism of nature.
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It is important to note that on the European continent questions of philosophy

between poets and scientists never became as contentious as they did in England. Indeed,
just across the channel, poets and scientists were finding great ideological agreement.
Continental Romantic science, dominated by German Naturphilosophie,32 facilitated this
not only by rejecting the mechanistic metaphors that it perceived as limiting the scientific
enterprise, but also by its emphasis on philosophical reasoning, particularly of the idealist
variety, as an avenue to knowledge. Creative forces were championed, and static matter
was subordinated, as dynamism became the organizing principle. This chapter will
examine in detail the arc of this most colorful expression of Romantic science, charting
its rapid rise and precipitous fall, and, most importantly, how by the intensity of the
dispute between its proponents and critics it has come to dominate popular conceptions of
scientific Romanticism.
The diversity of scientific and quasi-scientific beliefs competing for acceptance in
Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century was astonishing: mechanism and organicism,
creationism and evolutionism, catastrophism and uniformitarianism, to name but a few.
Many of these beliefs had deep and complex historical roots; others were just emerging.
Some were on the rise; some were in decline. All, however, were still operative and
advocated by some authority somewhere, and all informed the scientific debate of the
time, shaping the cultural landscape that Blake and Wordsworth inhabited as working
poets.

32 Indeed, Naturphilosophie, it is generally agreed, was conceived as a mediating envoy between the
sciences and the humanities.
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The Poet Chapters

One of the central questions that must be posed of this study regards its chosen
focus-namely, why Blake and Wordsworth? The answer is two-fold. For one, these
two figures make an interesting match in that they are not aligned in obvious ways.
In fact, together they represent the broad spectrum of English Romantic poetic practice,
both conceptually and stylistically. The second reason is that, by cross-referencing the
approaches of these two distinct representatives of English poetic Romanticism, one may
gain insights into the operations of the Romantic ideology as it engages an opponent
philosophy. Of particular interest to this study is the response of this ideology when its
opposing philosophy ceases to conform to the programmed model. Within their works,
these two poets appear to exhibit a nearly identical rejection of the emerging Romantic
scientific paradigm, yet this rejection in each case is arrived at independently and for a
different set of reasons.
In terms of its structure, each chapter dealing with a particular poet will include
four sections. One section, further divided into relevant sub-sections, will address the
poet's attitudes toward science in general. It will be in this section that I examine certain
critical misperceptions surrounding the poet on this topic. Specifically, this study will
attempt to explode as over-simple the binary thinking that all too often attempts to
promote these figures either as proto-scientists in their own right or as rigidly anti
scientific minds. Also within each chapter will be a section analyzing evidence of the
poet's awareness of the ongoing scientific revolution of the time, cross-referencing it
with its political equivalent, again with a critical eye toward the limitations always
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inherent in this type of analogy. Another section will deal with the specific reasons for
the poet's apparent rejection of the emerging Romantic scientific paradigm on
philosophical grounds-a rejection, I will argue, based on the "material objections" that
define that particular poet. A final section will address the poet's specific creative
response to all of the above, that response often focusing on a particular scientific field of
interest or concern.

Blake (Chapter Three)

This chapter will examine Blake's role in the Romantic poets' "loyal opposition"
to the Enlightenment scientific establishment. While the Enlightenment and Romantic
scientific paradigms were both unacceptable to Blake, the Enlightenment model was the
more established and more familiar adversary. It was also the weaker of the two
philosophically and aesthetically, and thus provided the better foil for his poetry. Within
this characterization exists a partial challenge to the usually unquestioned visionary
purity of the motives underlying Blake's poetic revolt. While avoiding the representation
of Blake as a self-serving poetic partisan, this study will advance the proposition that the
philosophical and aesthetic beliefs expressed in his works were almost certainly in part
dictated by his identity as a professional artist and poet.
The Enlightenment scientific paradigm, both mechanist and materialist, was
Blake's opponent philosophy of choice. Opposing it provided the foundation as well as
the exigency of the poetic program he pursued. The emerging entity of Romantic
science, I would argue, threatened to disrupt this program by its rejection of mechanism
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and its redefinition of materialism toward a view recognizing a physical universe
unbounded in time and space. Having painstakingly worked out his anti-materialist
argument, tracking the progression of the culturally poisonous concept from its origins in
religion to its apotheosis in science, Blake could hardly have welcomed the notion that
his view of limiting materialism might itself be limited, perhaps even unimaginative.
The works by Blake considered in this study will be those that most directly
address-usually in mythic form-the origins, motives, and consequences of science as a
human activity. These will range from early works such as There is No Natural Religion
(1788), for Blake's views on the stagnating effects of experimental science, to The
Marriage ojHeaven and Hell (1790-93), for his observations on both the cruelty of

biological nature and the divinity of life. America (1793) and Europe: A Prophecy
(1794) are also of interest: America for its various astronomical passages, including
Blake's vision of the origin of the solar system (in response to the theories of Kant and
others); Europe for Blake's additional exercises in astronomical imagery, along with
more observations on the cruelty of biological nature. The Book oJUrizen (1794) will be
examined for the embodiment of science that Blake presents within its title figure; The
Song ojLos (1795) for its vital glimpses into humanity's aforementioned downward slide

from materialist religion to materialist science. The most frequently analyzed works
within this chapter, however, will be the major prophetic books: The Four Zoas (1795
1804), for its elaborations on the inversion of internal and external experience and
Blake's provocative mentions of "sweet Science"; Milton (1804-08), for details of his
inverted model of the cosmos, as well as critiques on nature and natural religion, cause
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and effect, and vortices, capped with Blake's statement of the anti -science mission of the
poet; and Jerusalem (1804-20), for its extended rail against natural religion, the
importance of casting off "Demonstrative Science,,,33 and Blake's own views on
governing paradigms ("I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans,,34). A

Vision a/the Last Judgement (1810) provides a useful summary of Blake's views on the
material world. Outside of poetic sources, An Island in the Moon (1784-85) will be
considered for its light dramatic satire of scientific thinking and trendiness. Finally, this
study will draw upon Blake's letters and annotations to works within his personal library
for clarification and amplification of his views on a variety of topics.

Wordsworth (Chapter Four)
Wordsworth, even within his identity as a Romantic poet, manifests an early
affinity with the material world, evident in his appreciation of nature and his
acknowledgement of its ability to evoke a religious sense of awe. But the sublime-at
least, Wordsworth's conception of it-was pushed to the breaking point by the new
science's questioning of the necessity, and perhaps even the relevance, of the previously
essential element of the human observer. Wordsworth, like Blake, was possessed of a
deep philosophical commitment to the notion of material limits, a belief directly
contradicted by Romantic science's newly limitless material universe. Wordsworth's
resulting anxiety with the new view of the universe, 1 argue, is most prominently
manifested in his obsession with matters and metaphors of scale, an often-overlooked
33
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Jerusalem 12: 14.
Jerusalem 10:20-21.
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aspect of his work which this chapter will hope to foreground for the reader.
In examining the poet's aforementioned affinity with the natural world,
manifested in his oft-stated belief that the human mind and nature form a complementary
pair ("How exquisitely the individual Mind ... to the external World / Is fitted,,35), this
chapter will attempt to find balance between this view and the poet's equally longstanding sense of alienation from the physical realm and the role it plays in firing his
transcendental aspirations. These conflicts reach a resolution of sorts (but only of sorts)
in a series of epiphanies at various mountain locales in The Prelude,36 wherein the reader
shares in the poet's hard-won realization about nature and receives a glimpse into a
Romantic mind attempting to come to terms with the material versus the imaginative in
an intellectual landscape suddenly rendered unstable-in large part, I would argue, by the
new SCIence.
The works covered in this chapter will include the poems of Lyrical Ballads (in its
various editions) for insights into Wordsworth's views on the interaction of the active
senses and the participatory mind. Also examined within Lyrical Ballads will be the
Erasmus Darwin-influenced psychological case studies, such as "Goody Blake and Harry
Gill." The prose Preface to the 1802 edition will also figure prominently, with its
discussion of "What is a Poet?"-particularly as Wordsworth contrasts that social role
with the "Man of Science." Another prose work, the Guide to the Lakes Region (1810)
will prove revelatory in regard to Wordsworth's views on geological issues. Early works

"Home at Grasmere" (1800), lines 816-19.
Mont Blanc, Simplon Pass, and Mt. Snowdon (The Prelude 1805: 6.452-461,6.488-524, 13.10-119,
respectively).
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such as "The Ruined Cottage" (1798) and "Home at Grasmere" (1800), which later
reappear as elements of The Excursion (1814), will be explored in detail in that they
provide some of the poet's more provocative and often quoted views on the subject of
science, views often attributed to an older and more conservative Wordsworth. But
principally it will be the two turn-of-the-century incarnations of The Prelude-the Two
Part Prelude of 1799 and The Prelude of 1805 in Thirteen Books-that will inform this
chapter's analysis of Wordsworth's relations to the scientific enterprise. These early
versions of Wordsworth's landmark long poem, not incidentally, also benefit from the
expressiveness of the poet at the height of his creative powers.

Conclusion: Romanticism and the Philosophy of Science (Chapter Five)

In the framework I have proposed, Romantic poetry represents one model for
conceptualizing, evaluating, and-when necessary-resisting the role of science in
culture. By the time this study reaches its concluding chapter, the reader, it is fervently
hoped, will have a more detailed understanding of the Romantic poets' success or failure
in regard to this last point. Independent of this last point, however, yet just as intriguing
from the position of this study, are those first two less-emphasized points, concerning the
conceptualization and evaluation of science, because together they raise new and
provocative questions regarding the role that Blake, Wordsworth, and rest of the first
wave of English Romantic poets played as critics of science and the role that their
criticism played in the discipline's eventual self-redefinition. From this perspective,
Romantic poetry could be seen as serving a purpose akin to the philosophy ofscience
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that branch of the humanities providing useful critical analysis of the discipline from
outside the field. But Romantic poetry's role as philosophy of science is sometimes hard
to assess: the analysis of the subject it provides is so compromised by interdisciplinary
rivalry that it becomes difficult to separate Romantic poetry's ideological agenda from
what might be its unbiased social and cultural verdicts regarding science. The influence
Romanticism in general has had on the philosophy of science, however, is far clearer.
Indeed, it is the position of this study that there exist identifiable Romantic roots to at
least two of the key concepts that shaped the twentieth-century philosophy of science
debate: the institutional acceptance of limits to scientific knowledge and the
acknowledgement of the inexorably compromised nature of objectivity.

Romantic Science Studies in the Present Day

In the preface to a recent issue of Studies in Romanticism,37 issue editor Hermione
de Almeida acknowledges the problems inherent in the field of Romantic science studies:
"I had full and early warning of the problems of perception and reception that work in the
sciences of the period faced: it was under-recorded because scattered across several
disciplines, and it was marginalized because of the common presumption that science
was unromantic and therefore anathema to the period" (3). She goes on to note, however,
that "[s]cholarly work of the new century has done much to foster consciousness of the
importance of science in Romantic thought and culture" (3). I would here acknowledge
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the reciprocal influence of Romantic thought and culture on the emerging science of the
time.
Noah Heringman, editor of the anthology Romantic Science (2003), shares de
Almeida's concerns and optimism, finding numerous reasons to continue work in this
area of literature and science studies. "Such a project," he writes, "benefits from the
fruitful paradox implied by 'Romantic science' ... a paradox because hostility to science
is still a major feature of most popular definitions of Romanticism" (7). But despite
present critical perceptions that Romantic science presents such a paradox, fruitful or
otherwise, the awareness of the extent to which Romantic thought irrevocably impacted
our Western concepts of nature is at long last leading to the conclusion that it must have
similarly and permanently influenced our concepts of the scientific institution that studies
that nature.
As for how these concepts impacted the central figures of this study, William
Blake and William Wordsworth, it would be ideal if there were incontrovertible
documentary evidence regarding the views of these poets on the topic of Romantic
science vis-a-vis its Enlightenment counterpart, as well as its relations to the poetic
enterprise. The fact that their rhetoric toward science did not alter during this period of
great scientific change is one indicator, albeit a tacit one, that the new science held no
more appeal for them than did its predecessor. Then, of course, there is the countering
argument-to my knowledge almost entirely unsupported-that Blake and Wordsworth
neither knew nor cared about the scientific changes occurring during their years of poetic
production. It is an argument that subsequent chapters of this study will engage head on.
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Marilyn Gaull, for one, expresses skepticism toward such a view, suggesting that insights
into the new science were part of an available discourse that, "[g]iven the amazing
dissemination of scientific ideas in journals, periodicals, lectures, ... ordinary men and
women, as well as philosophers and scientists, were encountering" (English Romanticism
373). If these poets seem largely silent in regard to the epic cultural changes going on
around them-changes which, I would argue, they could scarcely have been unaware
ultimately it is within their poetry that they break this silence, providing indirect but
interpretable evidence of their views.
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Chapter Two
Setting the Context: Establishment of Scientific Culture at the Turn of the
Nineteenth Century

When the term "science" first entered the English language sometime in the
fourteenth century, it was understood to mean knowledge in general, but by the closing
decades of the eighteenth century that definition was well into the process of change. I
Blake and Wordsworth, along with the rest of their generation, were witnesses to this
change, clearly perceiving multiple contemporary meanings for "science" amid the
term's contraction to describe specialized and systematized areas of inquiry, as well as its
ongoing separation from "art." In differing ways and to differing degrees, both of these
poets work the ambiguity of the term during this transitional period. There exist within
the poetical works of each unmistakable instances where the archaic definition is
employed, usually somewhat wistfully, and other instances where the more narrow
meaning of natural science is clearly operative and almost universally negative in tone.
The term "natural philosophy," which arrived on the scene about a century after
"science," was long considered the more formal and flattering descriptor before it came
under fire as dated and inexact language. In the year 1834, Trevor Levere notes,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge "stood up in Cambridge to forbid the British Association for the
Advancement of Science the use of the word 'philosopher' to describe any student of the

I

All dates based on OED references.
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material world" (Poetry Realized 73).2 At the time, however, there was strong resistance
among those assembled to losing the cachet of philosophy and an open rejection of the
descriptor "science," which many perceived as marginalizing. "Whatever Coleridge ...
may have determined," John Wyatt observes, referencing the same episode in
Wordsworth and the Geologists, "men who dealt with material things saw themselves as
part of a unified high culture"(6). But before the nineteenth century was out, the change
from natural philosophy to natural science would be complete, the revised terminology
quietly adopted by both philosophers and scientists in a move to dispel any lingering
association of the discipline with the humanities. The resulting refashioning of "science"
had the effect of bequeathing an established title upon an upstart discipline-the reduced
and reductionist specialty suddenly becoming the namesake of "all knowledge." It is this
turn of events that Wordsworth addresses in the Addendum to "The Ruined Cottage"
(1798), as he acknowledges science's pretense (and present inadequacy) within the
context of a call for its reform:
Science then
Shall be a precious visitant; & then,
And only then be worthy of her name.
(42-44)3

If, as characterized in the introduction to this study, poetry and science may be
considered as differing and often competing interpretive strategies within a common

Levere draws from William Whewell's original account in the Quarterly Review 51 (1834).
"The Ruined Cottage, " Cornell Wordsworth, Ed. James Butler, 265. The passage cited was later
incorporated into Book 4 of The Excursion (1814), lines 1251-53.

2
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culture, as two distinct avenues of pursuing and receiving knowledge, then Blake and
Wordsworth, within their poetic works and within their identities as representatives of
poetry,4 make the case for a kind of knowledge obtainable by other than scientific means.
Their rejection of the worldview engendered by scientific activity is, as I have argued,
more complex than generally acknowledged, extending to not only the established
Enlightenment science of the day, as one would expect, but also to the emerging (and, by
most appearances, more ideologically appealing) alternative of Romantic science. To
explore the outlines of and reasons for this second rejection-which unfolds not only
within the context of poetic philosophy, but also of religious belief and secular scientific
practice-it will be necessary to define and contrast in detail the cultural entities that
were Enlightenment science and Romantic science.

Complicating Perceptions of Enlightenment Science
It is virtually impossible to characterize Romanticism, let alone praise it, without

criticizing the Enlightenment. One of the principal reasons that Enlightenment science
continues to receive a bad rap, Lorraine Daston argues convincingly, stems from a
present misunderstanding of the mindset of the times, attributable to Romantically
influenced biases regarding issues of imagination, facts, subjectivity, and independence.
Within the essay "Enlightenment Fears, Fears of Enlightenment," Daston sets out "to
explore what the Enlightenment was afraid of, and to contrast those fears to what we
On the topic of terms in transition, we must also acknowledge the status of "poetry" as a contracted
signifier. Once synonymous with all literature, even all art, it now occupies an interpretive range even
more tightly prescribed than that of "science." Frequently in the course of this study, the term must be
qualified and expanded from its contemporary defmition to meet Wordsworth's and Blake's view of it,
which could extend to any creative endeavor of the mind.

4
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currently fear about the Enlightenment" (116). In short, she argues that the
Enlightenment continues to represent for many the tyranny of science-particularly,
scientific facts. Such a view, Daston points out, errs in that it mischaracterizes the
Enlightenment's faith in such facts.
Contrary to the popular perception, Enlightenment thinkers, far from perceiving
facts as being unassailable, were instead consumed by an awareness of their fragility:
"No observer was immune to the blandishments of the imagination; hence no natural fact
could be trusted implicitly" (Daston 120). Such revelations were of no great concern to
the Romantics, Daston continues, in that from their perspective "[f]acts are only trivially
true" in the first place-"inadequate to create beauty in art, inadequate to instill virtue in
character, inadequate to give meaning to history" (124). The Enlightenment mentality,
however, could not get beyond this fear. 5 But because they were so fragile, facts were
simultaneously perceived as being incredibly precious; it was for this reason that the
Enlightenment revered them, lifting them up above all else. Enlightenment thinkers, as a
result, were ruled by facts-but it was a rule conferred by their own consent. It is
perhaps this crucial difference in sensibility between the eighteenth century and the
present that best explains the lingering sense of antipathy toward the Enlightenment in
some quarters.
If modern views of Enlightenment science continue to be shaped by Romantic
views on the subject, then the historical analysis of the root causes of the original
5 "[T]he errors that most terrified Enlightenment savants in theory and practice were errors of construction,
the fear of fashioning a world not reflected in sensation but made up by the imagination. . .. To be mad
was no longer, as it was in the seventeenth century, to suffer an excess of black bile, or to be possessed by
demons; it was to prefer a personal world of the imagination to the shared world of society" (Daston 118,
122).
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Romantic disaffection is certainly relevant and worth investigating. In the fourth volume
of The Cambridge History o/Science, Roy Porter identifies and reviews a number of
reasons for Enlightenment science's negative reception in Blake and Wordsworth's day.
First of all, there was the matter of its explosive rate of spread and its eventual spillover
into apparently unrelated disciplines. These episodes, which Porter sees as instances of
science's methods being appropriated by other fields, may well have been interpreted by
analysts of the time, such as the Romantic poets, as examples of imposition or
contamination. There was also, Porter notes, the issue of the Enlightenment not living up
to its promises or potential: "For the philosophes, scientific inquiry was the new broom
par excellence that would sweep mystifications and obscurantism aside, removing the
mumbo-jumbo of the Church and the 'feudal' ways that kept the masses poor, hungry,
and oppressed" (10). But despite its potential to liberate, Porter notes in a section
addressing the dark side of Enlightenment, "some of the most important recent work on
Enlightenment science has explored the recruitment of science as a disciplinary and
regulatory authority" (12).6 But by far the most prominent reason for Enlightenment
science's negative characterization within the pages of Romantic poetry lay in its
astounding success and ever-increasing power as a social and cultural entity. Indeed, as
Porter notes, the surest measure of science's authority is revealed
in the vehemence of the Romantic revolt against it. The antiscience satires
of the Augustan era-poking fun at virtuosi who peered down telescopes
and mistook flies for elephants on the moon-give the impression that,
6 Foucault, in particular, has analyzed "the role played by scientific rationality in creating new regimes and
technologies of power, often for the management of popUlations and environments" (Porter 12).
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around 1700, humanists still hardly discerned a scientific 'threat.' . .. In
stark contrast, there was something quite new in the venom of William
Blake, directed in the late eighteenth century at the infernal trinity of
Bacon, Locke, and Newton. (7)
Indeed, as George S. Rousseau observes, "Blake-the-phenomenon is unimaginable
without Enlightenment science" ("Science" 795).
Outside the skeptical assessments of Romantic poets, which, again, are not
altogether unexpected, eighteenth-century science does not always fare well even from
the standpoint of science history. Typically portrayed in
subdued tones ... [t]o most historians it lacks the heroic quality of what
came before-the martyrdom of Bruno, Galileo' s titanic clash with the
Vatican, the 'new astronomy' and 'new philosophy' of the 'scientific
revolution,' the sublime genius of a Descartes, Newton, or Leibniz ....
Given such judgments, it is not surprising that muted terms such as
'consolidation'? have come to mind for characterizing the natural sciences
in the eighteenth century. (1-2)
But the eighteenth century was an era of scientific innovation, as Porter continues: In the
physical sciences, "astro-physicists were ... making striking innovations-observational,
computational, theoretical. ... [C]onservation laws were developed that theorized the
cosmos in terms alien to the cosmology of divine intervention championed by Newton,
pointing toward Laplace's nebular hypothesis" (3-4). In biological circles,
A term which for science historians suggests the stagnation of Kuhnian "normal science," wherein
practitioners toil away within an established and often obsolete paradigm.
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[t]he first evolutionary theories were advanced, associated (obliquely)
with Buffon and (explicitly) with Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. It is not
crudely Whiggish or merely celebratory of the so-called 'forerunners of
[Charles] Darwin' to insist that theorists of life were finding that the static,
hierarchical, and Christian Chain of Being no longer possessed
explanatory power and that the living needed to be conceptualized within
a more dynamic framework and an extended timescale. (5-6)
It is not intended to subvert this acknowledgement of eighteenth-century innovation to

note that the majority of the crucial discoveries cited by Porter in his study-particularly
those serving to establish theories of cosmological and biological evolution-belong to
the late eighteenth century. I would similarly hope it does not seem paradoxical or
inconsistent for this study to argue that the Romantic scientific offshoot that eighteenth
century science gave rise to stands as compelling evidence of the latter's richness and
diversity. As a century, it was not without innovation-no one argues that anymore-but
at the same time, the rate, number, and character of those innovations were for a time
significantly bound by the established paradigm. All of these factors set the necessary
conditions for the changes that ensued.
Scientific culture at the turn of the nineteenth century remains a complex and
elusive context, a rich matrix of differing philosophical approaches. It was also, more
importantly, the setting for the transition from one paradigm of scientific theory and
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practice to another. 8 If, following Kuhn's model, scientific Romanticism can be
considered a reaction provoked by crisis-inducing elements within Enlightenment
science, it would be worthwhile at this point to back up the chronology and examine in
detail how the Enlightenment scientific paradigm-defined by its mechanist metaphorsbecame the eighteenth-century establishment that scientific Romanticism would
eventually challenge.

Mechanism as a Paradigm to Be Overthrown

The record suggests that the mechanist metaphors of Enlightenment science,
arising in the seventeenth century and consolidated in the eighteenth century, initially
attracted adherents largely because of their great explanatory power. There was a near
perfect fit between the machine as a model of natural systems and Bacon's call for a
knowable universe. As Steven Shapin writes,
Machines in general had a determinate structure: the materials and
motions required to make them, and to make them go, were knowable by
human beings and, in principle, specifiable. That is to say, machines were
accounted wholly intelligible . ... [T]here was nothing mysterious or

8

To reiterate the characterization of the two paradigms' views of nature:
Romantic Science
dynamic
transformative
chaotic
egalitarian
infmite
timeless
organic

Enlightenment Science
static
immutable
orderly
hierarchical
finite
temporal
mechanical
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magical, nothing unpredictable, nothing capricious about a machine.
(Revolution 36)
Mechanical metaphors were also seen as conducive to the production of an objective
perspective, which, as an epistemological approach, had considerable utility. Western
science, it is generally argued, benefited greatly from the distance between subject and
object provided by these metaphors and their view of nature as other. "Many Eastern
religions," Kenneth Miller notes, "take the view that reality is entirely subjective, and that
man can never truly separate himself from the nature he wishes to understand" (196).
Western natural philosophy had no such conceptual liabilities. Through the clear
explanatory lens of the mechanical model, nature was seen as a distinct and separate
entity, amenable to a reasoned approach from without, with no insurmountable barriers to
its knowability. Importantly, this view of nature as external object to humanity's subject
not only contributed to the productivity of the scientific enterprise, it also came to shape
science's mission as well-namely, to describe, explain, predict, and (whenever possible)
control the natural world-a mission easily aligned with existing Western religious
belief. 9 Indeed, in addition to its secular explanatory and epistemological appeals, the
theological aspects of the mechanical model proved compelling-particularly
mechanism's apparent support of the design argument. 10 "This clear evidence of
contrivance in the natural world," as Robert Boyle (1627-1691) once noted, is '" one of
the great motives' to religious belief' (Shapin, Revolution 143).

9

Genesis, for example, describes Adam's naming of the animals and his having dominion over nature.
"Design" here defined as "the relation between structure and function" (Shapin, Revolution 144).

10
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Eighteenth-century views on design in nature find their most famous expression
in the work of William Paley (1743-1805). Paley's Natural Theology (1802) begins with
the finding of a watch upon a heath, which prompts the author's logically derived
observation that, given that it had not always existed, "the watch must have had a maker:
that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or
artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who
comprehended its construction, and designed its use" (3).11 This opening statement is
followed by Paley's generalizing claim that "every indication of contrivance, every
manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature"
(17 -18). Readers of Paley's essay are then invited to conclude similarly that the various
elements of nature, like those of the watch, could not have come together by chance.
Though skillfully presented in a rhetorical sense, Paley's argument in support of
design offers nothing terribly new. More critically, it glosses over standing objections
raised decades earlier by David Hume (1711-76). To summarize Hume's objections: No
matter the evidence marshaled from the natural world, design arguments can "never
prove the existence of God, certainly not the existence of the Christian God with all his
moral attributes" (Luscombe 41). Hume questioned on logical grounds any evidentiary
approach to knowing God, particularly the design argument, which by the late 18th
century had a chorus of critics-from advocates of revealed religion to skeptics who
questioned the logic of its highly presumptive analogies. Despite the fact that Hume, in

II Even though he devotes the entirety of The Blind Watchmaker to debunking Paley's claims, Richard
Dawkins gives Paley his due, noting that while the theologian "gave the traditional religious answer to the
riddle ... he articulated it more clearly and convincingly than anybody had before" (4).
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the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, was able to concede that "the order of the
universe strikes us on occasion with enough force to support the design argument," that
argument in itself, he notes, does not support traditional Western religious faith "unless
we do the greatest violence to logic" (Price 143).

Origins of the EnlightenmentlRomantic Science Split
Despite its many compelling features, mechanism held hidden costs, both
theological and scientific, which the passage of time would reveal. Theologically, these
problems manifested themselves in the remote, uninvolved God implied by the
mechanical model of the universe. Scientifically, but still entangled with issues of
theology, were problems inherent in its view of a universe driven by natural laws,
problems which in time would trigger a split between physicists and naturalists (i.e.,
biologists). As Ernst Mayr notes:
The mechanization of the world picture caused a serious dilemma for the
devout. If he followed the claims of the physical scientist, he had to
assume that the world had been created at a single time and that at the
same time natural laws (' secondary causes ') had been established which
required only a minimal amount of divine intervention in subsequent
periods. . . . This interpretation fitted the phenomena of the physical
world reasonably well but was completely contradicted by the phenomena
of the living world. Here such a diversity of individual actions and
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interactions is observed that it becomes inconceivable to explain it by a
limited number of basic laws. (103)
As it turned out, however, these physicists' assumptions regarding the simplicity and
sufficiency of the mechanical model of the universe were overstated. One of the most
momentous developmental episodes within Enlightenment science, in fact, emerged out
of a rift in the mechanist camp between Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1 716) on just this issue.12 In regard to the operations of the
machine-universe, for Newton all questions of God's workmanship took a back seat to
observed facts and calculated problems:
In order to support ... the story of Genesis that the world was created in a
single act, [Newton] argued ... that the world is stable and has remained
unchanged since creation. But he could not prove this point, since he
admitted that, according to his theory, the gravitational pull among several
members of the solar system would tend to modify their orbits; hence ...
God in his providence must intervene from time to time to reset the
clockwork of the heavens. (Stecchini 93)
The famous correspondence between Leibniz and Newton's associate Samuel Clarke
(1675-1729) between the years 1715 and 1716 centers on this contentious issue of divine
intervention. As Ezio Vailati notes in his monograph on the subject:

12 The two also differed importantly on other questions that affected the direction of science: most notably,
Newton's championing of the causes of empiricism and inductive experimentation versus Leibniz's
predilection for the rationalist speculation and deductive hypotheses of traditional Cartesian philosophy.
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Leibniz thought that [Newton and] Clarke had tied God and nature too
closely, thus debasing the divinity. God's constant physical intervention
showed him [to be] a bad engineer. ... For [Newton and] Clarke, Leibniz
had separated God from nature ... too much ... in making God an

intelligentsia supramundana and nature a mechanism that never needs
rewinding. (10) 13
Interestingly, both sides in this debate felt that the other's position diminished God and
paved the way for atheism: Leibniz seeing Newton's scheme of a universe of disruptive
causal interactions requiring intervention as suggesting an incompetent creator, and
Newton seeing Leibniz's universe of independent parts functioning in preordained
harmony as yielding a remote and redundant one.
Though credited along with Rene Descartes (1596-1650) as one of the principal
architects of mechanism, Newton himself evidenced a profound awareness of the
mechanical model's shortcomings. 14 His de facto position as leader of the interventionist
camp, in itself, says a great deal about his doubts regarding mechanism's sufficiency.
Still, Newton's positions on the limits of mechanism-and of scientific knowledge in

13 Aside from questions of God's workmanship, there was another consideration wholly outside the spheres
of science or theology that might explain why some embraced or opposed a non-interventionist view of the
universe-namely, its political analogy. "The mechanical philosophy," Luscombe writes, "provided an
ordered picture of the universe, ruled by God through the mechanism oflaw, just as the sovereign ruled a
well-ordered kingdom, and without any need for the potentially destabilizing direct intervention of God at
every moment" (30). The inference that divine intervention is both undesirable and unnecessary is hard to
miss here, and it suggests the political volatility of this concept. Clarke and Newton, for their part, argued
that a good monarch is an actively involved monarch.
14 As Ault notes, "Newton placed himself squarely in opposition to the Cartesian 'mechanists,' who
assumed that the world was sufficiently stable not to require the constant intervention of God" (8).
Arguably, it was Descartes' dependence upon mechanical metaphors, with their assumptions regarding the
subject's predictability, that misled him into relying so heavily upon deductive speculation rather than
empiricism and experiment in the verification of his theories against natural phenomena.
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general-tend to be under-reported, even though the historical record on this matter is
fairly clear. "By the end of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth," Steven Shapin
writes, "Newton ... was expressing impatience at global philosophical attempts to give
mechanical explanations. Newton's reluctance to specify a mechanical cause for
gravitation" is perhaps the best example of this (Revolution 157). As Donald Ault
confirms, Newton "repeatedly said that he did not know the cause of gravity, or whether
that cause was material or 'immaterial"'(9). Further, Newton's doubts regarding
mechanism as an explanatory and epistemological model extended beyond his views on
gravity. As Shapin notes,
similar limits to mechanism also informed his treatments of, for example,
magnetism, electricity, and the phenomena of life.... If other
practitioners equated proper natural philosophy with the provision of
mechanical accounts, Newton here professed contentment with the
ultimate inscrutability of nature. (Revolution 157)
Newton's reservations regarding the mechanistic metaphors at the heart of the
Enlightenment science stemmed from problems with the paradigm that few except he had
the insight to see and which he personally resolved with the compromise of intervention.
It was a workable compromise for Newton, and for the many who followed his lead, but

it was one at odds with the fundamental appeal of a self-sufficient universe that had
established the concept of mechanism in the first place.
A collateral effect emerged from the rift between interventionists and non
interventionists, one which manifested itself within the expressions of scientized faith
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prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As mentioned earlier, questions
inherent in the mechanist view of a universe driven by natural laws exacerbated
differences in perspective between physicists and naturalists, eventually leading these
two groups to very different interpretations of nature. In The Growth ofBiological

Thought, Mayr further clarifies these differing perspectives: "The God who made laws at
the time of creation and then abdicated his authority, so to speak, in favor of secondary
laws was far more remote than the God of the naturalist, who left the imprint of his
design on every detail of living nature" (372). The divine but uninvolved creator Mayr
describes, embraced by practitioners within the physical sciences, became the
distinguishing characteristic of deist theology. "Deism," Mayr continues, "was-one
might say-almost a logical consequence of the development in physics. . . . The order
and harmony of the universe made the physical scientist search for laws, for wise
institutions in the running of the universe, installed by the creator" (372, 371)
Far and away the most culturally significant manifestation of natural religion,15
deism's scientific approach to faith was manifested in its theologically reductionist tenets,
which it maintained were derivable independent of any particular historical revelation.
These included, as summarized by Ian Barbour, "the existence of a Supreme Being, the
immortality of the soul, and the obligation to moral conduct" (21). While a large part of
deism's appeal was due to its "scientific" character, this same claim to scientific validity
also created liabilities as the eighteenth century wore on. Deism was particularly
vulnerable within the context of ongoing scientific discovery, in that its hands-off, self

15

"Natural religion," as it is defined in this study, refers to any evidentiary approach to faith.
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sufficient model of the universe required a "static, controlled, finished creation" (Miller
197). But by the close of the eighteenth century, such a view was becoming less and less
tenable, and in the nineteenth century, it would be overthrown completely. Once the
inevitability of change in natural systems was accepted, a troubling question arosenamely, who or what was actively directing this change and keeping it orderly? In time,
the system's own self-ordering, non-teleological drift would be identified and accepted,
but for a time this open question provided a strong arguing point for a competing faction
of natural religionists: the adherents of empirical theism. 16
As an alternative to deism, empirical theism had its own philosophical problems
with which to contend. Dedicated to the notion of discerning the hand of a traditionally
conceived creator l7 by a close study of his works, these researchers applied themselves to
a painstaking analysis of the "perfection" of the natural world. However, by the 1790s,
this close scrutiny began to raise unsettling questions, particularly in regard to the
extinction of scores of divinely crafted and adapted species, as well as some glaring
examples of less than optimal design in others. It could be said that empirical theism, just
like the Higher Criticism of the Victorian age, highlighted the problem with belief by
exhaustive study-namely, that inconsistencies and contradictions invisible to the casual
observer can in time become overwhelming when one focuses exclusively on the holy
"text"-in this case, nature.
While deism was the more widespread religious response to the Enlightenment

16 Hume, not surprisingly, was skeptical of both approaches, lumping the deists and empirical theists
together under the general heading of "empirical theologians."
17 In this respect, empirical theists demonstrated a much higher tolerance for revealed religion, which
further served to differentiate them from the deists.
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scientific enterprise, empirical theism stands as perhaps the more interesting from the
perspective of this study, particularly in regard to the elements it shares with what would
come to take shape as the Romantic scientific paradigm, raising the question of whether
empirical theism might be considered the direct lineal antecedent of Romantic science.
In that empirical theism, like deism, was locked into the view of a static, steady-state
universe of finite time and space-no, it was not, largely because it did not and could not
entertain the possibility of change on an evolutionary scale. It pondered the
imperfections and inconsistencies of creation, but it did not pursue alternative
explanations. However, in its belief in an active and immanent creator, its embrace of the
unpredictability of life (which opened the door to the organic metaphor), and in its
skepticism toward the sufficiency of secondary causes (natural laws ) in governing nature,
empirical theism does demonstrate interesting parallels with Romantic science and in all
likelihood did contribute conceptually to the new paradigm.

The Methodology Issue and Its Political Analogy

In The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn proposes that various
groundbreaking scientific innovations in the past have
served for a time implicitly to define the legitimate problems and methods
of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners. They were
able to do so because they shared two essential characteristics. Their
achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group
of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity.
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Simultaneously, [they were] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of
problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve. (10)
This passage, from the second chapter of the text, advances Kuhn's definition of a
"paradigm" within science. Evaluated against these criteria, one can say with confidence
that mechanism, as an element of the larger edifice of Enlightenment science, served
precisely this role during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Later in his study,
Kuhn advances his definition of what constitutes a "scientific revolution," describing
them as "those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is
replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (92).18 Kuhn's qualifier- ((or
in part "- is important, in that it explains why the landscape is not always completely

transformed after a shift in paradigm and why there may be lingering vestiges of the
previous regime. 19 But this scrupulous qualification can also be misleading. Mainstream
Romantic science, as defined by this study, is not simply Enlightenment science
redressed with a few organic touches. The two paradigms are incompatible views, the
discrimination of which is complicated by both their temporal concurrence at the turn of
the nineteenth century and by their sharing of the protocols of "the scientific method,"
that networked system of approaches which arose concurrent with-but were not peculiar
to-mechanist science, and which includes induction, empiricism, and experimentation.
To clarify a fine point regarding Kuhn's non-cumulative definition of scientific

18 In The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, Kuhn addresses the paradigm-shaking contributions of four
scientific practitioners central to this study's discussion: Hutton (15), Herschel (115-16), Dalton (130-35),
and Laplace (32).
19 One reason for this is that these vestiges may still have useful day-to-day applications as close
approximations . Newtonian physics, for example, though completely inadequate for a number of purposes,
is still regarded as accurate enough for use in architecture and engineering.
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revolutions, we are speaking here of the overthrow of reigning paradigms, not their
operational infrastructures. There is a difference, I would argue, between a paradigm's
ideology and its methodology. Thus, the methods that Romantic science inherited (and
not all of its offshoots embraced) should not be viewed as inextricably wedded to the
mechanist paradigm that they, for a time, faithfully served and supported. I insert the
qualifier "for a time" because, as history shows, it was these same methods that would
eventually reveal mechanism's inadequacies.

Scientific Romanticism
To review, the new science that emerged around the turn of the nineteenth century
differed from its Enlightenment predecessor first and foremost in regard to its organizing
central metaphor. In "any Romantic natural science," David M. Knight writes,
practitioners reject "mechanical metaphors in favour of organic ones" ("Romanticism"

14)?O Indeed, as Levere notes, "'mechanical' became the great polemical adjective of the
romantic movement in its contemplation of nature" (Poetry Realized 63). The change in
thinking that led to the ouster of the old mechanistic regime ushered in a new sense of
freedom and expanded possibilities within the sciences. Evidence of this new latitude is

There exists an ongoing debate about what meaning the term "organic" conveyed at the tum of the
nineteenth century. Alan Richardson, in British Romanticism and the Science ofthe Mind, is almost
assuredly correct in his assertion that organic at the time carried the meaning of "embodied" (5) or
"realized in bodily organs" (71)-in short, corporeal. It is an important historical distinction, but one
outside the objectives of this study. This study argues only that the character of the emerging science of the
time adheres to our present definitions of the term, not the Romantics' use of it. For the record, Richardson
himself employs the usual reading of the term (as a contrasting modifier to mechanistic) when he writes, "If
Romanticism involves promoting feeling and emotion at the expense of 'mere' reason, [and] preferring
organic to mechanistic theories of nature (including human nature) ... then the innovative brain science of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can usefully be thought of as Romantic" (Richardson 34
35).
20
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immediately apparent in regard to approaches to research. Within the paradigm of
Romantic science, the individual investigator's objective distance from nature was seen
to be a fiction. Humankind was no longer isolated from nature, able only to grasp its
mechanical functioning by mathematical equations (to use the Romantic poets' favored
caricature); it was now in intimate, subjective communication with nature through use of
the senses, reason, imagination, and intuition, and thus privy to inside information.
Within the "context of discovery," the phase in which scientific theories are born, all of
the above faculties now came into play. Within the "context ofjustification," meanwhile,
the phase in which these theories are actually tested, differences quickly became apparent
between the two principal variations of Romantic science identified within this studynamely, mainstream Romantic science and the German Naturphilosophie.

21

There is precedent, I would note, for drawing such distinctions within the broader
entity of Romantic science. Even though he advances a differing set of defining
characteristics, Robert J. Richards writes,
The kind of scientific perspective that emerged in Germany22 usually bears
variously the names Naturphilosophie and "Romantic science." I
distinguished the different sets of ideas traveling under these designations.

Naturphilosophie specifically focused on the organic core of nature, its
"[I]n the idiosyncratic process of inventing scientific theories, all methods are in principle admissible
deduction, induction, analogy, intuition and even hallucination-and the only real criterion is pragmatic.
On the other hand, the justification of theories must be rational" (Sokal 81). This spill-over of
methodology from the context of discovery to the context of justification would eventually emerge as one
of the primary factors leading to the demise of Naturphilosophie. (Note: Despite Sokal's status as persona
non grata in the circles of literary criticism following his infamous 1996 hoax involving the journal Social
Text, his views on the workings of science as a discipline, I would hope, may be considered apart from his
views on literary critics' (mis)use of that discipline.)
22 In this passage, Richards is addressing the period 1770 to 1830, spanning the intellectual communities of
lena, Weimar, Berlin, and Halle.
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archetypal structure, and its relationship to mind. . .. Friedrich Schlegel,
who coined the term romantisch, used it [(i.e., "Romantic")] to indicate a
specific kind of poetic and morally valued literature. I have used it to
distinguish a type of science that retains this aesthetic and moral heritage.
(516)23

Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, editors of the anthology Romanticism and the
Sciences, similarly acknowledge that Naturphilosophie and "Romantic science" are not
synonymous, defining the latter classification as a general heading that includes a wide
range of disciplines, among them:
Naturphilosophie, cosmology and cosmogony; developmental history of
the earth and its creatures; the new science of biology; investigations of
mental states, conscious and unconscious, normal and abnormal;
experimental disciplines concerned to unveil the hidden forces of natureelectricity, magnetism, galvanism and other life-forces; disciplines
concerned to read essences, inner natures and ideal types from outward
and visible appearances, signs and symptoms-physiognomy, phrenology,
meteorology, mineralogy, 'philosophical' anatomy, etc. (6)24

It was, in other words, a broad rubric, covering some of the most popular (if ephemeral)
"sciences" of the day.

23 Curiously enough, Richards makes Naturphilosophie the more inclusive entity of the two: "Thus, as I
have used the terms, all Romantic thinkers were Naturphilosophen, though not all Naturphilosophen were
Romantics" (516).
24 The period that Cunningham and Jardine are addressing in this passage is "[a ]round 1800" and spans the
cultures of continental Europe and Britain (1).
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The German Experiment

For all its charisma, Naturphilosophie is the evolutionary dead-end of the
Romantic science family tree. And within its rise and fall are lessons for any interpretive
strategy that would attempt to understand a mysterious cosmos. While it did re
invigorate the scientific enterprise, especially in the regard to the approaches allowed
during the process of theory formation, Naturphilosophie at the same time demanded
huge accommodations from the discipline it sought to revitalize. Describing the
repercussions of the arrival of German Romantic science to other areas of Europe, Sten
Lindroth observes that "the new intellectual climate ... was not in itself inimical to
natural science ... but it had to be pursued in accordance with certain rules of play....
Rational conclusions and exact calculations authorized no conclusions about physical
reality" (14).25 Indeed, as a species of natural philosophy anticipated by Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)26 but principally articulated by F. W. J. Schelling (1775
1854),27 Naturphilosophie proceeded with "gross simplifications and an uninhibited use

In his biography of chemist J ons Jacob Berzelius (1779-1848), Lindroth gives a compelling account of
the scene in the 1810s when Romanticism swept into Berzelius' native Sweden and of the chemist's
indecision regarding a proper institutional response: "This mysterious and beautiful gospel took hold of the
young like a revelation. . . . As long as it was confined to poetry and the fine arts, there was surely no
reason for a chemist to intervene. But Romanticism had totalitarian pretensions, it came with a new way of
experiencing and interpreting the world, and it sought to transform even the natural sciences" (13).
26 Hegel's role in the establishment of German Romantic science remains a topic oflively debate. As
Knight points out, Hegel "exalted the understanding at the expense of the intuition; he favoured
speculation, within limits. . .. [Still,] in Germany the reaction of [empirical] scientists ... against
Naturphilosophie must have produced a climate unfavourable to the systematic, speculative and dynamical
science of Hegel. ... [A]lthough Hegel is remarkably hard-headed, and critical of the 'unbridled
imagination and thoughtless reflection' to be found in Naturphilosophie, his science is, superficially at any
rate, not very different" ("Physical Sciences" 66-67).
27 Schelling's works on the subject include: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Nature (1797) (Ideas for a
philosophy of nature), Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der hoheren Physik zur Erklarung des
allgemeinen Organismus (1798) (On the world soul, a hypothesis of the higher physics for the clarification
of universal organicity), and Erster Entwurfeines Systems der N aturphilosophie (1799) (First sketch of a
system of nature philosophy). All title translations by Robert J. Richards in Romantic Conception, p. 127.
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of symbols, analogies, and images" (Lindroth 13-14). However, Naturphilosophie's
prescription for what it saw as the stagnant methodologies of Enlightenment science
proved to be a huge over-correction, lending support to what has been identified by some
analysts as one of the hallmark weaknesses of Romanticism-namely, its attempt "to
escape the dilemmas of [Enlightenment] mechanical philosophy by replacing all its basic
assumptions by the exact opposites" (Eichner 14).
Modes of instruction within the sciences at German universities in the late
eighteenth century certainly provided fertile ground for the rise of Naturphilosophie:
most learning at the time was book-centered, with virtually no laboratory or experimental
protocols required. Such a climate, particularly in Jena before 1800, was conducive to
deduction based upon hazy premises, which contrasted with the more rigorous inductive
and empirical model that the British had embraced since Newton. 28 But it was also
within the German academy that the backlash toward Naturphilosophie was most
pointed, coming principally from luminaries influenced by that self-same British
empirical tradition. As Cunningham and Jardine note, "In the course of the nineteenth
century strong opposition arose to the new Romantic approaches in the sciences
exemplified by Goethe's color theory 29 and the Nature Philosophy (Naturphilosophie) of
Schelling and his followers" (xix). What followed was a particularly contentious

As for the response it garnered in other parts of Europe: "The French," Levere notes, "were in general
quite as hostile to Naturphilosophie as the English were, and they were skeptical of discoveries inspired by
German philosophy" (69).
29 In the view of this study, Goethe's color theory is a particularly fascinating expression of scientific
Romanticism, neither quite mainstream Romantic science nor Naturphilosophie. Goethe held that color
was created at the boundaries of light and darkness, that colors were, in fact, a mixture of light and
darkness-an interaction mirroring that within the human soul. Despite his exhaustive empirical and
experimental verification, Goethe got it wrong, misled in part by the essential polar dynamism of Romantic
science but more crucially by his own spiritual metaphor.
28
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intellectual debate, with the rhetoric both in support of and against Naturphilosophie
becoming quite heated. John Reddick notes that the "polemical intensity of the battle can
be readily gauged from the scathing ... tone of [chemist] Justus von Liebig." Liebig,
Reddick writes,
attacked the Naturphilosophen and their doings as "the pestilence, the
Black Death, of the nineteenth century.,,30 Much later, Liebig pronounced
on Naturphilosophie in more moderate, but more devastating terms: "We
look back on German Naturphilosophie as though on a dead tree that bore
the most beautiful foliage and the most magnificent flowers-but no
fruit." (335)
In addition to attacks from without by hardline scientific empiricists, there were-as
alluded to earlier-a number of internal causes for Naturphilosophie's speedy demise.
Some of its elements, as Cunningham and Jardine observe, were "so solipsistic as to rule
out communal enterprise," others were "too speculative to allow attainment of
consensus," and others were simply "too esoteric to form disciplines" in the first place
(7). But a thorough post-failure analysis of Naturphilosophie, Reddick notes, reveals an
even more fundamental and systemic failing:
At its zaniest, Naturphilosophie [veered] towards a ludicrously absolute
and unproductive extreme. [But even] in its normal, median condition as a
classical mode of scientific inquiry enshrined in all the universities of the
land, its subordination of experiment to a priori ideology ensured that it
30 "Walpurgis-nightmare" was another of the epithets Liebig and his colleagues directed at
Naturphilosophie.
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could not survive against professional skepticism, the questioning
subjection of hypotheses to experimental testing. (335-36)
It was precisely this a priori orientation, along with its reliance on intuition and

speculation as tools in the verification of theories, that served to separate
Naturphilosophie from its more mainstream counterpart. The same could be said of its

strong resistance to analysis. In terms of its practice, Reddick concludes,
Naturphilosophie was almost invariably "deductive and integrative, never inductive and

atomistic: whereas the Baconian always starts with the part (and in the view of the
Naturphilosophen can never get beyond it), they begin with the whole-which indeed

they believe to be always immanent in every last particle" (334).
For the reasons cited above, the true importance of Naturphilosophie does not lie
so much in the legitimate scientific contributions made by its practitioners-though
multiple examples exist31 -but rather in how it boldly "extended the realm of the
thinkable" (Reddick 336)-its willingness to pursue unconventional avenues, particularly
at points of impasse. But despite this considerable contribution, the most important and
enduring innovations within Romantic science, without argument, came from other
practitioners who explored the new paradigm with the established methods inherited from
Enlightenment science-in other words, within the context of Romantic science as a

As Eichner notes, "There were researchers in the Romantic tradition who did make important
discoveries.... J. W. Ritter, one of the great pioneers of electrochemistry and the first experimenter to
succeed in separately collecting the hydrogen and oxygen produced by electrolysis, owed his discovery of
ultraviolet light directly to Schelling's supposed 'law of polarity,' from which he concluded, after hearing
of Herschel's discovery of infrared light, that there must be a similar phenomenon at the other end of the
spectrum. Similarly, H. C. Oersted succeeded in demonstrating the connection between electricity and
magnetism, after many years of experimentation, because he was convinced by Schellingian speculations
that such a connection must exist" (23-24).
31
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mainstream practice.

The Missed Opportunities of Naturphilosophie
Given its ahistorical orientation, an orientation rooted within its acceptance of an
unchanging mechanistic universe,32 Enlightenment science concerned itself primarily
with observable phenomena, leaving the issue of origins to theology and metaphysics.
Practitioners of Romantic science found this approach limiting. Inspired by the organic
metaphor, and applying it broadly, they avidly pursued the ancient origin and subsequent
development of systems both animate and inanimate. Naturphilosophie took the lead in
this endeavor. Indeed, as a subspecies of Romantic science, it was in large part defined
by its quest for the Ur-phenomenon. Some analysts might argue that this belief in "the
idea of a single, progressive developmental tendency in nature culminating in human
complexity" could be construed as decidedly anti-Romantic in its reductionist character
(Jahn 82), but adherents of Naturphilosophie would have flatly rejected this charge,
seeing such change instead as a transcendental and decidedly spiritual approach to the
question of life's origins. If spiritual, Naturphilosophie's take on original forms was also
classically philosophical. As Knight observes, "To see the Ur-plant in the rose or the
daisy is akin to seeing the 'form' of something in Plato's ... philosophy"
("Romanticism" 16). But having stumbled upon their one great, enduring discovery, the
concept that would make all of science a unified endeavor-namely, evolution-the

This widely held belief in an unchanging universe is another example of Leibniz' s influence, for if this
were the "best of all possible worlds," as Leibniz famously argued, then any change would be for the
worse, which a benevolent God would disallow.
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Naturphilosophen let this innovation languish, apparently more interested in the

philosophy than in the science. They were, as Knight concludes, "not in the business of
genealogy, [or] constructing family trees, but [in] searching for natural kinds"
("Romanticism" 16).
Despite this emphasis, Schelling did break with Platonic tradition in a useful way
with his evolutionary premise of werden. 33 As Hans Eichner explains,
Western thinkers had taken for granted that whatever is 'lower' or further
from perfection must have been created by, or emanated from, something
'higher' or more nearly perfect. ... According to the new vision, the
reverse is true: the 'higher' developed from the 'lower,' the more perfect
from the less; the world was not created once and for all by a perfect
supreme being but has grown or developed-and [is] growing,
'becoming.' (15)
The Naturphilosophen, however, encountered problems in developing a working model
of biological evolution because of their strong conceptual resistance to the process's
actual mechanism34-namely, heredity. Zenker35 advocated the development of
organisms "from primitive forms to increasingly perfect ones"; however, he did not
believe that the transformation of a species could be accomplished by means of descent,
but rather, as Ilse Jahn notes, "by means of new generation [i.e., spontaneous mutation]

Literally, "becoming."
I use the term "mechanism" cautiously here. Given the organic context of life's processes, the term's
figurative quality is, I hope, quite evident. But, admittedly, its prevalence as a linguistic convention can
create problems in discussions of this kind, as the next section of this chapter will make clear.
35 Carl Jonathan Zenker (1799-1837), botanist, eventual chair of Natural History at Jena.
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or by hybridization" (84-85). Voigt,36 meanwhile, "used the Hemmungstheorie 37 of
Schelling and with it argued that all species must have originated before they acquired
sex, because it is impossible to build new species through sexual reproduction" (Jahn

86)-the thinking being that breeding tends to water down new, non-normative
characteristics. In a world without selection pressures, this would be true.
The grounds for this strong resistance to hereditary change circles back to these
practitioners' philosophical orientation: "Since all of the best-known representatives of
Naturphilosophie ... were essentialists," Mayr writes, "they were quite unable to develop

a theory of common descent" (387). All plants from an Ur-plant, yes, but that Ur-plant
existed in the beginning, with no antecedents and no common ancestry with other original
forms. It is unfortunate but somehow fitting that Naturphilosophie was unable to
capitalize on its greatest conceptual breakthrough due to innate flaws in its makeup, both
philosophical and methodological-fitting in that it maintains this variant's reputation as
the fascinating, if fated, prodigal of Romantic science.

The Case for Evolution as a Romantic Science
Theories of evolution, particularly biological evolution, constitute the defining
contribution of the Romantic scientific paradigm in general. Even though the schemes of
organic development allowed by the new paradigm would not reach their culmination in
the life sciences for over half a century, with the 1859 publication of The Origin of
36 Friedrich Siegmund Voigt (1781-1850), botanist, appointed Director of the Ducal Botanical Gardens
(lena) in 1807.
37 Translated as "inhibition theory" -and frequently associated with Oken rather than Schelling-this is
Naturphilosophie's version of "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." Lorenz Oken (1779-1851), German
naturalist, appointed Professor of Medical Sciences at lena in 1807.
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Species, the Romantic ancestry of Charles Darwin's theory is still clear to many analysts.
In some quarters, however, the view persists that evolution as envisioned by Darwin
represents an altogether anti-Romantic conception of the natural world and its
processes-with speciation and adaptation as merely mechanical processes driven by the
"secondary cause" of natural selection. 38 In The Romantic Conception ofLife, Robert J.
Richards rebuts this argument in depth. Richards reviews the charge as it is usually
articulated by skeptics:
It might be thought that the influence of ... Romanticism on Darwin was

only of slight significance, that his fundamental conception of nature, at
least as presented in the Origin ofSpecies and the Descent ofMan, had
stripped off metaphysical assumption and aesthetic decoration, so that
only the cold machinery of the living world might lie exposed. . .. I do
not think this conception of Darwin's accomplishment to be sound. (526)
Richards goes on to claim that "a fair examination of his principal evolutionary tracts"
reveals "the deep penetration into Darwin's thought of a ... Romantic view of nature"
(526). This Romantic view of nature is most prominently demonstrated, he argues, in
Darwin's views regarding "the archetypal unity displayed by nature" and in nature's
fundamentally "organic and non-machine-like aspect" (526).39

"Secondary causes," once again, being synonymous with natural laws; the primary cause, of course,
being the creator who instituted those laws.
39 For this section of the discussion, I would like to advance a deeper analysis of the distinctions between
the traditionally opposed concepts of "organic" and "mechanical," with detailed definitions of each concept
(adapted from the OED). "Organic," for the purposes of this discussion, refers to an entity having the
characteristics of a living organism; it is intimately integrated into its environment and possesses an
organization characterized by the connection and coordination of its parts into a single, harmonious whole
manifesting continuous and natural development. A "mechanical" entity, on the other hand, while also
38
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Archetype theory, which advanced the notion of natural types, had its origins in
the works of several leading figures in early nineteenth-century German biology-among
them, Lorenz Oken. Richards resumes his account at this point, noting that
[w]hen archetype theory migrated from Germany to Britain ... it
underwent a reductive process. Goethe thought of the archetype as
containing all its potential variations-hence visible only to the mind's
eye. . .. Darwin [meanwhile] suggested that the generalized archetype of
[organisms] did not lie hidden away as an idea in the mind of God; rather,
it was [in] the form of a creature that walked the earth many generations
ago. (532)40
In advancing the argument for evolution's organic character, Richards asserts that the
fairly widespread conception of evolution as a mechanical process is primarily the fault
of linguistic convention: "No phrase," he states, "comes so trippingly to the lips of
contemporary biologists as 'the mechanism of natural selection.' Almost reflexively, we
think of natural selection, paradoxically, in nonorganic terms" (533). Still, Richards
maintains, "Darwin never referred to or conceived natural selection as operating in
mechanical fashion" (534). He did, however, come close on one occasion. In Chapter IV
of the Origin, comparing the operations of artificial versus natural selection, Darwin
writes,

manifesting organization, may be viewed as not so much a whole as an assemblage of discrete parts of
independent origin functioning together; it is, as a rule, an entity incapable of development or adaptation,
and one whose behavior conforms strictly to mathematical models.
40 In that it resided in the organisms themselves, Darwin's conception of the archetype represented more of
an Aristotelian view than the Platonic one advanced by Naturphilosophie.
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As man can produce and certainly has produced a great result by his
methodical and unconscious means of selection, what may not nature
effect? . .. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of
constitutional difference, on the whole machinery oflife. Man selects only
for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends .... It
may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing,
throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rej ecting that
which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and
insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the
improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic
conditions of life. (83-84; emphasis added)
The phrase "machinery of life" in this excerpt, Richards points out, "is the only instance
of any form of that word appearing in the Origin," adding that "[t]he context makes clear
it has no semantically significant role in [Darwin's] description" (534). I would say that
Richards is correct in this assessment. The striking aspect of this excerpt is not that
Darwin employs a mechanical metaphor but rather the overwhelmingly organic, even
sentient character he attributes to natural selection, the process itself arising out of the
active agency of nature which Darwin repeatedly personifies as "she.,,41 Given this
characterization in the Origin, it seems somewhat unlikely that Darwin would have

This sense of active, involved agency driving the process has, of course, since been refuted by the
scientific community, but it is a salient aspect of Darwin's original thesis and evidence of its Romantically
influenced, anti-mechanist character.
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conceived of nature and its processes as "clanking along in the manner of a nineteenthcentury steam engine" (Richards 539).

The Antecedent of Modern Science
Science changed in the midst of the Romantic poetic response to Enlightenment
science. This change, generally characterized in this study as the rise of scientific
Romanticism, emerged as an unavoidable new element of the cultural landscape at the
turn of the nineteenth century. It was also a persistent change, in that the view of the
natural world inaugurated by this shift in scientific paradigms endures to this day. In

Romantic Dynamics: The Poetics ofPhysicality, author Mark Lussier-while declining
to acknowledge the differences between Enlightenment and Romantic science, seeing it
all of a cloth against which Romantic poets rebelled-at least seems to concur with the
assertion of this study that what emerged during this period is, within certain key
disciplines, recognizable as modern science:
[B]y the close of the eighteenth century, the established cosmological
model against which Romantic poetry rebels had begun to assume a

relatively modern guise; the cosmos had expanded into multigalactic
dimensions; the solar system had itself undergone spatial inflation; and the
dominion of gravity extended to light itself. (21; emphasis added)42
I find this co-identification of Romantic and modem science to be a compelling idea, but
admittedly it is not yet a widely held one. Hans Eichner, for example, in "The Rise of
I would note that the central poetic figures of the title chapter of Lussier's study (from which the above
excerpt is drawn) are Blake and Wordsworth.
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Modern Science and the Genesis of Romanticism," offers his views (advanced within a
Kuhnian perspective) on what he perceives to be the vastly differing outcomes that
Romanticism experienced in the humanities and in the sciences:
I would have to say ... that when turning against Newtonian science, the
Romantics adopted a new paradigm or research tradition. .. This new
tradition brought about substantial progress in the humanities and ... in
such 'human' studies as psychology. In the hard sciences, however, the
Romantic tradition turned out to be a dead end, while the tradition the
Romantics rejected continued to flourish. (23)43
I would respectfully disagree with Eichner on this last point: The scientific tradition the
Romantics rejected-namely, mechanism--did not continue to flourish; what did
continue were the baseline scientific methods embraced by Enlightenment science,
methods which originated under-but, again, were not contingent upon-that eclipsed
paradigm.44 As I noted earlier, in an environment in which Romanticism is so closely
associated with non-scientific ends, such connections are almost inevitably deemphasized. This situation is fueled by the refusal on the part of many analysts to open
up the Romantic scientific paradigm beyond the boundaries of Naturphilosophie-the
apparent reason being that if its most extreme examples are taken to be representative of
Eichner, like many critics, identifies Romantic science with the extreme of Naturphilosophie, viewing
Romanticism in general as "a desperate rearguard action against the spirit and the implications of modern
science"- identified by Eichner with its Enlightenment expression-"a rearguard action that ... liberated
the arts ... but that was bound to fail in the proper domain of science" (8).
44 I will grant that this is a large claim, but the point being argued is not without precedent. To support it, I
would once again draw upon the argued parallels between political and scientific institutions. Within
science, practices and paradigms are separable, just as institutions and ideologies are separable within the
political sphere. The two elements can and often do support one another, but they are also modular. A
democratic and a totalitarian state will, for example, both have departments of state, education, and defense
that function almost identically.
43
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the paradigm as a whole, then the insights of Romantic science can be fairly effortlessly
dismissed. Despite this, I would decline to characterize the present received account of
Romanticism and its relations with science as a consciously constructed "revisionist
history"; I would instead characterize it as simply a misunderstanding of the transforming
changes that occurred within the scientific discipline at the tum of the nineteenth century.
Other analysts have not been as generous in their assessment; among them, Cunningham
and Jardine, who conclude,
[J]ust as the Romantics wrote histories which portrayed the natural history
and natural philosophy of their predecessors as limited and outmoded, so
in turn the new breed of professional natural scientists of the 1840s, 1850s
and 1860s used history to promote their own ideology and to discredit
Romanticism in the sciences. We may well suspect that both the
stereotype of the Romantic sciences as speculative, fantastic, mystical and
ill-disciplined, and their alleged defeat by the empirical natural sciences,
are polemical constructs rather than the fruits of unbiased historical
research. (7_8)45
This chapter has focused on the interpretive strategy of science and the ways in
which it has interacted historically with other interpretive strategies. In the context of
this discussion, I have argued that during the course of the eighteenth century this
interpretive strategy at some point split into two distinct and competing paradigms, each
Cunningham and Jardine, while they also largely identify Romantic science with non-mainstream
expressions such as Naturphilosophie, do agree that a "new natural science" emerged in the early
nineteenth century and that it differed from its Enlightenment predecessor. Further, they observe that this
new variant, identified as the antecedent of contemporary science, "owed much to Romanticism and
Naturphilosophie" (8) .
45
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with differing risks and rewards for culture. Before closing this chapter, I would like to
acknowledge that within any distinctions I have drawn here, there are finer distinctions
still in the form of opposing sub-factions-for example, deists and empirical theists
within the ranks of natural religionists, interventionists and non-interventionists within
the ranks of mechanists, and so on. It was a remarkably rich and complex age, in which a
multitude of belief systems-theological, scientific, political, and philosophical-were
all competing head to head for allegiance. This was the context in which Blake and
Wordsworth lived and wrote. If we take Romantic poetry by its own definitions-and
even if we do not-it had a clear stake in these ongoing cultural contests, which included
not only its own high-profile conflict with science, but also the divisions emerging
between what would become distinct species of scientific theory and practice.
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Chapter Three
Blake

Material Opposition

The observation that William Blake's vision of the universe stands in defiant
opposition to the one advanced by Enlightenment science comes as no surprise to
contemporary students of literature and science studies. As S. Foster Damon long ago
described it, Blake's universe is one of "immediate sensuous and imaginative perception,
not of geometric logic; [it is] psychological, not material" (417). The Enlightenment
model of the universe, meanwhile, established in large part by Isaac Newton, was
rationally explanatory, internally consistent, and in most aspects machine-like. Because
this model required no supernatural explanations for physical phenomena, it appealed to
newly prevailing trends in Western thought. To Blake, however, it was an untenable
scheme, palatable only to those content to dwell in a state of "Single vision."} At the
same time, Blake was sensitive to the genius behind Newton's plan and the persuasive

Now I a fourfold vision see
And a fourfold vision is given to me
Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
And three fold in soft Beulahs night
And twofold Always. May God us keep
From Single vision & Newtons sleep.
(Letter to Thomas Butts, 22 November 1802; E722)
I include Damon's still serviceable defmitions: "Single vision ... is seeing with the physical eye only the
facts before it. ... Twofold vision is seeing 'through' the eye, the perception of the human values in all
things.... Threefold vision ... is the creative state, where thought appears in emotional form. Fourfold
vision is mystical ecstasy" (436-37). "Newton's sleep" Blake defmes as an unquestioning belief in the
material universe and reliance upon the physical senses in apprehending it.
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force it possessed as a result; he therefore dedicated himself to attacking what he viewed
as its central errors-its materialist and mechanist orientation. 2
As the principal architects of the ascendant materialist worldview, Newton along
with Bacon and Locke constituted for Blake an infernal trinity, their life's work dedicated
to advancing an agenda antithetical to the poet's own program of imagination and vision.
Bacon, as the leader of this trinity, earned Blake's condemnation for his founding role in
establishing experimental science, which Blake viewed as a strategy for intellectual
stagnation, one requiring a poetic response:
If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic
character. the Philosophic & Experimental would soon be at the
ratio of all things & stand still, unable to do other than repeat
the same dull round over again ....
He who sees the Infinite in all things sees
God. He who sees the Rati0 3 only sees himself only.

(There Is No Natural Religion [b]; E3)4
Locke's philosophy of the five senses is one example of such a ratio. In his annotations
to a copy of The Works o/Sir Joshua Reynolds,s Blake writes of having read (and having

"Materialism" is defined for this study as being the theory that all experience and phenomena are the
result of manifestations of physical matter, and that these manifestations constitute reality. Within his
works, Blake certainly devotes more criticism toward the material than the mechanical aspects of the
Enlightenment worldview. This may not indicate any distinction in Blake's thinking; he may simply have
felt that criticism of mechanism was superfluous, in that notions of mechanism presuppose a materialist
metaphysics.
3 Calculating, sense-limited reason and its intellectual products.
4 All Blake citations referenced in this study are drawn from David V. Erdman's The Complete Poetry and
Prose of William Blake. For excerpts having no identifying line numbers, the specific page number in
Erdman's text has been included.
5 Edmond Malone, ed. London, 1798.
2
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similarly annotated) Locke and Bacon in his youth, documenting his reaction at the time
and his continuing resistance:
I read Locke on Human Understanding & Bacons Advancement of
Learning 6 on Everyone of these Books I wrote my Opinions. . . . I felt the
Same Contempt & Abhorrence then; that I do now. They mock Inspiration
& Vision ... my Eternal Dwelling place. how can I then hear it

Contemnd without returning Scorn for Scorn[?] (244; E660-61)
Despite this resistance, the Enlightenment view of nature, the earth, and the larger
cosmos was one that Blake, and similarly Wordsworth, was apparently unable to part
with completely, even once a viable alternative appeared. To a certain extent, it may be
that these Romantic poets were simply accustomed to the established view, a product of
their education and religious indoctrination. But beyond that, I would argue the retention
of the principles of Enlightenment natural philosophy proved necessary to provide the
framework and all-important foil for their own opposing philosophical positions. Blake's
view of the physical universe, after all, was one underwritten by the concept of material

limits- both spatial and temporal-a view which the finite, ordered, and stable universe
of Enlightenment cosmology had endorsed for over a century, but which the new
scientific aesthetic of the late eighteenth century had begun to question. In Blake's
visionary model, space is defined as a concept characteristic of-and limited to-the
material universe. The same holds true for time. Both are consequences of the "fall,,,7

Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) articulates the philosopher's opposition to the
notion of "innate ideas" and advances the claim that all knowledge comes from experience. The
Advancement ofLearning (1605) outlines Bacon's systematic division of knowledge.
7 Equated by Blake with the materialist concept of the creation.
6
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with infinity and eternity as their corresponding divine forms. But these fallen forms
exist for a reason.
Blake's views on the function of "created" space and time are elaborated in a
series of episodes wherein the mythic figure of Uri zen becomes associated with the Satan
of Milton's Paradise Lost,8 episodes spread over a number of the prophetic books. In
Chapter III of The Book of Urizen , the title figure is cast out of eternity9 for his errorschiefly, his separatist tendencies.
Los round the dark globe of Urizen,
Kept watch for Eternals to confine,
The obscure separation alone;
F or Eternity stood wide apart,
As the stars are apart from the earth. (5.38-6.1)
At this point, a policy of containment begins. Undertaken by Los-embodiment of the
poetic imagination-it takes the form of a material creation separated from eternity, a
process enabled by the fact that Los-in concert with his emanation, Enitharmon- wields
control over the domains of time and space:
He could controll the times & seasons, & the days & years
She could controll the spaces, regions. (The Four Zoas 1.9.27-28)10

8 A more detailed analysis of the parallels between Uri zen and Satan will be featured in a later section of
this chapter dealing with materialist religion.
9 Blake, as a rule, usually subsumes the spatial concept of infinity and the temporal concept of eternity
under the collective heading of "Eternity."
10 This identification of domains is confirmed in Blake's Milton: "Los is by mortals nam'd Time[.]
Enitharmon is nam'd Space" (24.68).

77

In Night 8 of The Four Zoas, Los, addressing Rahab, embodiment of the most fallen form
of nature 11 and its materialist offshoot of worship in Natural Religion, describes
Enitharmon's "merciful" creation of a protective space for SataniUrizen, in essence
giving Rahab the story of her own origin:
Enitharmon in tears
Wept over him Created him a Space closd with a tender moon
And he rolld down beneath the fires of Orc a Globe immense
Crusted with snow in a dim void. here by the Arts of Urizen
He tempted many of the Sons & Daughters of Los to flee
Away from Me. (The Four Zoas 107[115].14-19)
In Milton, Blake offers another glimpse of this same episode:
So Leutha 12 spoke. But when she saw that Enitharmon had
Created a New Space to protect Satan from punishment;
She fled to Enitharmons Tent & hid herself. Loud raging
Thundered the Assembly dark & clouded, and they ratify'd
The kind decision of Enitharmon & gave a Time to the Space,
Even Six Thousand years. (13.12-17)
Enitharmon is the creator of protective spaces, but the question becomes: protective for

whom? These limited spaces are "kind" in that they limit the spread of error embodied
by SatanlUrizen to the material earth. The Assembly of Eternals' (and Los's) temporal
limits are likewise kind in that they restrict its tenure to only six thousand years. In short,

II

12

Generally identified with the figure of Vala.
Usually interpreted as the human sense of guilt over one's "sins."
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time and space were meant to be merciful constructs of limitation, inhibiting the expanse
and duration of the materialist error, a precept that the emerging science of the Romantic
era was jeopardizing which each new discovery. Romantic science, with its unfolding
view of an unfathomably ancient, perhaps ageless cosmos, unbounded in three
dimensional space, threatened to co-opt for materialist science notions of infinity and
eternity that had once been the exclusive province of the spiritual realm. It was this
radical materialist revisionism that perhaps best explains the apparent alienation from the
new science that Blake evidences from time to time. It also perhaps informs the sense of
distress Blake vocalizes earlier in Milton:
The nature of a Female Space is this: it shrinks the Organs
Of Life till they become Finite & Itself seems Infinite. (10.6-7)
Given the overt sexual subtext of so much in Blake, we might be tempted to dismiss this
passage as simply that, with Blake lamenting some sense of male inadequacy, whether
personal or collective. But the feeling of disorientation within infinite spaces that Blake
voices here, I would argue, could well be more generalizable.
In Blake, material incarnation bears the traditional neo-Platonic liabilities: the
material being seen as that flawed ·element of spiritual eternity that was cast out and
deposited in/as this world. Blake's curious mix of allegiance to, and dissatisfaction with,
the materialist view is seen in his stubborn (though stylized) assertion of a model of the
limited physical universe-namely, the "Mundane Shell," which he describes in Milton
as
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a vast Concave Earth: an immense
Hardend shadow of all things upon our Vegetated Earth
Enlarg'd into dimension & deform'd into indefinite space,
In Twenty-seven Heavens and all their Hells; with Chaos
And Ancient Night; & Purgatory. (17.21-25)
Note that Blake characterizes the above as occupying "indefinite space," not infinite.
The twenty-seven heavens, meanwhile, point toward the twenty-seven constellations of
the northern hemisphere sky that Blake accepted; he allots twenty-one to the southern
hemisphere. I3 Taken together, they yield "the Mundane Shell, a mighty Incrustation / Of
Forty-eight deformed Human Wonders of the Almighty" (Milton 37.53-54).

Matters of Primacy
The cornerstone of Blake's anti-materialist argument, as it is usually advanced, is
his rej ection of materialism's unquestioned assumptions, starting with the reality of the
earth beneath us. "Such are the Spaces called Earth & such its dimension," Blake writes
in Milton, that it bears "false appearances which appears to the reasoner, / As of a Globe
rolling thro Voidness, it is a delusion ofUlro"I4 (29.14-16). But if Blake is correct in his
claim that what we apprehend with our physical senses is largely delusional, then why
mount such an enormous and ambitious poetic response? The reason seems to be that
such views-in the form of the beliefs of others that are imposed upon us-have

13 Details such as this provide evidence of Blake's acquaintance with astronomical instruments of the
period (star maps, etc.), though, as David Erdman has noted, Blake's assessment of the number of
constellations is low, even for the time ("Front Matter" 269).
14 Ulro: The material universe.
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consequences, both physical and spiritual. It is just this oppression that Blake addresses
in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell. Among these oppressive assumptions for Blake
was the age's increasing emphasis on material phenomena as a source of truth, borne out
by his vehement resistance to any form of "Natural Religion." The probable conclusion
that emerges from a considered analysis of Blake's rhetoric questioning the veracity of
physical phenomena is that its chief aim was not so much to challenge the reality of
matter as it was to challenge its primacy. For Blake, there was the active concern that if
reality were to be deemed primarily a material proposition, then the poetic imagination
would be demoted to the status of a secondary phenomenon-simply an abstraction of
matter, instead of the other way around.
Blake's central thesis, of course, is quite the opposite-namely, that material
reality is a production of our intellectual and imaginative lives. IS Evidence of the
material world's subordination to the imaginative and the spiritual, Blake contends, lies
in the fact that the material world serves a spiritual purpose. That purpose, once again, is
to contain error. This is where the new scientific paradigm intrudes, for if the material is
now realized to be infinite and eternal, then this resident error is not and cannot be
contained. Error thus becomes eternal by default because of the new science.

It is a fundamental tenet of Blake's poetic philosophy that infinity and eternity
underlie material existence. They are the truth underlying appearances. But the concept

15 This is, of course, a debate that Blake picked up from Enlightenment philosophers such as Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume. Each figure contributed, in his own way, to the eighteenth century's understanding of
the "real": Locke arguing that knowledge is acquired only through the five senses and the process of
reflection; Berkeley, that nothing exists without perception; and Hume, that there is no knowledge except
that which is directly observed.
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of a timeless material infinity throws a wrench into these distinctions. 16 Insight into
Blake's verdict on material infinity, a notion supported by the observations and theories
of the new science, may be gleaned by examining one prominent instance of that very
concept at work within his poetry. In The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, Blake presents
his vision of a bounded material space made limitless-and abomination-namely, the
infinite cavern of the "Abyss":
[D] own the winding cavern we groped
our tedious way till a void boundless as a nether sky appeard
beneath us & we held by the roots of trees and hung over this
immensity; but I said, if you please we will commit ourselves
to this void and see whether providence is here also.

By degrees we beheld the infinite Abyss, fiery as the smoke
of a burning city; beneath us at an immense distance was the sun,
black but shining. (18; E41)
In Blake's vision, the metaphysically mixed construct implied by material infinity
combines the worst of both realms, constituting, in short, a material hell-a realm wholly
different in character from the creative "hell" of imaginative energy envisioned elsewhere
in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell.

16 Blake, it should be mentioned, does open the door to alternate visions of infinity, but only on condition.
In his annotations to Swedenborg's Divine Love and Divine Wisdom , he writes, "That there is but one
Omnipotent ... I agree but / that there is but one Infinite I do not" (E602). The condition that Blake sets,
however, is that these alternate expressions of infmity be likewise creative and spiritual in nature.
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Materialist Religion
If true and not simply apocryphal poetic legend, then Blake's famous childhood
visions at Peckham Rye and elsewhere, enshrined by early biographer Alexander
Gilchrist, had to have had an indelible effect on the young poet-to-be:
On Peckham Rye (by Dulwich Hill) it is, as he will in after years relate,
that while quite a child, of eight or ten perhaps, he had his first "vision."
Sauntering along, the boy looks up and sees a tree filled with angels,
bright angelic wings bespangling every bough like stars. . . . Another
time, one summer morn, he sees the haymakers at work, and amid them
angelic figures walking. (I, 7)
Once finding his voice as an adult artist, Blake went on the ideological offensive,
mounting a ceaseless campaign in support of the premise that there is another world
beneath, behind, and beyond the material world we see. One proof for this claim Blake
found within the context of his early demonstration that, even via logic, he could
overthrow his opponents' rationalist position: In direct response to Locke's "Philosophy
of Five Senses,,,17 he observes in There is No Natural Religion (1788), "None could have
other than natural or organic thoughts if he had none but organic perceptions" ([ a] IV;
E2). This campaign against the philosophic positions represented by materialism was a
mental war that Blake waged on multiple fronts, engaging not only the sciences but
religion as well. 18 For just as surely as materialism had contaminated the science of this

The Song ofLos 4.l6.
Writing Thomas Butts in January 1803, Blake confesses, "The Thing I have most at Heart! more than life
or all that seems to make life comfortable without. Is the Interest of True Religion & Science & whenever
any thing appears to affect that Interest ... It gives me the greatest of torments" (E724).
17
18
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world, it had, in Blake's opinion, at an even earlier date corrupted its religion. Indeed, in
Blake's view, it was materialist religion, separated from its visionary essence, which had
laid the groundwork for the eventual triumph of materialist science seen in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
In Blake's anti-materialist theology, all things pre-existed their "creation" in
Genesis, the narrative of which simply describes the process of their materialization
during the fall. 19 Blake's unorthodox beliefs on this topic were in large part influenced
by Gnostic tradition, particularly its view of a flawed creation issuing from a flawed
creator-a demi-god (the Demiurge) who, like Uri zen, mistakenly believes himself to be
God, but who in truth is only an alienated fraction of the original divine essence. The
writings of Jakob Boehme (Behmen)2o were also deeply influential, sensitizing Blake to
the possible materialist assumptions of his faith, principally by Boehme's suggestion that
the Bible be interpreted symbolically. Such an orientation led Blake in time to reject vast
tracts of the scriptures, including the Ten Commandments, which he saw as representing
the ultimate embodiment of "One Law.,,21 An interesting question here is whether such
moral reductionism had its roots in scientific reductionism, or vice versa. Drawing upon
the chronology cited earlier in this section, the fact that its moral articulation in The
Marriage ofHeaven and Hell (c. 1790) precedes its scientific articulation in The Book of
Urizen (l794i 2 is intriguing, but is by no means conclusive. The same may be said

"Error is Created[.] Truth is Eternal" (A Vision ofthe Last Judgment N95; E565).
German theologian and mystic (1575-1624).
21 The defming statement of Blake's rejection of the reductionist view, found on plate 24 of The Marriage
ofHeaven and Hell: "One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression" (E44).
22 Put forth in Uri zen 's annunciated ideal of "one weight, one measure / One King, one God, one Law"
(4:39-40).
19

20
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regarding the progression described in The Song ofLos, wherein the Decalogue and other
biblical laws stand implicated in humanity's downward slide to a pervasively materialist
culture:
Thus the terrible race of Los & Enitharmon gave
Laws & Religions to the sons of Har23 binding them more
And more to Earth: closing and restraining:
Till a Philosophy of Five Senses was complete
Uri zen wept & gave it into the hands of Newton & Locke.
(4.13-17)
In his published Diary, Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) recounts a
conversation with Blake wherein the poet asserted that, as it is experienced by human
beings as a material entity, "Nature is the work of the Devil.,,24 When Robinson
protested that according to Genesis it is God who "created the Heavens and the Earth,"
Blake responded that "this God was not Jehovah but Elohim'" (qtd. in Symons 298).25
"[T]here is a God of this World," Blake writes in his annotations to Watson's An Apology
for the Bible, "A God Worshipd in this World as God & Set above all that is calld God"

(33; E618). Under this heading, Blake would place the God of the deists, noting:
Identified in Blake's Tiriel as the father of all mankind.
The discussion that follows highlights a major point of frustration for Blake scholars: Blake's religious
views are among his most ambiguous and self-contradictory, borne out by his conflicted stands on the
divinity of Christ, the "cruelty" versus the "mercy" of creation, etc. The problem here, I propose, is not so
much one of Blake's unorthodoxy, but rather that Blake's belief system, if anything, is not sufficiently
differentiated from its parent ideology.
25 Blake is revising conventional theology to his own ends here: The Elohim (plural), as they are usually
interpreted, are absentee creators evidencing no contact with or interest in humanity, but who are by all
accounts benign. Yahweh, usually interpreted as the on-site manager of creation, is present and active in
human affairs but is seen as vengeful and judgmental. Since Blake associates the former with the deist
God, and supports the notion of supernatural involvement represented by the latter, he apparently proceeds
to revise both entities to his liking, freely transposing characteristics between the two.

23

24
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"Deism, is the Worship of the God of this World by the means of what you call Natural
Religion and Natural Philosophy" (Jerusalem 52 Prose; E201). It is this same remote
view of the Godhead that Blake attacks in "To Nobodaddy":
What art thou silent & invisible
Father ofjealousy
Why dost thou hide thyself in clouds
From every searching Eye

Why darkness & obscurity
In all thy words & laws.
(Notebooks, E471)
As recorded in the preceding chapter, varying schemes of natural religion had come to
dominate the theological landscape by the second half of the eighteenth century. In
general, Blake did not trouble himself to differentiate between deism-with its absentee
God-and empirical theism-with its interventionist one. It was his habit to include
under the rubric of "Natural Religion"-and subsequently dismiss-any evidence-based
approach to faith if that evidence consisted of physical facts rather than metaphysical
premises. The "Outward Creation," he writes, "is as the dirt upon my feet [and] No part
ofMe.,,26 This is not to say, however, that the figure of the Creator was unimportant to
Blake. On the contrary, creative forces, in all their aspects, are central to Blake's poetic
vision. Indeed, his mythos is just as concerned with the "created" material realm-its

26

A Vision o/the Last JudgmentN95; E565.
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origins and its consequences-as it is with that of its imaginative counterpart. In fact, as
established in The Book of Urizen and elaborated upon in The Four Zoas, Blake accords
responsibility for the material realm as it exists to not only the actions of the tyrannical,
materialist, and scientizing aspect of the eternal human whole (embodied by Urizen), but
also the well-intentioned but still divisive actions of the imaginative element (embodied
by Los), which sought to isolate the other element and limit its extent.
Blake's attitudes regarding the contingent from hell, perhaps not surprisingly, are
no less complicated than his views on a creator God. Blake's early and arguably more
interesting take on Satan-patterned almost solely after Milton's interpretation in Pardise

Lost and reflected in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell-depicts the adversary as a
heroic figure of resistance to restraint. This yields to a more conceptual view of the
entity in later prophetic books. In these works, Satan emerges as the embodiment of a
state-specifically, the state of "Error.,,27 The traditional (if unstated) purpose of Satan
in orthodox Christianity has been to give an external form to error so that it might be cast
out, a role clearly paralleling that of materialism in Blake's poetic philosophy.28 Perhaps
as a result of this, Blake's depiction of Satan gets conflated with materialism and
everything associated with it, achieving a level of complexity nearly unequalled in the
"Yet they are blameless & Iniquity must be imputed only I To the State they are enterd into that they may
be deliverd: I Satan is the State of Death, & not a Human existence" (Jerusalem 49.65-67).
28 On the twelfth plate of Jerusalem, Blake, through the persona of Los, voices what he perceives to be the
main function of materialism (and by extension, materialist science) in this world:
I saw the finger of God go forth
Upon my Furnaces, from within the Wheels of Albions Sons:
Fixing their Systems, permanent: by mathematic power
Giving a body to Falshood that it may be cast off for ever.
(10-13)
On the same plate, Blake states that "Ulro"-i.e., the material universe-"is the space of the terrible starry
wheels of Albion's sons" (12:51).
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poet's mythos, ultimately encompassing Urizen, the creator "God of this World," and
SCience.
The figure of Urizen is the dominant member of this association advanced by
Blake, and, in general, Urizen might be best viewed as a composite of the worst aspects
of the traditional God and Satan. He is a being of error who misleads mankind, as well as
the flawed creator of the fallen world. Urizen's career as creator begins, as does Satan's
career as adversary, during the course of his fall, when he is cast out of eternity. Urizen,
in effect, falls into the state which is Satan (i.e., error) because of his need to create
division and subsequently dominate the products of that division.

29

Urizen's parallels with Satan, particularly Milton's Satan in Paradise Lost, have
long been acknowledged and for a simple reason; they are obvious parallels that Blake
cultivates. Cast out of Eternity in Chapter III of The Book of Urizen, and materially
isolated by Los in Chapter IV, Urizen, as the narrative continues in The Four Zoas, finds
himself in his new domain:
Endless had been his travel but the Divine hand him led
For infinite the distance & obscurd by Combustions dire
By rocky masses frowning in the abysses revolving erratic
Round Lakes of fire in the dark deep the ruins of Urizens world
Oft would he sit in a dark rift & regulate his books
Or sleep such sleep as spirits eternal wearied in his dark
Tearful & sorrowful state. then rise look out & ponder
29 In truth, Urizen creates nothing. He simply mistakes the material products of his division of the eternal
whole as new creations.
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His dismal voyage eyeing the next sphere tho far remote
Then darting into the Abyss of night his venturous limbs
Thro lightnings thunders earthquakes & concussions fires & floods
Stemming his downward-fall labouring up against futurity
Creating many a Vortex fixing many a Science in the deep.
(6.72.2-13)
In acknowledgment of his previously unfallen form, once he is in his new estate Urizen is
frequently (and accusingly) addressed by his former title, which he also shares with the
biblical Satan:
Thou Knowst me now 0 Uri zen Prince of Light
And I know thee[. I]s this the triumph this the Godlike State
That lies beyond the bounds of Science[?]

(The Four Zoas 7.80.40-42)30
While Urizen has his parallels and associations with Satan, the case is usually made that
Blake does not intend for him to be co-identified with that entity. However, on occasion,
he is, as in Milton:
Then Los & Enitharmon knew that Satan is Urizen
Drawn down by Ore & the Shadowy Female into Generation.
(10.1-2)
Similarly, the case is made that while Uri zen is associated with both Satan and science,3l
those two entities are likewise not meant to be co-identified, even though in The Laocoon

30

See also The Four Zoas 8.102.23-29.
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Blake explicitly references "Antichrist Science" (prose; E274). Still, these explicit
identifications are rare, and one must be careful not to push them too far. After all,
Urizen, as an embodiment of the rational faculty, can be redeemed from his fallen state
as, indeed, he is at the conclusion of The Four Zoas, with his reunification with Eternity
and the appearance of "sweet Science." Satan, meanwhile, cannot be redeemed. This
notion of scientific reasoning representing a reparable error can and should be interpreted
as a hopeful note in Blake.

Blake's Science
To the best of our knowledge, Blake had no formal education in mathematics or
the sciences such as Wordsworth received at Hawkshead and later Cambridge. What he
had instead was multiple years of arts instruction and an engraving apprenticeship in his
youth, followed by a brief stint at the Royal Academy of the Arts. Despite this, Nelson
Hilton makes the case for the lay scientific resources at Blake's disposal, citing the likely
contribution of three individuals: James Basire, Joseph Johnson, and Emmanuel
Swedenborg. Hilton argues that "Blake's apprenticeship to the engraver for the Royal
Society ... , his prolonged association with one of England's significant publishers of
medical and scientific works, [and] his intent reading of the century's noted scientist
turned-theosopher all point to an available scientific discourse that was an important part
of Blake's environment" (417). Among the three, it is Johnson who will provide Blake

31

Jerusalem offers the description: "Urizen, cold & scientific" (38.2; E184).
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with the most demonstrable access to scientific information, but before examining the
publisher's contribution, let us briefly address the other two possible influences cited.
In 1772, Blake was apprenticed to James Basire, who two years earlier had been
appointed Engraver to the Royal Society, the pre-eminent scientific body in Britain at the
time. The apprenticeship lasted for the next seven years, of which not a great deal is
known, but it appears that the studies that Blake did for Basire (again, that we know of)
were non-scientific, chiefly architectural in nature. 32 However, Basire's connections in
the sciences were extensive, as engraving artists became more and more integral parts of
scientific publishing. Among these connections were the eminent anatomist John Hunter
and his older brother William, also a noted figure in the field. 33
Ironically, Blake's interest in Emanuel Swedenborg's occult writings may have
contributed to his scientific awareness. Biographer Peter Ackroyd confidently dates
Blake's first acquaintance with the works of Swedenborg to 1787. 34 Other researchers
are more guarded. "It is not clear when Blake first took to reading Swedenborg," writes
Charles Gardner, adding:
There is no trace of his influence until The Songs ofInnocence and
Experience [(1789-94)]. Some of Swedenborg's early scientific works

had been translated into English. But of his theological works only one
volume out of twelve of the Arcana Celestia had been translated into
Blake's entry in The Oxford Dictionary ofArt describes these as "drawings of the monuments in
Westminster Abbey and other London churches."
33 Carmen Kreiter has confirmed that "Basire, Blake's engraving master until 1779, did occasional work for
both the Hunters" (113).
34 This was two years before he and wife Catherine first attended a meeting at the "Swedenborgian chapel
in Great East Cheap" (102). That meeting occurred on Sunday, April 13, 1789. The texts from this period
that Ackroyd posits acquaintance with are the Arcana Celestia and Heaven and Hell.
32
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English; and, for the rest, those who could not read Latin had to be content
with samples. (SSi 5
Arguably as significant as Blake's access to Swedenborg's theosophical works was his
possible exposure to the mystic's earlier scientific writings, which, as Gardner indicates,
were available in Britain before the publication of the Arcana Celestia and might well

have been sought out by his interested English followers. 36
Ultimately, however, it was the demands of his professional life that led Blake
into his closest probable contact with the sphere of scientific culture in Britain. During
the early and mid-1780s, Blake occupied himself with a variety of commercial ventures.
It was during this period that friend and colleague Henry Fuseli introduced Blake to

bookseller and publisher Joseph Johnson. Though he had completed one early
assignment for Johnson in 1783, Blake's close working association with the publisher
would not begin in earnest until 1788. 37 Johnson's political sympathies were, by his own
description, liberal--others might say radical-and these were the authors he chose to
publish. He became friends with a number of these figures and was in the habit of
inviting them to weekly dinner parties at his home. By 1791, the year of Blake's peak

Swedenborg's dates of publication and translation: A Treatise Concerning Heaven and Hell, and ofthe
Wonderful Things Therein, as Heard and Seen, by Emanuel Sweden borg (published 1758, English
translation 1784), Divine Love and Divine Wisdom (published 1763, English translation 1788), Divine
Providence (published 1764, English translation 1790), and Marital Love (published 1768, English
translation 1790). The primary sources for these dates are David V. Erdman, The Complete Poetry and
Prose of William Blake, and Morris Eaves, et al., William Blake: The Early Illuminated Books.
36 The cornerstone of Swedenborg's scientific work was his three-volume Opera Philosophica et Mineralia
(1734), the first volume of which, the Principia Rerum Naturalium, is the most important. In it,
Swedenborg details his view of the universe as mechanism and outlines his first approach to a philosophic
system. The most detailed analysis of Swedenborg's scientific theories may be found within eyrie I
Sigstedt's The Swedenborg Epic (New York: Bookman, 1952).
37 Recorded in Gerald Tyson's biography of Johnson 113-14.
35
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association with Johnson, the bookseller's shop had become, as Gerald Tyson reports, a
renowned meeting place for radical minds (121).
Blake's inclusion in these events has become something of a point of contention
in Blake studies. Of particular interest is the question of whether Blake, a scientific
layman, might have received uncommon insights into the discipline by direct social
contact with some of its most eminent British practitioners. The more conservative view
holds that Blake likely secured such information on his own. In this category is Peter
Ackroyd, who notes that on scientific topics Blake had "the eclectic instincts of the
autodidact" (135). In the other camp are S. Foster Damon, Charles Gardner, and, at one
time, David Erdman. In his biography of the poet, Gardner argues that Blake mingled
intimately in Johnson's circle and was a frequent guest-a flattering view, but probably
an exaggerated one. In Tyson's account there is no record of Blake being on the list of
frequent visitors to the publishers home, though his occasional participation has been
confirmed. 38 In the end, Tyson straddles the fence diplomatically, writing: "The large
number of engravings for Johnson at this time indicates ... that Blake was in relatively
close contact with the publisher and his circle" (113; emphasis added). Overarching such

a debate, of course, is the question of what real relevance lay in Blake's having direct
social contact with these scientific luminaries versus his merely having contact with their
38 Tyson lays out Johnson's guestlist of regulars and semi-regulars during the 1780s: "The extended group
would eventually come to include Mary Wollstonecraft, Gilbert Wakefield, John Home Tooke, Alexander
Geddes, [Henry] Fuseli, Thomas Christie, and, more briefly and somewhat sporadically, Erasmus Darwin,
William Blake, Joel Barlow, William Godwin, Thomas Paine, [Joseph] Priestley, and many others less well
known" (66). By 1791, when "Johnson's bookshop had become a meeting place for radicals," the guestlist
had expanded considerably, still including Wollstonecraft, Godwin, Darwin, Fuseli, Paine, and Priestley,
but by now Blake's name is conspicuously absent (121). Tyson goes on to note that later visitors would
include "William Wordsworth, Henry Crabb Robinson, William Hazlitt, Maria Edgeworth, Humphrey
Davy, and T. R. Malthus" (121). The chief source of information we have about these gatherings, Tyson
notes, is William Godwin's Diary.
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ideas through their works. I would offer that it is most likely relevant in regard to what it
has to say about Blake's degree of immersion in the world of these ideas, and how his
subsequent acceptance or rejection of these ideas might have been a personal as well as
an academic matter for him.
From the perspective of Blake's relations to science, particularly in regard to his
access to contemporary scientists and scientific ideas, An Island in the Moon 39 stands as a
fascinating entry in the poet's canon. An intermittently witty send-up of the
philosophical excesses of its day, cast in the form of a "plurality of worlds" fantasy, 40 the

Island telegraphs its satirical intent in its opening line: "In the Moon, is a certain Island
near by a mighty continent, which small island seems to have some affinity to England,
&, what is more extraordinary the people are so much alike & their language so much the
same that you would think you was among your friends" (E449). The associations with
lohnson's famed dinner parties were perhaps inevitable from the structure of the piece,
even though Blake presents his various hosts and guests as laughable leisure class
dabblers and eccentrics, nothing at all like the dynamic circle of minds that gathered
around lohnson's table. Nevertheless, identification of the principal characters

41

within

the work to actual historical figures (both inside and outside of lohnson's circle) has
become something of a parlor diversion in its own right. Early on, Damon staked out the

39 An unfinished prose satire dating from the mid-1780s, though revision of the work is possible up through
the year 1789, since it contains early drafts of three of the Songs ofInnocence: "Holy Thursday," "The
Nurse's Song," and "The Little Boy Lost."
40 In another work, Blake approaches the same "plurality of worlds" notion much more seriously: In
Visions ofthe Daughters ofAlbion, Bromion speaks of "places yet unvisited by the voyager ... in worlds /
Over another kind of seas, and in atmospheres unknown" (4.17-18).
41 These include the "three Philosophers"-Quid the Cynic, Sipsop the Pythagorean, and Suction the
Epicurean-plus Etruscan Column the Antiquarian, Obtuse Angle the Mathematician, Inflammable Gass
the Wind-finder (an experimental scientist), Jack Tearguts the Surgeon, Steelyard the Lawgiver, and others.
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following associations: "Inflammable Gass is obviously Joseph Priestley .... Jack
Tearguts is the famous surgeon [and anatomist] Dr. John Hunter .... But whoever they
were, they were certainly friends and acquaintances of Blake" (199).42 Subsequent critics
have raised objections to this kind of one-to-one identification with specific persons and
especially the notion of presumed social familiarity. Nancy Bogen, for one, has taken
exception with Priestley's identification as Inflammable Gass on these grounds:
[W]ere Blake and [Priestley] actually friends? Is there any evidence to
show that one, an unknown artist, and the other, a famous scientist and
philosopher, twenty-four years his senior, were intimate to the extent of
paying each other visits at home? The answer is no-emphatically no.
(110)

Bogen's persuasive argument notwithstanding, Blake's personal acquaintance with
Priestley, again, was not required for him to have gained an awareness of the scientist's
work, which An Island in the Moon clearly suggests he did. Chapter 10 describes a group
visit to the home of Inflammable Gass, during which the host attempts to entertain his
guests with his experiments: "[H]e went up stairs & loaded the maid, with glasses, &
brass tubes, & magic pictures" (E462). Upon returning, the host presents his collection
of natural specimens; he then proceeds to pneumatic experiments with an air-pump,

An alternate point of entry for Blake into the social circles of intellectuals hinted at in An Island in the
Moon could well have been the salon of the Rev. A. S. Mathew. Mathew, along with sculptor John
Flaxman, had financially underwritten the printing of Blake's Poetical Sketches. "In the Mathew salon,"
Johnson and Grant note, "Blake sang his songs to tunes he composed himself' (xxx). There, Blake would
also have had occasion to make the acquaintance of several eminent figures, among them, Krieter states,
the anatomist John Hunter (nl12), identified by Blake's own notes with the character of Jack Tearguts.
42
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during the course of which a bottle of "Flogiston,,43-actually privy gas-is broken,
driving the assembled company from the premises.
More important than Priestley's association with the Island's experimentalist is
the question of what Blake might have found so ridiculous or threatening about
Priestley's inquiries into phlogiston that it required censure. One possible answer is
suggested by Blake's anti-materialist posture. Though one of the four earthly elements of
antiquity, fire is the most ethereal and thus the least material. Phlogiston theory sought to
emend that perception. It has long been known that fire held a special significance for
Blake, particularly as a symbol of inspiration. On plate 6 of The Marriage ofHeaven and

Hell, he describes "walking among the fires of hell, delighted with the enjoyments of
Genius, which to Angels look like torment and insanity." Further evidence of fire's
opposition to the materialist scientific viewpoint is enacted through the character of its
mythic embodiment, Fuzon, and his eventual rebellion against his father Urizen in the

Books of Urizen and Ahania.
Aside from encounters with Johnson's social circle, there are other means by
which Blake might have accessed the scientific thought of the day while under the
publisher's patronage. Johnson, as Tyson notes, had a reputation for his active
participation in ongoing scientific controversies, usually backing "the iconoclastic side"
of a particular argument (47). Johnson published Erasmus Darwin's Botanic Garden, a
work that for its time was certainly on the cutting edge scientifically, if mired in
neoclassical conventions poetically. Darwin, as noted previously, was also an occasional
43 Cf. Priestley's phlogiston-the proposed flammable component of matter, released during burning into
the atmosphere.

96

member of lohnson's circle, and the publisher, in point of historical fact, commissioned
Blake to execute four engravings of the Portland vase for Darwin's volume. 44 It does not
strain credibility to suggest that Blake could have gleaned a wealth of information on
contemporary science from the text of the resulting publication. "The footnotes alone,"
Ackroyd notes, "cover such subjects as geology and biology, the production of iron and
the power of magnetism, the formation of star clusters and the nature of salt crystals,
pumps and steam-engines, volcanoes and electricity" (135). Given the indications we
have of Blake's interest in not only opposing materialist science, but of being an
informed opponent of that philosophy, then his incentive to pursue such knowledge might
have been strong indeed.
In regard to Blake's knowledge of Romantic science as a discrete species of
scientific thought, things become more speculative. The question is whether Blake was
interested in and engaged with the emerging science of his time, particularly as that
science sought to redefine the physical universe he presumed to understand in the course
of his attacks upon it-a physical universe that now sought to extend its domain, even to
the point of overlapping and usurping the realm of the spiritual. The answer would seem
to be: How could he not have been? His access to these ideas is another matter. As
For works by Erasmus Darwin, Blake completed a total of six engravings, none of them scientific in
content. These include the four views ofthe Portland vase, plus two mythic representations: "The
Fertilization of Egypt" (for the first edition of The Botanic Garden in 1791) and "Tornado" (for the third
edition in 1795), both from original illustrations by Fuseli. Recent research by Tristanne Connolly sheds
some additional light on the likelihood of Blake's scientific awareness coming as a result of the graphic
assignments he performed: "Blake did not produce anatomical drawings as a commercial engraver, though
he was associated with James Basire, and Joseph Johnson, both of whom dealt with medical publications.
The closest Blake came was his work for James Earle's Practical Observations on the Operation for the
Stone. The plates in this book portray urinary tract stones, and the tools used to extricate them .... Blake
engraved plates for two other medical books, John Brown's Elements ofMedicine and Thomas Henry's
Memoirs ofAlbert de Haller, but they were portraits of the physicians, and the books contained no other
plates" (34).
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Romantic science has been traditionally construed by critics, its sources would have been
largely foreign and might have required a concerted effort on Blake's part to discover. 45
However, in its expanded definition, as I have proposed in this study, I would argue that
the sources of Romantic science were largely domestic and readily available-present
within the works of Herschel, Hutton, Dalton, E. Darwin, and others. As Marilyn Gaull
notes in "Coleridge and the Kingdoms of the World," the sources of access to the new
science were broad and dispersed.
[T]hese sciences, the sciences of the [17]90's, seem designed for literature and for
the literary mind in both origin and style. . .. There were presented to the non
specialist, to learned societies (which were largely recreational) or, in this first
great age of publication, in magazines, books, and reviews alongside sermons,
topographical poetry, history, gothic novels, and economic theory. And since
much scientific inquiry was both followed and practiced as a hobby, science itself,
before it was institutionalized, was accessible, familiar, engaging to anyone with
an interest in "the world of life." (47)
In short, these revolutionary scientific ideas, like their political counterparts, were simply
in the air; they infused conversations and current events. And in that respect, access to
the basic principles of Romantic science-again, in the broader definition that I have
proposed-required nothing more from Blake than a healthy interest in his own culture.

This might be overstating the case, however. German Naturphilosophie had energetic ambassadors-the
most notable of which was Danish physicist and philosopher H. C. Oersted, who was multi-lingual and
possessed contacts and colleagues within the scientific circles of nearly every European capital, including
London. And then, of course, there were cultural translators like Coleridge, deeply in tune with the
principles outlined by F. W. J. Schelling. Coleridge, in fact, went to Germany with the intent of translating
German works for a London bookseller (Levere, "Coleridge" 297).
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Physics, Visionary and Otherwise
Given its identity as opposing philosophy, Newtonian physics played a
commanding role in shaping Blake's anti-materialist vision. Despite the century
separating their creative primes, Blake's choice of Newton as his philosophical opponent
was in many ways fitting. Newton, after all, was popularly perceived as the chief prophet
of the materialist worldview. 46 Blake scholars in the late twentieth century, notably
Donald Ault and Stuart Peterfreund, have commented on the degree to which Blake
appreciated the "imaginative appeal" of Newton's model-a scientific system so
complete that it intellectually satisfied the mind in a way that previously only poetry and
religious faith had. These analysts have also communicated how strongly Blake felt that
such a system posed a spiritual threat to Western thought. That these beliefs provoked a
reaction on Blake's part is unquestioned: Newton's Principia and Blake's Milton,
Peterfreund argues, can best be understood as constituting thesis and antithesis ("Blake
and Newton" 205-06). But beyond that, as Ault observes in Visionary Physics, "the
increasing complexity of Blake's mythology" over the years can be seen in large part as a
direct response to "the increasing threat the Newtonian perspective posed to Blake's own
imaginative powers" (1). However, while Ault and Peterfreund agree that Blake's system
constitutes a studied, intentional dialectic with Newton's system, both are quick to
observe that it does not constitute a point-by-point refutation. Still, within his works,

Though it remains open to debate whether Newton was ever as lost a materialist soul as Blake perceived
him to be. As noted in the preceding chapter, Newton was resistant to the global philosophical mechanism
of Descartes and not unconflicted on the question of materialism as a final explanatory philosophy.
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Blake does provide narratives and mythic structures by which he is able to advance
challenges to the Newtonian view.
In that the works of Newton lie chiefly within the domain of the physical
sciences-and in that Blake, once again, viewed Newton as his chief ideological and
philosophical opponent-Blake's views on physics are particularly revelatory of his
overall poetic response to Enlightenment era science. But it will be necessary to first
clarify what constituted "physics" in Blake's view. The discipline of physics, in its most
general sense, deals with how the universe works; chiefly, it is the study of its active
forces. Given that for Blake the greater universe included the actions of the non-material
and unseen realms, his view of the subject was likely an expansive one-one expressive
of his opposition to what Mark Lussier has termed "the visionary contraction" of
Newtonian physics (36-37).
In formulating a response to the materialist/mechanist model, Blake's visionary
approach to physics was shaped by diverse and unorthodox influences from the worlds of
both science and theology. One such influence was Paracelsus (1493-1541), the noted
Swiss physician and (al)chemist, whose influence on Blake is evident in their shared
spiritualist approach to natural philosophy, manifested in the desire to understand the
invisible forces that govern the universe. Also influential was Jakob Boehme, for his
view that "will is the original force" and that "all manifestation involves opposition"
("Jacob Boehme" 115). In Blake's response to Newton, the final legacy of both
philosophers is found in the poet's concept of a universe driven by polarities and his
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belief that accepted physical laws are simply "an expression of the spiritual realities
underlying them" (Damon 40).
In Jerusalem, Blake proclaims, "I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by
another Mans.,,47 One might note that Newton's revolutionary theory of physics was
itself the product of his discomfiture living under another man's system-namely, the
one proposed a half century earlier by Rene Descartes. Blake's rejection of Newton's
response, however, should in no way be construed as an endorsement of its Cartesian
predecessor. While Blake does depict Urizen as "[c]reating many a Vortex" in the course
of his fall-during which "many a Science" is fixed "in the deep,,48-he does not draw
upon the concept of the vortex in any way that Descartes would recognize, choosing
instead to interpret these vortices figuratively, in this instance as portals along the path of
human experience, with this material world being just one stop on a much longer journey:
The nature of infinity is this: That every thing has its
Own Vortex; and when once a traveller thro Eternity.
Has passd that Vortex, he percieves it roll backward behind
His path, into a globe itself infolding; like a sun:
Or like a moon, or like a universe of starry majesty,
While he keeps onwards in his wondrous journey on the earth

The larger quote reads: "I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans I 1 will not Reason &
Compare: my business is to Create" (10.20-21). Drawing upon the evidence of Blake's collected works,
the reader is led to the conclusion that the system(s) the poet is responding to here is not just Newton's but
any system that would attempt to dominate.
47
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The Four Zoas 6.72.12-15.

101

Thus is the earth one infinite plane, and not as apparent
To the weak traveller confin'd beneath the moony shade.
Thus is the heaven a vortex passd already, and the earth
A vortex not yet pass'd by the traveller thro' Eternity.
(Milton 15.21-35)

As Blake describes it, a vortex is an involuted road forever circling back toward its--or
rather, the traveler's-point of origin in "Eternity." As admittedly ambiguous as the
preceding excerpt is, one aspect does clearly emerge, and that is Blake's strategy of
engaging the opponent philosophy-whatever its manifestation, whether new or old,
established or radical-by co-opting and adapting its concepts to his own poetic ends. As
with his approach to the religious scriptures, Blake frequently chooses to read science
symbolically. But in a twist perhaps unique to Blake, he not only recasts the literal as
figurative, but, just as importantly, in some cases he chooses to interpret science's
figurative conventions literally. This literalizing of the figurative-this imposing of the
constructs of imagination upon the material form of the universe-is, I would suggest, a
defining element of Blake's poetic response to the science of his day. This pattern of
response becomes most apparent in Blake's consideration of the astronomical universe,
particularly science's means of conceptualizing physical space, specifically the
conventions of the star map and the sky globe.
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Revisioning the Mundane Shell
As David Erdman writes, "William Blake ... thought of himself as opposing the
'corporeal war' of swords and muskets with the mental war of Art. And he often thought
of his staging area as the night sky (bordered by dusk and dawn) where the old Heaven of
tyranny is replaced by a new Heaven of freedom" ("Art Against Armies" 296). Without
question, the night sky was an ideological territory that Blake strove to control poetically.
In the essay "Under Romantic Skies," Marilyn Gaull takes note of the Romantic poets'
employment of the predictable, mechanistic universe of Enlightenment astronomy as a
foil for their poetic arguments, choosing largely to ignore the shifting currents within the
astronomy of the time. For whatever reason-whether Enlightenment astronomy was too
useful an adversary to dispense with or, as I have argued, because the tenets of the new
astronomy posed perhaps even greater threats to the Romantic poetic ideology
"[a]stronomical allusions in Romantic art and poetry are normally Newtonian, refer to a
universe that [is] stable, symmetrical, mechanical, bounded in space and time rather than
the vast, tumultuous, infinite, volatile one contemporary astronomy was revealing" (Gaull
35). Though he is specifically exempted by Gaull,49 I would suggest that Blake, too,

Gaull exempts B lake from this group on the basis of what she sees as elements of "Romantic
astronomy" fmding expression in Blake's "mythic representations" (35). By Romantic astronomy, Gaull
means "the astronomy of Swedenborg, who influenced Kant's Universal History and Theory a/the
Heavens (1755), who in turn influenced William Herschel's "On the Construction of the Heavens" (1784),
... who in turn influenced La Place's Celestial Mechanics (1796). The unifying element here, as I
interpret it, is the "nebular hypothesis" of the solar system's formation from a diffuse and rotating cloud of
cosmic gas, or some precursor of that theory. More than one critic has remarked on the seeming parallels
between Blake's description of the origin of the earth-moon system in America: A Prophecy (b:3-7) and a
similar passage from Erasmus Darwin's The Botanic Garden (I:I03-12)-the latter being a work heavily
influenced by Herschel. In truth, the connection between the two passages is somewhat tenuous. While
both describe the violent process of one body being ejected from another, Darwin is interested in it as a
scientific process while Blake focuses on the event principally as a manifestation of the separation of the
male spectre from its female emanation, a dynamic central to his mythology. More importantly, both
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when presented with this compelling alternative, similarly chose to perpetuate the
Newtonian view as the view of the scientific community because it was in his poetic
interests to do so.
Despite the likelihood of Blake having absorbed, as David Worrall claims, "some
near contemporary astronomic theories" (281),50 it appears that Blake's astronomical
preferences ran toward the traditional, if not the antique. One example occurs on plate 19
of The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, wherein Blake and his Angel voyage to "the void
between Saturn and the fixed stars" (E42). The notion of fixed stars, long suspect, had
been officially buried in 1783 by William Herschel, whose observations of the proper
motions of several bright stars established that the sun and its stellar neighbors were
indeed moving through space. That Blake would continue to cling to the notion of fixed
stars, at least poetically, is not all that surprising. In this work, as in others, he is most
likely echoing the universe Milton constructs in Paradise Lost. Also, as Anthony Low
has noted, Blake, being a poet, did not feel compelled to "promulgate any astronomical
'truth' in his poem" (267). Despite these considerations, Blake's complete failure to
mention the planet Uranus, discovered in 1781 by Herschel, remains surprising. Blake

had to be aware of the discovery and the man who made it: Herschel was the first

works might simply be interpreted as a description of events occurring at the moment of creation, with no
ensuing eons of cosmological development implied.
50 In "The 'Immortal Tent, ", Worrall supports this claim, advancing the intriguing association of Ore-the
central figure of Blake's America: A Prophecy and Europe: A Prophecy-with the variable "Demon Star"
Algol (285). The brightest star in the constellation Perseus, Algol marks the severed head of the Gorgon,
which the hero Perseus holds at arm's length. Worrall's association is strengthened by Blake's illustrated
rendering of Ore throughout the two works, always depicting "the spirit of revolution" with wild, unruly
hair that does indeed resemble a nest of snakes. Ore's variations are explained as the result of his being
covered and uncovered by the shroud of Enitharmon (illustrated on plate 4 of Europe), paralleling the
observed variations in the brightness of the star.
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individual since antiquity to find a new planet. 51 In addition, he was an Englishman
(albeit naturalized). But Blake never once refers to Herschel in print-not within his
poetry, prose, or known correspondence. What could explain such a slight? It is
interesting to speculate that Blake perhaps scorned Herschel for reasons that had nothing
to do with science, but rather because of the astronomer's attempts to curry favor and
patronage with the court of George III. Herschel had, after all, originally named his
newly discovered world "Georgium Sidus": the Georgian Planet. Another possibilitycloser to the focus of this study-could be that Herschel had alienated Blake by his
contributions to the expansionist view of the material universe, which had begun with the
small step of adding a new outer planet and had culminated with his declaration that the
depths of space were-from our human perspective-unmeasurable. But one question
remains: If Herschel's contributions conflicted with Blake's views, just as Newton's
theories had, then why does the astronomer not merit the same kind of notorious mention
Blake gives Newton in his works? The answer could be that, in contrast to his well
worked-out response to Newton's long-familiar reasonings, Blake had no ready answer to
the new view of the universe that Herschel's work supported.
The vista of Blake's poetic works, as Erdman has noted, is a vast cosmic
battlefield in the war against the universe envisioned by materialist science. And it is the
site of a conflict in which Blake is willing to play whatever role is necessary, whether
radical or reactionary. An example of the latter, identified by Worrall, occurs in America,
John Keats' sonnet "On Chapman's Homer" (1816) suggests the level of acknowledgement of this
achievement during the later Romantic period: "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies I When a new
planet swims into his ken" (9-10). Keats is obviously referencing Herschel's discovery; as stated above, no
one had discovered a major planet (as opposed to an asteroid) since antiquity, and no one would again until
the discovery of Neptune in 1846 by LeVerrier and Adams.
51
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in the passage wherein Blake portrays Ore as a comet "wandering dangerously out of
orbit" (284).
Albions Angel stood beside the Stone of night, and saw
The terror like a comet, or more like the planet red
That once inclos'd the terrible wandering comets in its sphere.
(America 5.1-3)

In this passage, Blake succeeds in both vividly communicating Ore's revolutionary spirit
and, at the same time, subverting the image of comets prevalent since Edmund Halley
(1656-1742). In Blake's revisioned, politically informed cosmos, comets are not the
conformist periodic visitors of Newtonian science, but rather the imaginatively invested
comets of antiquity: unpredictable harbingers of war, calamity, and inevitable change.
But Blake could also play the astronomical radical. Perhaps the best example of
this position is seen in his aforementioned literalizing of the figurative in regard to the
conventions of science. In "Visionary Astronomy," Paul Miner makes the following
claim: "[T]he illumination on plate 12 of Europe can be read as a star map: on lines
which divide the page the way lines of latitude and longitude divide the heavens we see a
gigantic web full of spiders and flies; this north and south placement accords with the
astronomers' charting of the flies Musca Australis and Musca Borealis" (308).52 In this
assertion, Miner confidently projects an astral coordinate system of declination and right
ascension where a less alert observer might see only a somewhat loose rendering of a
spider's web. His assertion is supported, however, by both the accompanying text of the
52 Miner's inversion of the order of the Southern and Northern Flies is curious, but it does not alter the
thrust of his argument.
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plate-which describes the sky of that "deadly night," where "[b Jetween the clouds of
Uri zen the flames of Orc roll heavy" (6, 32)-and by their combined association with a
similar cosmic web glimpsed earlier, in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell:
[BJeneath us at an immense distance was the sun,
black but shining[;J round it were fiery tracks on which revolv'd
vast spiders, crawling after their prey; which flew or rather
swum in the infinite deep, in the most terrific shapes of animals
sprung from corruption. & the air was full of them, & seemd
composed of them. (18; E41)
These two episodes are united in presenting a similarly visionary and hellish
interpretation of the night sky, with "the most terrific shapes of animals sprung from
corruption" usually interpreted as yet another unflattering take on the constellations by
Blake. 53
A glimpse of a conventional star map of the time, its coordinate system of
celestial longitude and latitude projected onto the night sky, appears to have evoked a
creatively literal response in Blake, as if the scientists by their convention might have
brushed up against some kind of cosmic truth. Blake appropriates this figurative device
and imposes it upon the heavens as a literal-if visionary-structure in service to his
poetic mythology. As we might suspect, this web of the night sky, derived from an
instrument of practical scientific utility, emanates from the fallen Urizen:
Cold he wander'd on high, over their cities
53 Recall that in Milton B lake refers to them as "immense / Hardend shadow[ s] of all things upon our
Vegetated Earth" (17.21-22) and as the "Forty-eight deformed Human Wonders of the Almighty" (37.54).
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In weeping & pain & woe!
And where-ever he wanderd in sorrows
Upon the aged heavens
A cold shadow follow'd behind him
Like a spiders web, moist, cold, & dim
Drawing out from his sorrowing soul
The dungeon-like heaven dividing.
Where ever the footsteps of Uri zen
Walk'd over the cities in sorrow.

Till a Web dark & cold, throughout all
The tormented element stretch'd

And all calld it, The Net of Religion.
(The Book of Urizen 25.5-22)
This constraining Net of Religion is the counterpart of the Tent of Science-woven by
the Eternals to shield them from view of our world (Urizen 19.2-9)-providing more
evidence of the shared origins of materialist science and religion, and another level of
separation between the material earth and the heavens. Blake elaborates on the
emanation of this net in The Four Zoas:
Travelling thro darkness & whereever he traveld a dire Web
Followd behind him as the Web of a Spider dusky & cold
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Shivering across from Vortex to Vortex drawn out from his mantle of
years
A living Mantle adjoind to his life & growing from his Soul
And the Web of Uri zen stre[t]chd direful shivring in clouds

... winding round to the heavens of heavens
Within the dark horrors of the Abysses lion or tyger or scorpion.
(6.73.31-39)
To leave little doubt that he is describing the astronomical heavens here, Blake again
references the Abyss, as well as the constellations of Leo and Scorpius, and perhaps
Lynx. 54
On plate 27 of Jerusalem, Blake writes, "You have a tradition, that Man anciently
containd in his mighty limbs all things in Heaven & Earth. . .. But now the Starry
Heavens are fled from the mighty limbs of Albion" (E171). Blake's stated ideology
regarding the individual as the center of his or her own cosmos-a hierarchy expanding
outward from the divine inner self to the fallen outer world-lies at the very heart of his
vision of the universe. In Blake's cosmology-like the perspective offered by another
practical convention of astronomical science-namely, a sky globe 55 -the orientations of

On the contents page of the Bulletin ofResearch in the Humanities (84.3), Erdman notes that in the
eighteenth century the constellation Lynx was alternately known as the Tiger. He further speculates that
the inspiration for the smiling, "rather amiable Lynx" seen in Bode's Uranographia (1801), which, I would
note, depicts the traditional constellations against the backdrop grid of celestial longitude and latitude,
perhaps likewise "influenced Blake's illustration to 'The Tyger' in the Songs ofExperience," published
1794.
55 A conceptual scientific instrument which maps the heavens as seen from the earth onto the convex
surface of a globe.
54
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inward and outward are reversed, with "Eternity" lying at the center of all. This
proposed inversion of the material and the eternal is presented by Blake as yet another
consequence of the fall. When humankind fell, he argues, its collective senses turned
outward: "Their eyes their ears nostrils & tongues roll outward they behold / What is
within now seen without" (The Four Zoas 2.25.22-23). From that moment forward,
nature appeared as a material entity separate from man, himself now also clothed in
"vegetative" matter. 56 Both conclusions are false, Blake maintains:
[I]n your own Bosom you bear your Heaven
And Earth & all you behold, tho it appears Without it is Within.

(Jerusalem 71.17-18).
This involuted view of the cosmos, this refashioning of its structure to affirm the notion
of eternity within and the spiritual and creative meaning lying beneath and beyond
surfaces, is not original to Blake. It has been a central tenet of theosophical belief
systems since their inception. But it is nonetheless radical, and thus representative of that
aspect of Blake's approach to revisioning the universe of materialist science.

Change in the Natural World
Blake's commitment to radical change in this world-most notably in the social
and political realms-has become a central part of his identity for critics. But in keeping
with his character, Blake's view of change is not uncomplicated, particularly as it is
played out in the sphere of living things. A defining moment in regard to Blake's views
Vegetable/vegetative: In general, Blake intends these terms to mean the corporeal/physical. In specific
instances, it also suggests life without thought or sentience.
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on the biological world occurs early in Europe: A Prophecy, the Preludium of which
centers around the lament of the Shadowy Female 57 as she agonizes over nature's
inherent cruelty and its incessant cycle of fertility and death. 58
Unwilling I look up to heaven! unwilling count the stars!
Sitting in fathomless abyss of my immortal shrine.
I sieze their burning power
And bring forth howling terrors ...
Devouring & devoured roaming on dark and desolate mountains
In forests of eternal death. (2.1_6)59

It is, as Blake later affirms in Jerusalem, a "Creation that groans, living on Death, / where
Fish & Bird & Beast & Man & Tree & Metal & Stone / Live by devouring, going into
Eternal Death continually" (50.5-7).60 In characterizing these harsh dynamics of nature,
Blake establishes his dichotomy of life, introducing on plate 16 of The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell the archetypes of "The Prolific and the Devouring."

Thus one portion of being, is the Prolific. the other, the
Devouring: to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in
his chains, but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence
and fancies that the whole.

In Blake's system of myth: this material earth.
Cf. "Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a
struggle for existence" (Darwin Origin a/Species 63).
59 Cf. The "forests of the night" in "The Tyger"-another avatar of predatory physical violence.
60 The tree is sustained by "devouring" the nutrients of decomposed organisms in the soil. As for the metal
and stone, one must assume that Blake is referring to the process of vulcanism, wherein the earth's crust
itself is recycled. Thus, every extant entity is indebted to the demise of some predecessor-a process that,
as Blake indicates at the close of Jerusalem, stops only in Eternity.
57
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But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the
Devourer as a sea recieved the excess of his delights. (E40)
As it is instituted, Blake argues, this earthly realm of corporeal existence is based on
cruelty61 and cannot continue without it: "These two classes of men are always upon
earth, & they should be enemies; whosoever tries to reconcile them seeks to destroy
existence.,,62 As painful and perhaps wasteful as it is, Blake argues, still, the struggle
between these contraries offers progress.
As the previous excerpt illustrates, these distinctions of Prolific and Devouring
exist not only between species, but also within the same species. In a subsequent passage
of The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, Blake offers up a scene in which these roles are just
so co-identified. It occurs midway through the work, when Blake turns the tables on his
guiding "Angel," remarking, "[N]ow we have seen my etemallot, shall I shew you
yours?" (19; E42).
I descended driving the Angel before me, soon we saw seven houses
of brick, one we enterd; in it were a number of monkeys,
baboons, & all of that species chaind by the middle, grinning and
snatching at one another, but witheld by the shortness of their
chains: however I saw that they sometimes grew numerous, and then
the weak were caught by the strong and with a grinning aspect,
first coupled with & then devourd, by plucking off first one limb

61 "Eternity," by contrast, is characterized by "mercy." Whatever "mercy" the material creations of time
and space possess are, Blake argues, the product of their merciful transience.
62 The Marriage a/Heaven Hell 16-17; E40.
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and then another till the body was left a helpless trunk. this
after grinning & kissing it with seeming fondness they devourd
too. (19-20; E42)
Blake's proffered vision of humanity's descent to-rather than ascent from-a simian
hell is, like the rest of the episodes in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, intended to be
instructional, in this case allowing the reader to witness firsthand a stylized and
nightmarish spectacle of a species' self-predation. The provocative question is why
Blake chooses monkeys for this depiction. 63 One possibility, one that relates to the
previously articulated thesis of Blake's engagement with the speculations of the new
science, is that they are there because of their manifest similarities to human beings. But
these similarities are muted by important differences. Thus one is left to speculate
whether Blake intends to suggest that what separates monkeys from men constitutes a
narrow gap or an uncrossable gulf.
To suggest that this primate context might be meant to evoke, at least in part, the
question of human origins does not require any claims that Blake is here anticipating
concepts contained within Charles Darwin's Origin ofSpecies-which would not be
published for another seventy years. 64 We need simply only acknowledge the scientific
arguments and speculations ongoing at the close of the eighteenth century, for the later
work of Charles Darwin lies clearly grounded in the nascent concepts articulated by,

63 One answer might be that since, according to folk tradition, there are apes in hell anyway, why not use
them? The trope of unmarried women "leading apes in(to) hell" was well established in literature
perhaps the most famous example being that in Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, wherein Beatrice
answers Leonato that her intent is to lead the apes of any potential suitors up to the gates of hell, then
simply step aside as they march in (2.1.31-46).
64 The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell composed circa 1790.
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among others, his own grandfather. We may note that Coleridge, responding to Erasmus
Darwin's speculations in a letter to Wordsworth, criticizes "the absurd notion of ...
Darwin ... of Man's having progressed from an Ouran Outang state-so

~ontrary

to all

History, to all Religion, nay, to all Possibility.,,65 On this topic, Blake's views appear to
align with those of Coleridge, and, indeed, Blake's resistance to the idea of biological
evolution would be wholly consistent with the ideology staked out in his works.
In "Eternity," as Blake envisions it, entities are unchanging, since-in the
perfection of eternity-nothing need change:
In Eternity one Thing never Changes into another Thing Each Identity is
Eternal. . . . A Man can never become Ass nor Horse some are born with
shapes of Men who may be both but Eternal Identity is one thing &
Corporeal Vegetation is another thing Changing Water into Wine by Jesus
& into Blood by Moses relates to Vegetable Nature.

(A Vision ofthe Last Judgment N79; E556)
The last two lines here, however, would appear to open the door to evolution in the

material realm. 66 Note, however, that the two instances of such a change that Blake cites
are the result of divine miracles wrought by God or his representative, reflecting a break
in the normal history of the world. 67 In regard to the connection between the material and
eternal realms as it presently exists-i.e., pre-apocalypse-Blake proposes that "every

Selected Letters 188.
What to make of the fact that Blake elsewhere forbids such miracles is unknown (see Annotations to
Watson 12; E616-17).
67 Blake describes another change in the material world scheduled to occur under similar circumstances
namely, the transforming renovation due at the outset of the apocalypse and the arrival of the "New Earth"
(Vision ofthe Last Judgment N84; E561).

65

66

114

Natural Effect has a Spiritual Cause" (Milton 26.44). This would seem to imply that
changes in material forms could only stem from precipitating changes in their underlying
spiritual forms. To revisit the distinctions between the dynamic and the transformative
from Chapter One, where the former describes changes in conditions and the latter
changes in entities, it would seem that Blake would tend to endorse the former and deny
the latter, writing in Milton that "States Change: but Individual Identities never change
nor cease" (32.22-23).
Other critics have drawn less skeptical conclusions regarding Blake's views on
this topic. In "Evolution and William Blake," Carmen Kreiter argues for Blake's
advanced knowledge and possible support of a precursor to the biogenetic law of
"ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,,68 some sixty-five years before Darwin published the
Origin and seventy-two years before his disciple Haeckel first enunciated that

extrapolated axiom. 69 Kreiter's argument is based upon three lines from The Book of
Urizen (1794):

Many forms offish, bird & beast
Since discredited. More correctly stated, the ontogeny of higher organisms recapitulates ancestral
ontogenies.
69 Any claim of this kind, of course, requires some form of provenance. Kreiter suggests that "one of
Blake's acquaintances may have possessed advanced scientific knowledge" (111). In Kreiter's assessment,
Blake possibly had such a contact in the person of "England's famous surgeon John Hunter [1728-93], who
was also a great anatomist and embryologist" (112). Ultimately, Kreiter draws the conclusion that a
"concatenation of facts and internal evidence suggests that the details of embryology, anatomy, and
evolution utilized by Blake in Urizen were indeed drawn from John Hunter" (112). In William Blake and
the Body, Tristanne J. Connolly, while supporting this proposed connection between Blake and John
Hunter, finds little direct evidence of contact but does succeed in establishing a credible connection
between Blake andHunter's older brother William, who might not only have been a conduit of ideas but
could have possibly provided direct access and entry to John Hunter's world. As Connolly writes,
"William Hunter was Professor of Anatomy at the Royal Academy from 1768 to 1783; Blake joined in
1779.... As a student at the Royal Academy, Blake probably would have attended some of the lectures
and demonstrations offered" (35). In this instance, I would offer that the question of actual acquaintance
becomes more relevant, since John Hunter's views on embryology were not in print when Blake wrote The
Book of Urizen.
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Brought forth an Infant form
Where was a worm before. 7o
(19.35-37)
"It is possible," Krieter suggests, "that Blake was using the new biogenetic law to

indicate straightforwardly his acceptance of a new and much debated scientific theory of
man's origin" (118). Once again, the notion that Blake might postulate on evolutionary
theory in the 1790s is not remarkable. The idea, after all, was in the air at the tum of the
nineteenth century. As noted in Chapter One, it is explicitly outlined in Erasmus
Darwin's posthumously published Temple ofNature (1803).
Organic life beneath the shoreless waves
Was born and nurs'd in ocean's pearly caves;
First forms minute, unseen by spheric glass,
Move on the mud, or pierce the watery mass;
These, as successive generations bloom,
New powers acquire and larger limbs assume;
Whence countless groups of vegetation spring,
And breathing realms of fin and feet and wing.
But if the description of Orc' s development from Urizen is to be taken as Blake's
acknowledgement of evolutionary theory, an important question arises in regard to how
this passage bears upon Blake's subsequent assertion in Vision ofthe Last Judgment

Blake association of human beings with worms appears to be grounded in Job 25:6. In the context of the
comparison that not even stars are pure in God's sight, the speaker asks: "How much less man, that is a
worm? and the son of man, which is a worm?" The obvious associations with mortality are also in play.
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(1810) that "one thing never changes into another." Is there a contradiction here? There
might be if Blake actually accepted evolutionary theory, with its central tenet of species
change. As it stands, he may simply be acknowledging that all organisms, even humans,
develop within the context of their lifespans-that we, like other creatures, might pass
through the equivalent of a "larval" stage. 71 This would not preclude him from holding
the still dominant belief of the time that the essential forms of species-that is, their
types-were fixed. Krieter would appear to concede this:
Blake's three lines, in themselves, can be said to only reflect the preDarwinian observation that the embryo of a human being passes through
various forms resembling the adult forms of lower life-a fact that does
not necessarily entail species evolution. (111; emphasis added)
An alternative view regarding episodes of apparent evolutionary thinking in Blake
posits that, in any identification of such processes in Blake, we must raise the possibility
that what the reader is witnessing is simply the process of materialization-the physical
incarnation initiated by the creation/fall-drawn out to an agonizing degree. Even
Kreiter might admit that this is a more likely interpretation of such imagery in Blake,
since, as she writes, the poet's acceptance of this "new and much debated scientific
theory of man's origin ... would not appear to agree with Blake's known prejudices"
(118).
On the two schools of embryology active at the time, Tristanne Connolly writes, "Theories of
development took two major forms: preformationist and epigenesist. ... 'Preformationists understood
growth as an increase in size of an already complex creature- one whose limbs, organs, and so forth were
understood to be initially invisible only because of limitations of the human eye.' ... Epigenesists, whose
view began to prevail at the tum ofthe century, believed 'that the embryo develops and becomes more
complex in it organization, that it changes morphologically rather than just in size '" (81). Kreiter's
argument would place Blake with the camp of epigenesists.
71
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There is one last fundamental obstacle in regard to Blake's possible acceptance of
an early iteration of evolutionary theory: biological evolution, like the other proposed

.

revisions of the new Romantic scientific paradigm, likely represented for Blake simply
another reworking-if not an outright metaphysical expansion-of material processes he
was forced to reject out of principle. Further, this specific scheme in all likelihood would
have been especially unpalatable to him, in that it sought to link more intimately
humankind with "vegetable" nature. While Blake was undoubtedly accustomed to the
notion of change in the natural world-generation, birth, maturity, decay, and deathevolutionary theory proposed a new order of change and a further testament to the powers
of matter.

Material Revolutions
At the close of this chapter, in a bid to further establish the link between political
and scientific revolutions raised earlier, I would here note that Blake's critiques of
science, usually expressed within the context of diatribes directed toward the figure of
Uri zen, from time to time take on the unmistakable aspect of anti-monarchical political
rhetoric,72 with Blake, within the personae of various figures, threatening to depose
sCIence. In The Four Zoas, "The Eternal Man" confronts Urizen with his demands for
reform:

72 Blake's own identified connections between the political and scientific spheres are evident in his
observations on the state of the arts in Europe and England in the early nineteenth century, with the
"wretched state of the Arts in this Country & in Europe originating in the Wretched State of Political
Science which is the Science of Sciences" (Public Address N20; E580).
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[I]f thou darest obstinate refuse my stern behest
Thy crown & scepter I will sieze & regulate all my members
In stern severity & cast thee out into the indefinite
Where nothing lives, there to wander. (9.120.34-37)
Blake, like Wordsworth, like many poets of the era, certainly drew inspiration from the
political events transpiring in America and in France-particularly the latter, where the
events of the early Revolution were viewed with almost apocalyptic anticipation. They
saw the possibility of the Last Judgment being realized in their lifetimes and, with it, the
long-awaited redemption of a fallen world. But Last Ju.dgments, like the revolutions that
presage them, can be figurative things. In Blake's eyes, once he adjusted his vision, a last
judgment became an event that occurred whenever error was recognized and cast out. 73

It became an event synonymous with the recovery of one's imaginative vision, producing
not so much a change in the world as a change in one's worldview. In the case of Blake,
one after-effect of such a philosophical realignment was that the portrait of the French
Revolution in his works became a largely negative one. Debate still rages whether this
was because the revolt was doomed to fail from its inception because its means were
physical rather than imaginative. There is, however, an appreciable difference in the
revolutionary rhetoric on display in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell (c. 1790)
"France rend down thy dungeon" (25)-and that of The Four Zoas (1797-1804)74 and
Jerusalem (1804-1820) on the subject of "Mental" versus "Corporeal War.,,75

73 "[W]henever any Individual Rejects Error & Embraces Truth a Last Judgment passes upon that
Individual" (A Visi.on ofthe Last Judgment N84[b]; E562). This reassessment occurred sometime after
1793 and before 1810, VLJ's year of publication.
74
Urthona rises from the ruinous walls
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.......,.

Our wars are wars of life, & wounds of love
With intellectual spears, & long winged arrows of thought.
(Jerusalem 34.14-15; E180)
This same characterization and subsequent rejection of materiality by Blake might be
extended to Romantic science. Despite its many ostensive attractions, embodied in its
fundamental differences from its Enlightenment predecessor, it was still a materialist
science. Its concepts, such as organic evolution and material infinity, were revolutionary,
enough so to topple the Enlightenment scientific paradigm. However, by successfully
separating materialism from mechanism and by expanding materialism's domain, it only
more strongly advanced the primacy of matter and, in the process, "Single vision."
Blake's intent, meanwhile, and his final destination, was the achievement of the mystical
ecstasy of fourfold vision, which no earthly science could approach.

In all his ancient strength to form the golden armour of science
For intellectual War[.] The war of swords departed now.
(The Four Zoas 9.139.7-9; E407)
Urthona is the eternal form of Los, now reunited with his emanation Enitharmon.
75 Milton Preface; E95.
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Chapter Four
Wordsworth

The Spirit of the Age

In "English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age," M. H. Abrams questions
William Hazlitt's long-standing assumption that it was the French Revolution and
Wordsworth's sojourn in France (1791-92) that served as the instrumental sources for the
poet's republican views. l Far earlier, Abrams finds, the poet was influenced in this
regard by his religious sympathies. 2 Beyond that, there is another important selfdocumented early influence-namely, the poet's college years:
N or was it least
Of many debts which afterwards lowed
To Cambridge and an academic life,
That something there was holden up to view
Of a republic, where all stood thus far
Upon equal ground; that we were brothers all.
(The Prelude 1805 9.226-31i

Kenneth Johnston, who has examined Wordsworth's political development in detail,

Expounded in Hazlitt's own The Spirit a/the Age (1825).
Abrams cites Wordsworth's "subservience from the first / To God and nature's single sovereignty" (The
Prelude 1805 9.237-38; The Prelude 18509.233-35). Particularly influential were the writings of the New
Testament, grounded in "the radical paradox that 'the last shall be first'" ("Spirit" 65).
3 Whenever possible, excerpts from The Prelude within this study have been drawn from the 1805 version,
with the corresponding line numbers from the 1850 version cited in footnote. In this instance, the passage
from The Prelude 1850 (9.222-27) interestingly omits any specific reference to Cambridge.
I
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notes that this "idealized view of Cambridge sits very ill with Wordsworth's account of it
in Book III [of The Prelude], and even less well with his actual performance there" (183).
It was in October of 1787 that Wordsworth first entered St. John's College ~t Cambridge,

where, as biographer George McLean Harper notes, "[h]aving a year's start of the other
freshmen in mathematics, he neglected that branch of learning" (30).4 Evidence indicates
it was Wordsworth's lack of interest in the discipline, rather than his lack of aptitude, that
held him back at the university and explains his lackluster performance there. Jonathan
Wordsworth, et al., examining the correspondence of Dorothy Wordsworth, note that
"Dorothy ascribed her brother's failure to achieve a fellowship to his dislike of
mathematics, the dominant subject at Cambridge, and at this period the only one in which
academic distinction could be achieved: 'William, you may have heard lost the chance,
indeed the certainty, of a fellowship by not combating his inclinations'" (Prelude nIl 0).
Though it did not constitute a period of academic distinction, Wordsworth's time
at Cambridge (October 1787 to January 1791) did serve the purpose of exposing him to
activist political influences. 5 Often overlooked, however, is the changeable nature of
these influences, particularly in regard to university views toward the Revolution. In
1789, Nicholas Roe notes, "Cambridge University welcomed the French Revolution,"
with "a great number of members of the Senate" actively friendly to the cause (Radical
Wordsworth's grammar school years at Hawkshead (1779-1787) had centered around a curriculum
stressing mathematics, for which he displayed an above-average level of ability. Wordsworth reflects on
his college experience with math and what he describes as his modest skills in that area in The Prelude
18056.135-53 (The Prelude 18506.115-32).
5 While pervasive at the university, such influences were, as Harper observes, anything but officially
sanctioned. Harper adds that Wordsworth's embrace of these influences may well have contributed to the
alienation he felt there, emphasizing that "English universities of [Wordsworth's] day were not, in a broad
sense, national institutions. They were organs of the Church of England. . . . In academic groups religious
and political doubt were treated with the disgust due to filial ingratitude" (32, 36).
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Years 17). Then came the 1790 publication of Edmund Burke's Reflections on the
Revolution in France, and everything changed:
The mood of Cambridge after 1790 reflected growing anti-French opinion
elsewhere in the country. This change provides a significant demarcation
between the period leading up to Wordsworth's departure from St. John's
in January 1791, and Coleridge's arrival at Jesus on 16 October of that
year. ... Wordsworth's Cambridge had joined with liberals and dissenters
throughout the country in welcoming the Revolution, whereas Coleridge's
Cambridge was divided by the argument as to what the Revolution had
achieved. (Radical Years 17-18)
Recent scholarship is divided regarding Wordsworth's individual political orientation.
For example, while Johnston agrees that Wordsworth "sympathized with the direction of
liberal reform and republican sentiment," at the same time the author points out that
"[Wordsworth] also contained within himself tendencies of a sharply opposite nature"
(184).6 The evolving point of discussion has now become whether Wordsworth ever

actually had any radical principles to compromise in later life or revolutionary impulses
that needed to be sublimated-as Abrams has famously speculated-by an "inward
turn,,7 to the medium of poetry. One view of Wordsworth gaining support, Johnston
notes, proposes that

Johnston argues that "[Wordsworth's] own personal, family politics, his interests, were Pittite all the
way" (184). William Pitt, British Prime Minister from 1783 to 1801, began his political career as a protege
of Whig leader Charles Fox. His later political evolution saw him transformed into a moderate PM and
finally into a loyali'St collaborator and leader of the crackdown on dissent.
7 Abrams writes, "When the later events in France dashed their faith in political revolution as a means to
the millennium, a number of Romantic writers salvaged their apocalyptic hope by giving it a new
6
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-,
he and his poetry existed much more within the confines of established
social and cultural norms than the traditional romanticizing of his poetical
revolution acknowledges. His later conservatism thus

app~ars

less as a

betrayal of his younger self than as its continuation in more public (and
more extreme) forms. This was a suspicion that his younger
contemporaries always had of him and that recent scholarship has
substantially confirmed. (669; emphasis added)8
If, however, for the sake of argument, Wordsworth's radical leanings were sincere, 9 and a
philosophical involution along the lines of an "inward tum" did actually occur,10 it would
have a clear parallel in Wordsworth's and also Blake's apparent rejection of the emerging
paradigm of Romantic science, in that these poets may have felt compelled to turn their
backs on the scientific revolution of their day for exactly the same reason it is speculated
that they renounced active political revolt-namely, the consequences they perceived its
materialist orientation as having for the imaginative and spiritual elements at the heart of
interpretation. They transferred the agency of apocalypse from mass action to the individual mind-from a
political to a spiritual revolution-and proposed that "the new earth and new heaven" of Revelation is
available here, now, to each man, if only he can make his visionary imagination triumph over his senses
and his sense-bound understanding" ("Romantic Period" 15).
8 In one of the most direct challenges to Wordsworth's radical credentials, James Chandler, in
Wordsworth's Second Nature, has noted the parallels between the writings of Wordsworth and Edmund
Burke. Indeed, Wordsworth's deeply nationalistic views on liberty, far from being forward-looking, do
resemble Burke's in the aspect of their being "profoundly indebted to the English past" (Chandler 61).
9 And there is strong evidence that Wordsworth did at one time possess genuinely radical beliefs: The
poet's unpublished 1793 pamphlet, A Letter to the Bishop ofLlandaff, contains both a justification of the
execution of King Louis XVI ("I am sorry that you attach so much importance to the personal sufferings of
the late royal martyr" (Prose Works, I, 32-33) and an apology for the subsequent Terror ("Alas! the
obstinacy & perversion of men is such that [Liberty] is too often obliged to borrow the very arms of
despotism to overthrow him, and in order to reign in peace must establish herself by violence" (Prose
Works, I, 33-34).
10 As tenuous as the premise of the inward turn presently seems, it is grounded in the observation, which
Roe corroborates, that "[a]s the French Revolution became increasingly bloody, its supporters were
encouraged to ... identify alternative spheres in which human amelioration might yet be practicable"
(Politics ofNature 2).
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their poetic programs.

Matters of Scale
Romantic science, for all of its conceptual innovation, was still science. Even in
its most extreme varieties, it still advanced a fundamentally materialist explanation for
experiential phenomena. On this basis alone, as I have noted, Blake's impulse would
have been to rej ect the new science outright. Wordsworth's reaction was more subdued.
Not as intractably at war with the material world as Blake, Wordsworth likely would
have been much more disturbed by Romantic science's unique twist on materialism than
by its simple inclusion. The suggestion that Wordsworth might have rejected the new
science on the basis of its expansive stretching of spatial and temporal boundaries could
come as a bit of a surprise, especially given that he, like his close associate Coleridge,
had been "habituated to the Vast"ll from the period of youth onward. In Book IV of The

Excursion, I2 Wordsworth poses the question of what is truly eternal. The answer, voiced
by the sage Wanderer, is that the material universe-with absolute certainty-is not. But
for Wordsworth and others of his generation, the new science would have challenged this
certainty.
In addition to the soul, the imagination and the mind in which it dwells could both
be reasonably considered infinite, in that, while both share a corporeal platform, they

II As a result of the fantastic reading of his childhood, Coleridge writes in October 1797, "my mind has
been habituated to the Vast-and I never regarded my senses [versus his reason and imagination] in any
way as the criteria of my belief' (Letters, Griggs, I, 354-55).
12 Though published in 1814, portions of this work, particularly key passages dealing with issues of science
and culture, date from the turn of the century. These will be noted when cited. This passage (beginning at
line 66) in all likelihood was composed later but is germane to this discussion.
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themselves have no physical existence. But everything else in our experience would
seem to be subject to the limitations the Wanderer describes. The concept of an infinite
material universe, however, extending endlessly in all four dimensions, p~esented for
Wordsworth a metaphysically adulterated construct of disorienting character and
disruptive implications. In regard to physical nature, there was for Wordsworth it seems
a distinction between the awe-inspiringly vast and the alienatingly infinite. While the
latter would seem to meet the criterion of the sublime, careful consideration reveals that it
simultaneously pushes the concept to its breaking point, in that the sublime in the
Romantic sense is defined in a comparative context between the object in question and
the essential human observer-specifically, nature's ability to affect the mind of the
observer by merit of its power, grandeur, or scale-all of which is underwritten by the
religiously informed sentiment that this affect on the observer is the purpose of such
natural sublimity. But the view ushered in by the new science was, as Gaull describes it,
one of "an alien and inaccessible external universe ... created long before and with little
relevance to human beings" (English Romanticism 373). The new regime, by challenging
the relevance of this previously defining element of necessary human perspective, had the
result of yielding a universe that magnified the non-human physical void at the expense
of the human poetic vision and voice, an outcome which Wordsworth would later appear
to lament in Book III of The Excursion:
V oiceless the stream descends into the gulf
With timid lapse;-and lo! while in this strait
I stand-the chasm of sky above my head
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Is heaven's profoundest azure; no domain
For fickle, short-lived clouds to occupy,
Or to pass through; but rather an abyss
In which the everlasting stars abide. 13
Within these lines resides a vivid, through grantedly speculative, assessment of poetry's
future, with the "chasm of sky ... an abyss / In which the everlasting stars abide"
suggestive of the newly conceived physical universe, fathomless now in both scale and
duration, and the human voice intimidated into silence. In a move of characteristic
healthy self-estimation, Wordsworth responds to this bleak scenario with a direct address
to his own mental powers:
Hail Contemplation!

hither come and find a lodge
To which thou mayst resort for holier peace,
From whose calm centre thou, through height or depth,14
Mayst penetrate, wherever truth shall lead;
Measuring through all degrees, until the scale
Of time and conscious nature disappear,
Lost in unsearchable eternity!

.

This excerpt and the following are found between lines 3.92-112.
14 The realm of three dimensions- i.e. , physical space.
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There is little doubt that the "eternity" Wordsworth reasserts here is a contrasting and
traditionally conceived spiritual eternity, subsuming and exceeding the dimensions of the
newly configured physical universe.
Engaged with the science of his day, Wordsworth, the evidence suggests, actively
responded to the concern that if the universe was in truth limitless, humanity might
subsequently be demoted and decentered-in short, lost in the scale of creation. The
resulting preoccupation with matters of scale that one finds in Wordsworth's poetical
works serves to support claims of the poet's resistance to this notion of humanity as
something perhaps spatially and temporally incidental. Metaphors of scale in regard to
the effects of science in particular-for instance, the repeated use of descriptors
suggesting division and dwindlinglS--communicate not only the traditional poetic
concern about science making the individual investigator's spirit a meaner thing, but also
a new warning that the enterprise collectively labors to diminish humankind in the grand
scheme of time and space. Wordsworth's gravest concern, in all likelihood, lay in how
these issues might affect the final estimation of the human poetic imagination, the fear
being that it, like ourselves, could be diminished by the ultimate scale, and that it might
come to be viewed as a transient rather than a transcendent faculty.

15 One example: Wordsworth questions whether in the course of scientific investigation "'twas ever meant
/ That we should pry far off yet be unraised; / That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore" (The
Excursion 4.958-60). Excerpt originally composed 1798, as part of the Addendum to "The Ruined
Cottage" (58-60).
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The New Materialism
Wordsworth is clearly not averse to the notion of spiritual infinity, the existence
of which is frequently suggested to him by scenes from the natural world. For example,
here at Mt. Snowdon, in Book XIII of The Prelude 1805:
I beheld the emblem of a mind
That feeds upon infinity, that broods
Over the dark abyss, intent to hear
Its voices issuing forth to silent light
In one continuous stream; a mind sustained
By recognitions of transcendent power. (73-78)16
That we come from infinity is in large part the argument of the Intimations Ode (1802
1804); thus, such infinity cannot be considered alien.17 The same, however, cannot be
said for infinity's new material expression-at least, not by Wordsworth around this time.
By later in his career, however, in a passage not present in The Prelude 1805, the poet

seems to have come to terms with-or at least can finally acknowledge-the new view of
the universe, and mathematical science's role in establishing it:
[B]y what process led,

16
17

The Prelude 1850 14.70-75.
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
Bllt trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.
(Intimations Ode 5.1-8)
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Those immaterial agents 18 bowed their heads
Duly to serve the mind of earth-born man;
From star to star, from kindred sphere to sphere,
From system on to system without end.
(The Prelude 1850 6.124-28)19
But in the lines immediately following this insert, Wordsworth reverts back to the
traditional (and comfortable) notion of a materially bounded universe, with its
unquestioned inferiority to the eternal and infinite spiritual realm.
[T]here,20 [I] recognised
A type, for finite natures, of the one
Supreme Existence, the surpassing life
Which-to the boundaries of space and time,
Of melancholy space and doleful time,
Superior and incapable of change,
Nor touched by welterings of passion-is,
And hath the name of, God.
(The Prelude 1850 6.132-39)
Though it has not been noted by other commentators, 1would argue that the existence of
a corresponding (if less developed) equivalent of this latter passage in the 1805 version

21

The "abstractions" of "geometric science" (lines 117 and 123).
As Jonathan Wordsworth, et al., note, "The 1850 Prelude is the result of three full-scale reworkings of
the poem, and numerous minor revisions. In 1816119, 1832, and 1839, new faircopies were made, and
from the last of these The Prelude was fmally printed just ten weeks after Wordsworth's death" (xi).
20 In mathematics.
21 The Prelude 1805 6.154-57.
18

19
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confirms that the passage preceding it in 1850 is indeed an insert, an enhancement of his
1805 position, indicating-if not a shift in Wordsworth's attitude in later decades-then
at least the eventual recognition on his part of a change in the scientific viewpoint.
Wordsworth's response to the new materialism proposed by Romantic science, as
well as the old materialism of Enlightenment science, usually finds expression within a
context of generalized anti-scientific rhetoric, which can lead to the voicing of some
unexpected characterizations and conclusions on the poet's part, particularly toward the
material object of science's study-namely, the natural world. In contrast to our divine
origins cited in the opening lines of stanza five of the Intimations Ode, our earthly
experience, described later in stanza five and stanza six, is presented in a comparative
critique of nature wherein "Shades of the prison-house" soon close about the "Inmate
Man" (5.10; 6.6). A decade later, on the topic of science's "dominion over nature,"
Wordsworth writes, without apparent irony:
yet do I exult,
Casting reserve away, exult to see
An intellectual mastery exercised
0' er the blind elements; a purpose given,
A perseverance fed; almost a soul
Imparted-to brute matter.

(The Excursion 8.199-204)
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Within the context of this darker perspective, a strategy of sorts emerges on
Wordsworth's part-not one of confrontation, but rather one of letting materialism run its
course and play itself out. The preceding passage continues:
[W]ith the sense of admiration blends
The animating hope that time may come
When, strengthened, yet not dazzled, by the might
Of this dominion over nature gained,
Men of all lands shall exercise the same
In due proportion to their country's need;
Learning, though late, that all true glory rests,
All praise, all safety, and all happiness,
Upon the moral law. (The Excursion 8.208-16)
This hands-off response to the actions of material science is not a move of resignation on
Wordsworth's part, but apparently one of faith: a deep and abiding faith in the failings
inherent in the materialist viewpoint. In a late poem, "Musings near Aquapendente"
(183 7), Wordsworth speculates on the dark fate awaiting the ever-expanding scientific
enterprise; employing a variation on the "river of time" metaphor, he reflects on the
scientific character of the nineteenth century thus far:
The Stream
Has to our generation brought and brings
Innumerable gains; yet we, who now
Walk in the light of day, pertain full surely
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To a chilled age, most pitiably shut out
From that which 'is' and actuates, by forms,
Abstractions, and by lifeless fact to fact
Minutely linked with diligence uninspired,
Unrectified, unguided, unsustained,
By godlike insight. To this fate is doomed
Science, wide-spread and spreading still as be
Her conquests, in the world of sense made known. (321-32)
The concluding lines here referring to the "wide-spread and spreading ... conquests" of
science are, of course, quite provocative and suggest the possible argument that science's
fatal flaws, as Wordsworth sees them, are in no way ameliorated, and perhaps are even
exacerbated, by the expanding materialist vision of the cosmos fostered by the ongoing
change in the scientific paradigm. Interestingly, this poem dates from the same period as
the final revisions to The Prelude 1850, and thus may be concurrent with that poem's
earlier identified explicit acknowledgement of the new material infinity of Romantic
science. 22

Wordsworth and the New Science: Access and Issues
As a working poet during the tum-of-the-century period for which he is of most
interest to literary historians, Wordsworth's views on the subject of science were shaped
by a variety of sources, none more important than his association with Samuel Taylor

22

The Prelude 1850 6.124-28.
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Coleridge, which from the year 1795 forward brought Wordsworth into close contact
with the world of contemporary scientific thought. Of this astonishingly productive
period of poetic collaboration, James Averill writes,
The year of almost daily contact in Somersetshire cause[ d] Wordsworth to
become aware of contemporary scientific inquiry. References to
"Science" and requests for books of natural philosophy begin to appear in
his poems and letters, as he makes an intense, if short-lived, attempt to
comprehend and exploit poetically the scientific discoveries of the age.
(235)
Coleridge did unquestionably endeavor to keep Wordsworth involved in this area. One
notable account, in a 1801 letter from Coleridge to Humphry Davy,23 relates Coleridge's
unrealized plan for starting up a "Chemical Laboratory" and recruiting Wordsworth into
the venture with the intent of supplying his friend with some much needed diversion from
the demands of poetry, Coleridge writing, "[H]e feels it ... necessary for him to have
some intellectual pursuit less closely connected with deep passion than poetry and is of
course desirous, too, not be so wholly ignorant of knowledge, so exceedingly
important. ,,24

Davy was a personal acquaintance of Wordsworth as well (through Coleridge). As Roger Sharrock
reports, before discontinuing his term of residence in Bristol, "Davy had corrected the proofs of the second
edition of Lyrical Ballads, receiving them in batches from Wordsworth with his directions. It was a
convenient arrangement since Biggs & Cottle, the publishers, were in Bristol and Wordsworth was far
away in Grasmere . . . [and because] Wordsworth was averse to the drudgery of correction" (57). Through
their contact, Davy was likely an important influence on Wordsworth's attitudes toward science but, as
noted above, not as large an influence as Coleridge would have liked.
24 Letters, Griggs, Vol. 2, 670.
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The pursuit of scientific knowledge had a definite influence on the poetic
collaboration of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Wordsworth's letter of March 11, 1798, to
James Losh makes clear one of the principal motives behind the poets' publication of

Lyrical Ballads-namely, to provide funding for what was envisioned as in part a
scientific expedition to Germany: "We have come to a resolution, Coleridge, Mrs.
Coleridge, my Sister, and myself of going into Germany, where we purpose to pass the
two ensuing years in order to acquire the German language, and to furnish ourselves with
a tolerable stock of information in natural science.,,25 Given the timing of this
announcement, and their declared destination, the knowledge that Wordsworth and
especially Coleridge sought would have included elements of the Naturphilosophie of
Schelling, et al. As Trevor Levere describes it: "Schelling had formulated a philosophy
tending in the same direction as Coleridge's thought and feeling," one that showed the
way toward "a dynamic science that would oppose and topple sterile, dead, mechanical
science"; in short, "Coleridge became persuaded that he needed to go to Germany"

(Poetry Realized 68, 16).26
Coleridge's selective attraction to some species of Romantic science-such as

Naturphilosophie 27-and resistance to others-such as Erasmus Darwin's evolutionary

Early Letters 189.
Once actually in Germany, it should be noted, Coleridge and the Wordsworths promptly split up.
William and Dorothy, because of their [mances, wound up in Goslar, where they rode out a hard winter in
the rustic setting. Coleridge's destinations, meanwhile, included the university towns of Ratzeburg and
Gottingen, where he pursued his interests. The actual duration of their stay abroad was less than a year.
27 Among the species of Romantic science in existence at the tum of the century, the German variant did
prove to be the most accommodating and popular choice for Romantic poets, at least for a time. Coleridge,
for one, was an adherent until he became dissatisfied with its failure to discriminate between the
speculative and the empirical (Levere, Poetry Realized 68). Coleridge's views on empiricism are complex,
but, in essence, what he saw as a vice in poetry he could allow as a virtue in science.
25
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speculations28-is significant in that Coleridge's views exercised a direct influence on
Wordsworth's views. Beyond the concept of material infinity and the challenge it posed
to the anti-materialist rhetoric of the Romantic poetic program, the most vocal flashpoint
~ ,

between the practitioners of the new poetry and the new science lay within the concept of
evolution. On the topic of biological evolution, particularly, Coleridge had a keen
interest; which is not to say that his expressed sympathies for a dynamic and developing
natural system extended to the history of humankind. On the contrary, Levere writes,
Coleridge repeatedly remarked nature's self-anticipation-instinct in ants
foreshadowing understanding in man, the anatomy of the apes
foreshadowing human anatomy .... But between the lower anticipation
and the higher manifestation there was always an absolute separation....
"[T]he impassable Chasm between the highest Orders of Animals and the
Man ... cannot be filled up or bridged over. . .. [The preceding] dim
Prophecies [are] not incipient Fulfillments." (Poetry Realized 214)
In Coleridge's view, there is an observable ascent of life-a ladder being the key
metaphor-but it is a created rather than a developed hierarchy, with the spaces between
the rungs of the ladder every bit as important as the rungs themselves. In Coleridge's
scheme, humanity was the crowning achievement of nature, embodying all of the
refinements modeled by lower organisms.

To reprise Coleridge's opinion ofE. Darwin's speculations: "[T]he absurd notion of ... Darwin ... of
Man's having progressed from an Ouran Outang state-so contrary to all History, to all Religion, nay, to
all Possibility" (Selected Letters 188).
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A generalized Romantic poetic resistance to the notion of biological evolution,
clearly evident in Coleridge, may be traced to two intricately related perceptions
regarding the earliest version of the theory: first, that it required no creator, and, second,
that it defied logic. Disallowing any consideration of the timeframe necessary for the
processes of evolution to work, as most theories of origin did prior to Hutton's revised
estimate of earth's age, the alternative to intelligent design was not gradual development
over the ages but rather the instantaneous and "fortuitous concourse of atoms" that Lord
Byron once derided. 29 If the universe and the ancestor of every living thing came into
existence in its present form in a single instant, then creation by divine agency was the
only logical argument. As for Wordsworth's own views on evolution, a telling episode is
recorded in the closing passages of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads: In regard to the
futility of analyzing whether a work constitutes good poetry or bad if it has not yet been
ascertained that it is poetry in the first place, Wordsworth observes, "Why trouble
yourself about the species till you have previously decided upon the genus? Why take
pains to prove that an Ape is not a Newton when it is self-evident that he is not a man?"
(270). Altogether, it is an interesting choice of metaphor for the time.

Research and Rebellion
A fascinating thesis advanced by James Averill suggests that a good deal of the
anti-scientific rhetoric one observes in Wordsworth's work at the turn of the century

"[A] creator is a more natural imagination than a fortuitous concourse of atoms" (Letters and Journals,
ed. Leslie Marchand, IX, 46-47)
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resulted from the poet's resistance to the oppressive weight of the Recluse project30
particularly the staggering amount of research he felt was required for its creation. The
story begins in April 1797, when Coleridge, writing to Joseph Cottle,3l outlines the

..

preparation-including the scientific preparation-necessary to write a truly epic poem
for the times. Before undertaking such a poem, Coleridge writes, "I would be a tolerable
Mathematician, I would thoroughly know Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Optics, and
Astronomy, Botany, Metallurgy, Fossilism, Chemistry, Geology, Anatomy, Medicinethen the mind ofman then the minds ofmen. ,,32 Perhaps in recognition of the limits of his
own discipline as a writer, Coleridge ceded his idea to Wordsworth, who agreed it to be a
worthy plan and promptly set to work. In March of 1798, Averill notes, Wordsworth
"industriously begins a program of extensive reading." Interestingly, and probably not
coincidentally, a recurrent theme within Lyrical Ballads (published that very same year)
is "the pointlessness of such reading" (Averill 244).
As for the nature of this research, Desmond King-Hele, in a separate study, notes
that toward the end of February, 1798, Wordsworth requested that Cottle send him a copy
of Erasmus Darwin's two-volume Zoonomia; or, the Laws ofOrganic Life: 33 "I write
merely to request (which I have very particular reasons for doing) that you would

In the Preface to The Excursion (1814), Wordsworth outlines the three-part Recluse, conceived as the
magnum opus of his career, of which The Excursion is Part II and The Prelude merely the abstract for Part
I.
3 1 Bristol publisher of Ly rical Ballads.
32 Letters, Griggs, Vol. I, 320.
33 Volume I published in 1794 by Joseph Johnson. The two-volume edition that Wordsworth consulted
appeared in 1796.
30
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contrive to send me Dr. Darwin's Zoonomia by the first carrier.,,34 King-Rele goes on to
note that "Wordsworth probably received the volumes about March 10, and kept them
until May 9, two months when several of the Lyrical Ballads were written" (116). As
useful as Darwin's work was to Wordsworth in regard to its psychological case studies,
clearly something in the scientist's approach rubbed the poet the wrong way, with Darwin
becoming a central figure in the poet's anti-science backlash. In "A Poet's Epitaph,"
which appears in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth interrogates the object
of his contempt: "Physician art thou? One all eyes, / Philosopher! a fingering slave, /
One that would peep and botanize / Upon his mother's grave?" Averill, with strong
justification, speculates that Wordsworth has "a particular 'physician-philosopher' in
mind" (245). The identification with Darwin is strengthened by the offending party's
penchant for "botanizing"-a not-so-subtle reference to Darwin's most famous work, The

Botanic Garden. Ultimately, Averill writes, the "rejection of the aggressive quest for
knowledge, implicit in [such works as] 'The Tables Turned,' and in its companion poem,
'Expostulation and Reply,' reflects ... Wordworth's rebellion against his own ambition
to write the all-encompassing poem" (244). We may also read into it a sense of
frustration at his lack of progress on the epic, and perhaps his eventual realization that, as
originally envisioned by Coleridge, such a work constituted an essentially Enlightenment
project.
It is worth noting that Wordsworth's inquiries into contemporary science in

support of the Recluse project continued beyond the September 1798 publication of
In The Early Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth, editor Ernest de Selincourt places this undated
piece of correspondence in a sequence of letters from the summer of 1797 (169).
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Lyrical Ballads, and were pursued both at home and abroad. But these efforts were not
always immediately a success-at least, not in the way projected. Take for example the
intended researches of Wordsworth and Coleridge's excursion to Germany in the closing
t-

months of 1798. In regard to both aims of their journey abroad-first, "to become
profitable translators" and, second, to investigate German natural philosophyWordsworth was handicapped by "his low rate of progress in learning the language"
(Johnston 627,625), a struggle expressed in his exasperated comment: "A fig for your
languages, German and Norse.,,35 "As I have had no books," Wordsworth wrote to
Coleridge from his winter isolation in Goslar-meaning no books in English he could
actually read, "I have been obligated to write in self-defence.,,36 And on that score, at
least, it was an incredibly productive period. As for the acquisition of German natural
philosophy: Ironically, what Wordsworth came to know of it, he appears to have
absorbed from Coleridge once back in Britain.

The Preface

In The Study ofPoetry (1880), Matthew Arnold critically examines the altered
roles of poetry, science, and faith in the second half of the nineteenth century. Arnold
organizes his discussion around a quotation by Wordsworth from the 1802 edition of
Lyrical Ballads: 37 "Poetry," Wordsworth writes in the work's Preface, "is the

The first line of "Written in Germany, on one of the coldest days of the century," composed in Goslar
and published in the 2nd edition of Lyrical Ballads in 1800.
36 Early Letters 204.
37 The 1798 edition of Lyrical Ballads carried only a brief prefatory "Advertisement." The second edition
of 1800 carried the first full-length Preface. For the third edition of 1802, Wordsworth added the now
famous "What is a Poet?"/ "Man of Science" insert.
35
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impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science" (259). Even within
its original context, Wordsworth's remark is somewhat ambiguous. 38 To Arnold,
however, Wordsworth's meaning is clear-namely, that poetry possesses within it the
means of fulfilling the mission of science. Indeed, Arnold says, "Without poetry, our
science will appear incomplete" (1445). As the essential prose document of
Wordsworth's relations to science at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Preface of
1802 stands as an unparalleled resource. Within its pages, Wordsworth acknowledges the
tensions building between the scientific enterprise and other epistemological systems; in
the process, he makes the case for constructing an integrated role for the "Man of
Science" in the order that is to come. 39 Whether motivated by a generous sense of
inclusion or by an anxious sense of necessity, Wordsworth in the Preface seems to
advance a rhetoric of reconciliation:
If the labours of men of Science should ever create any material
revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition ... the Poet will sleep then
no more than at present, but he will be ready to follow the steps of the
Man of Science, not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at
his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of Science itself.
(259-60) 40

38 The ambiguity of the quote Arnold selects unfortunately dredges up the entire semantic debate regarding
science as all human knowledge versus the more narrowly defined systematic study of the natural world.
39 When Wordsworth speaks of the "Man of Science" in the 1802 Preface to Lyrical Ballads, evidence
indicates he is responding personally to Humphry Davy on the occasion of the chemist's introductory
lecture at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, on January 21, 1802, the topic of which had been the noble
role of the scientist in culture.
40 All citations from the Preface to Lyrical Ballads in this study are drawn from the Brett and Jones edition
(New York: Routledge, 1991).
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It is worth noting here that science-in the form of Romantic science-had by this time

already created such a "material revolution" in its revisionist view of the dimensions,
origins, and processes of the physical universe. And what is immediately striking is that
t-

Wordsworth, in his capacity as poet, is not busying himself with the cultural assimilation
of these particular "objects of Science." Perhaps an important point to consider is the one
raised by Ralph Crum in Science and Literature-namely, that "[w]hile Wordsworth did
not deny the possibility of scientific thought finding expression in poetry ... for him, this
was in the future" (188).41 Unfortunately, this deferring of the integration of poetry and
science to another time-and to a succeeding generation of poets-has raised questions
about the sincerity of Wordsworth's commitment to the reconciliation he proposes.
When the Preface to Lyrical Ballads is cited in Wordsworth and science studiesand it almost invariably is-the discussion usually focuses upon a single passage: the
nearly 3000-word insert added to the third edition of April 1802. This addition,
embedded within an examination of what constitutes the appropriate language for poetry,
begins with Wordsworth's assertion that poetry and prose are not antithetical entities as,
say, poetry and science are antithetical. In regard to the insert's central questionnamely, "What is a Poet?"-the answer seems to be that he or she is everything the
scientist is not. Indeed, within the Preface, Wordsworth misses no opportunity to contrast

As the Preface continues, Wordsworth states that the "remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist,
or Mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the Poet's art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time
should ever come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are
contemplated by the followers of these respective Sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us"
(260). In other words, poetry shall become more scientific when culture in general does, when the
scientific knowledge of the layman permits, and when the motives of the scientific community are clear.
Again, for Wordsworth, this is a scenario to be played out in some indefinite future-perhaps because, as
Geoffrey Hartman has speculated, at that time "science's human significance was still too remote or
uncertain for him" (195).
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favorably the role of the poet with that of the scientist, going so far as to suggest that a
good deal of poetry's radiance stems from its shining so brightly in comparison to
science, a view that Wordsworth sees as an inescapable by-product of their underlying
philosophical differences:
[T]he Poet, prompted by this feeling of pleasure which accompanies him
through the whole course of his studies, converses with general nature
with affections akin to those, which, through labour and length of time, the
Man of Science has raised up in himself, by conversing with those
particular parts of nature which are the objects of his studies. (259;

emphasis added)
Reading between the lines, we gather that, in that poetry is generalizing and science is
particularizing, poetry appeals to our sense of unity while science caters to our
predilection for division-in short, it boils down to a question of the synthetic versus the
analytic. There is an implicit values judgment in this comparison for Wordsworth. He
then proceeds to shore up this comparative argument with a theological metaphor: "The
Man of Science seeks truth as a remote and unknown benefactor; he cherishes and loves
it in his solitude: the Poet, singing a song in which all human beings join with him,
rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and hourly companion" (259). This
casting of science's truth as the remote deist god and poetry's truth as the engaged theist
equivalent is unquestionably done with a clear understanding of the conclusions these
associations evoke-namely, that poetry's truth is immanent and ever-present, while
science's is disconnected and far removed from human affairs.
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Qualified Criticism

As noted in Chapter Two of this study, "science" was still a term in transition at
the tum of the nineteenth century, its newly specialized connotation seen by Romantic
t-

poets as being emblematic of the intellectual fragmentation the discipline itself promoted.
In the case of Wordsworth particularly, it appears that this contraction of the signifier
contrasted with poetry's inclusiveness--comes to represent the chief failing of the
signified and that this perceived failing goes on to inform a good deal of the poet's
subsequent criticism of institutional science. With his status as future laureate making
him the highest-profile figure among the early English Romantics, Wordsworth has
historically served as the focus of polarizing arguments by ensuing generations of critics
in regard to poetic Romanticism's response to the scientific enterprise. In the text of a
presentation before the Wordsworth Society in 1884, R. Spence Watson references Leslie
Stephen's even earlier work, the History ofEnglish Thought in the Eighteenth Century
(1876), in which
Stephen says that Wordsworth 'hates science, because it regards facts
without the imaginative and emotional colouring.' The statement is not
correct, but it expresses the belief generally held. And that this unfounded
view should be the common one is scarcely surprising when we consider
the way in which Wordsworth speaks of science and her votaries in the
few writings known to the general reader. (201)
The truth is, poetic partisans would not have to concern themselves with explanations of
an author's apparently anti-scientific rhetoric if science itself were a historically
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unambivalent force. But the reality is that even as its cultural presence has remained
constant, science's reputation has waxed and waned, with the discipline cycling in and
out of popular favor;42 keepers of Wordsworth's poetic legacy, meanwhile, have been
sensitive to how the artist's reputation might be affected by these shifts. Over the years,
these analysts of Wordsworth's poetry have been fairly united in their insistence that
what the poet opposes is not science but simply science's excesses, de-emphasizing any
perceived criticisms of the innate character of the enterprise. In the Victorian era,
Watson, in the aforementioned presentation to the Wordsworth Society, himself essayed
this line of rhetoric, arguing that the issue for Wordsworth was not science's penchant for
specialization, but rather its potential for overspecialization:
Wordsworth's warning voice is of even greater value in our time than it
was in his own. For this is the day of specialised study-of specialised
life. In all branches of human affairs, intense competition, the pressure of
numbers, the desire to go far, the wish to know much, and to know it
accurately, have led to subdivision of labour, to the individual man's
becoming a specialist. (216)

One of the more famous essays on this subject is Stephen Toulmin's "The Historical Background to the
Anti-Science Movement" (1972), wherein the author writes, "I do not think we shall understand the anti
science movement properly unless we look at it in its longer-term historical context"; he then proceeds to
describe such fluctuations as "things that come and go-recurrent if not permanent features of human
experience, which are normally below the surface, and have occasionally blown up to serious proportions"
(23). Toulmin concludes: "Looking back at the whole history of public attitudes to science, in fact, 1 have
sometimes wondered whether they were not a generational or secular phenomenon, as predictable as the
tides. Throughout the last half-millenium ... anti-scientific attitudes seem to have peaked at intervals of
130 years or so, ifM.ot every 65 or 30-35 years" (24). Among these periodical revivals, Toulmin
specifically addresses the Romantic Period and 1960s counter-culture, citing as common threads the
renewed interest in such issues as humanism, individualism, and imagination.
42
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A half century later, in 1925, Alfred North Whitehead zeroed in on a different excess: In
"The Tables Turned," Whitehead notes, Wordsworth "discloses the intellectual basis of
his criticism of science" (121):
He alleges against science its absorption in abstractions. His consistent
theme is that the important facts of nature elude the scientific method ....
He felt that something had been left out, and that what had been left out
comprised everything that was most important. . . . Wordsworth opposes
to the scientific abstractions his full concrete experience. (121, 112, 118)
Interestingly, Whitehead claims that, in his critique of science, "Wordsworth was not
bothered by any intellectual antagonism" (112), though eight pages later he cites
Wordsworth's "dislike of science" as a flaw in the poet's arguments regarding nature
(120).
Whitehead also mentions Wordsworth's objections to science's habit of analysis:
"Wordsworth emphatically bear[ s] witness that nature cannot be divorced from its
aesthetic values; and that these values arise from the cumulation, in some sense, of the
brooding presence of the whole on to its various parts" (127). That Wordsworth is hostile
to such analysis is manifestly clear, particularly the removal of the object of study from
its natural context:
Oh! there is laughter at their work in heaven!
Inquire of ancient Wisdom; go, demand
Of mighty Nature, if 'twas ever meant
That we should pry far off yet be unraised;
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That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore,
Viewing all objects unremittingly
In disconnection dead and spiritless;
And still dividing, and dividing still,
Break down all grandeur ...

. . . waging thus
An impious warfare with the very life
Of our own souls! (The Excursion 4.956-68)43
Some might again argue that what Wordsworth is objecting to here is science's excesses,
not its essence, but that does not obviate the fact that everyone of the characteristics
Wordsworth criticizes-specialization, abstraction, and analysis-is a defining aspect of
the enterprise,44 making his critique much more problematic than generally
acknowledged.

Lines 958-68 of this excerpt originally appear as lines 58-68 of the Addendum to "The Ruined Cottage"
(1798). The bulk of this poem would go on to form the core of Book I of The Excursion (see pages 139,
376, and 402 in The Poetical Works o/William Wordsworth, Vol. 5 (DeSelincourt and Darbishire, eds.)).
In the Cornell Wordsworth edition of The Ruined Cottage, editor James Butler notes that this "reconciling
addendum" numbered 146 lines total (20). The excerpt cited here constitutes lines 57 to 67 of that
addendum in Butler's numeration of the original manuscript (see pages 267-69); this is a minor variance
from that recorded in previous sources. As Butler also notes, the precise dating of the addendum has not
yet been determined, but speculation exists primarily in regard to which month in early 1798 it was
composed (20-21).
44 Granted, these characters apply more to some scientific disciplines (such as biology) than to others (such
as astronomy). Still, all are implicated. In "Star Gazers" (1806), Wordsworth observes, "Whatever be the
cause, 'tis sure that they who pry and pore / Seem to meet with little gain, seem less happy than before"
(29-30). The rhetOJic here-in addition to its echoes of the preceding passage from "The Ruined
Cottage"-is not all that different from that in "A Poet's Epitaph," with its criticism of the biological
scientist who would "peep and botanise / Upon his mother's grave" (19-20).
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Other analysts are willing to grant a certain fractious tone to Wordsworth's
youthful opinions on science but argue that that these views moderated during the course
of his long lifetime, moving from tolerance to acceptance to even qualified endorsement
t

in some cases. This view parallels, and in all likelihood is grounded in, the poet's
popularly perceived shift in political views from radical to conservative during the same
period. In regard to science, however, there is not much evidence to support this claim.
There is Wordsworth's somewhat unexpected (and completely un-ironic) take on natural
and scientific harmony within the oft-cited lines from "Steamboats, Viaducts, and
Railways" (1833), wherein the poet allows that "Nature doth embrace / Her lawful
offspring in Man's art." On the other hand, this sonnet stands as anything but a ringing
endorsement of science and technology. In light of the fact that those concluding lines of
faint praise are prefixed by cutting observations regarding science's possessing a
presence that "mar[s] / The loveliness of Nature" (4-5) and "harsh features" disowned by
"beauty" (9-10), the work seems more a gesture of poetic expansiveness than anything
else, with Wordsworth generously acknowledging that nothing is all bad.
A number of critics have noted the comment to amanuensis Isabella Fenwick,
recorded in 1843, wherein Wordsworth does the once unthinkable and makes a case for
the aesthetic appreciation of nature through scientific analysis:
Some are of the opinion that the habit of analysing, decomposing, and
anatomizing is inevitably unfavourable to the perception of beauty....
Admiration and love, to which all knowledge truly vital must tend, are felt
by men of real genius in proportion as their discoveries in natural
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Philosophy are enlarged; and the beauty in form of a plant or an animal is
not made less but more apparent as a whole by more accurate insight into
its constituent properties and powers. (qtd. in Evans 136)
This is another generous but hardly emphatic or universal endorsement. Note first of all
that the scientifically mediated perception of beauty Wordsworth cites is limited to those
who toil in the natural sciences; second, recall that, as the Preface to Lyrical Ballads
makes clear, in Wordsworth's opinion a scientist's and a poet's sense of aesthetics are
two very different and unequal things.
I would say in concluding this section that any acknowledgment of the complexity
of Wordsworth's views regarding science, the willingness to go beyond simplistic pro
and con caricatures, is laudable and valuable. However, the ameliorist views of many
critics, from Watson to Whitehead to the present day, appear at times to be a bit too
selective in that they fail to satisfactorily account for the numerous and blatant examples
of overt anti-scientism found in Wordsworth. The risk is that Wordsworth's views may
once again become oversimplified-in this case, towards the positive and the
conciliatory-when real grounds and documented evidence of contention exist. Again,
this is not to say that Sir Leslie Stephen's overbroad edict that "Wordsworth hates
science" is any more accurate than it ever was, simply that the grounds on which he
based that assessment are not a complete mirage.
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"The Pre-eminent Science of Revolution"

Just as discoveries within astronomical science were redefining this culture's
understanding of material space, a science much closer to home, during the same period,

..

was expanding material concepts of time. Geology was a strikingly diverse field at the
turn of the nineteenth century, incorporating under its umbrella a wide range of activities.
The developmental history of the earth as revealed by sedimentology, stratigraphy, and
geomorphology, as well as the history of organisms revealed by paleontology, provided
striking evidence for a new view of earth's history and the changes that had unfolded
within its span. The two most prominent theories of the day each presented a distinct
view of that history and each possessed a piece of the truth; these theories were the
catastrophism of Cuvier and the uniformitarianism (gradualism) of Hutton. The former,
though misguided in its belief in a young earth, had the benefit of allowing the possibility
of radical change, while the latter, positing an unfathomably ancient world of "deep
time," allowed only gradual change at an exceedingly slow pace.
The key reference in regard to Wordsworth's views on these matters of scientific
interest is, like the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, once again a prose work-namely, the
poet's popular Guide to the Lakes. 45 Within the Guide are various examples of
Wordsworth's philosophical ambivalence regarding geological issues, with the poet
apparently accepting one view, uniformitarianism, as scientific fact, while embracing the

Wordsworth's Guide originally appeared in 1810 as an introduction to Wilkinson's Select Views; it was
later published separately, the first edition appearing in 1822. The excerpts cited in this study are from the
1835 edition: A Guide Through the District ofthe Lakes in The North ofEngland with a Description ofthe
Scenery, &c. for the Use ofTourists and Residents, Fifth Edition with Considerable Additions, 1835.
45
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other, catastrophism, for its Romantic aesthetics. 46 "The sea appears to have been
retiring slowly for ages from this coast," Wordsworth writes in the Guide. "From

Whitehaven to St. Bees extends a track of level ground, about five miles in length, which
formerly must have been under salt water so as to have made an island of the high ground
that stretches between it and the sea" (Prose Works 188n; emphasis added). Implicit in
such a reference as this is the poet's acceptance of the role of gradualist processes in
shaping the earth's surface. 47 But at the same time, Wordsworth elsewhere refers to the
waters of the Deluge as reaching up to the highest peaks of the Alps.
The reason such a discussion is of interest is that the issues raised in the
geological science debates of the era had implications that extended far beyond the field
itself. Indeed, by the closing decade of the eighteenth century, "geology," as Alan
Bewell notes, "had assumed the status of the preeminent science of revolution" (246)
not just in regard to how geological concepts (such as deep time) required a rethinking of
established systems of human knowledge, but in regard to how the very processes of
geology themselves appeared to model the dynamics of radical political change. There
occurred within the science, John Wyatt notes in Wordsworth and the Geologists, "a
recognition of significant 'revolutions.' ... Violations of earth's structure ... followed

46 In the Guide, Wordsworth reaches a compromise view of sorts, allowing that the gross features of the
earth were created at the time of its possibly violent formation, but that they have since been modified by
steady processes over the span of ages: "Sublimity is the result of Nature's first great dealings with the
superficies of the earth; but the general tendency of her subsequent operations is toward the production of
beauty.... That uniformity which prevails in the primitive frame of the lower grounds among all chains
and clusters of mountains where large bodies of still water are bedded, is broken by the secondary agents of
nature, ever at work to supply the deficiencies of the mould in which things were originally cast" (Prose
Works 181).
47 Edward Proffitt notes that "throughout Wordsworth, there are passages that suggest an evolutionary
reading of the landscape consonant with his developmental conception of human growth. . .. [I]n Book IV
of the The Excursion, for instance, the Wanderer speaks of 'nature's gradual processes' (1. 288)" (89).
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by periods with 'new' environments and different organic forms" (39). This
revolutionary model and moral was not lost on the Romantics.
In regard to the connection between earth science and earthly politics,

..

Wordsworth, without question, found in geology a compelling source of imagery for
human environments undergoing enormous change. The geological and political merge
in a particularly memorable episode from Book IX of The Prelude. At the site of the
Bastille, stormed two years previously, Wordsworth gathers up a stone as a souvenir of
the time and place:
Where silent zephyrs sported with the dust
Of the Bastille, I sate in the open sun,
And from the rubbish gathered up a stone,
And pocketed the relic in the guise
Of an enthusiast. (9.63-67)48
But despite the deceptive tranquility of the scene in 1791 , Wordsworth is not lulled,
realizing that as
Year follows year, the tide returns again,
Day follows day, all things have second birth;
The earthquake is not satisfied at once.

(The Prelude 1805 10.72-74)49
It is interesting to note that in the excerpt from Book IX Wordsworth picks up the stone

in the guise of a geology enthusiast-the scientific discipline providing him with

48
49

The Prelude 18509.67-71.
The Prelude 1850 10.83-84.
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ideological cover, as it were, allowing his youthful self to assume the pose of a detached
scientific observer at this historically charged site-as opposed to an emotionally
invested, perhaps even sentimental supporter of the revolutionary cause. Interesting, too,
is how Wordsworth's temperament on this occasion (at least, as he recalls it in 1805) is
muted by this scientific posture-"I looked for something which I could not find, /
Affecting more emotion than I felt" (9.70-71).50 In short, the older, post-revolutionary
Wordsworth of 1805 finds a use for the scientific mentality and its distance from its
object of inquiry, if only in this one instance when the process of change went so horribly
awry.

Mind and Matter

In his annotations to Wordsworth's Poems, William Blake writes, "Natural
Objects always did & now do Weaken deaden & obliterate Imagination in Me[.]
Wordsworth must know that what he Writes Valuable is Not to be found in Nature"
(E665). Whereas Blake viewed matter as a fallen and passive expression of existence, its
failings evident in its need for "animation by the activities of consciousness" (Lussier
53), Wordsworth, in general, strikes a more cordial tone toward the world of material
phenomena-at least, in its most familiar expression in nature, particularly his own
beloved Lakes region. Reflecting that view, Wordsworth advances the following
assertion in the verse Prospectus to The Recluse: 51

The Prelude 18509.72-73.
Contained within .he Preface to The Excursion (1814). The verse Prospectus itself, however, consists of
the last section of the earlier, unpublished "Home at Grasmere" (1800). Within that poem, the following
excerpt occupies lines 816-21.
50
51
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How exquisitely the individual Mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external World
Is fitted:-and how exquisitely, tooTheme this but little heard of among menThe external World is fitted to the Mind. (63-68)52
Blake's response to this notion was characteristic: "You shall not bring me down to
believe such fitting & fitted I know better.,,53 Whether Wordsworth "believed" it either,
as opposed to advancing it simply as a philosophical position, is an open question. While
the Prospectus /"Home at Grasmere" seems a confident assertion of humanity and
nature's long history of compatibility and mutual belonging, there has also been
identified in Wordsworth, as suggested earlier, a simultaneous sense of alienation from
the material world, which becomes first noticeable just after the tum of the century and
which underwrites a good deal of the transcendental impulse frequently seen in his work.
Within Wordsworth's poetic output during this period, we have the opportunity to trace
the progression of his views on the topic of humanity's functional and aesthetic "fit" with
the natural world as they are played out against the backdrop of this coexistent sense of
alienation from nature's essential materiality.

Wordsworth here, it should be stressed, is not arguing for any evolutionary sense of adaptive
complementarity; his thesis is simply that mankind and nature were made (i.e., created) for one another.
53 From the Annotations to Wordsworth's Preface to The Excursion, being a portion o/The Recluse, A
Poem; E667.
52
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In The Two-Part Prelude of 1799, within the "Blessed the infant babe" passage,
Wordsworth finds his "best conjectures" for tracing the "progress of our being" (2.267
69):
No outcast he, bewildered and depressed;
Along his infant veins are interfused
The gravitation and the filial bond
Of Nature that connect him with the world. (2.291-94)
The infant, though a new arrival, is clearly not an outsider in Wordsworth's eyes,
experiencing instead a genuine and powerful connection to this world. Wordsworth's
choice of metaphor for this attractive force, "gravitation," is interestingly scientific. In
"Home at Grasmere" from the following year (1800), Wordsworth describes a subsequent
developmental stage, still harmonious, in which the human mind is productively
"wedded" to the material world, yielding an experience on earth evocative of "Paradise,
and groves / Elysian, [and] Fortunate Fields" (800-01).54 It is within this same work that
the concept of "fit" is originally raised-a notion which is seconded in the Preface to the
1802 edition to Lyrical Ballads:
To this knowledge 55 which all men carry about with them, and to these
sympathies 56 . . . the Poet principally directs his attention. He considers
man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man
54

For the discerning intellect of Man,
When wedded to this goodly universe
In Jove and holy passion, shall find these
A simple produce of the common day. (805-08)
55 The knowledge that "man and the objects that surround him" can be seen as "acting and re-acting upon
each other" (258).
56 "[S]ympathies yielding enjoyment" (258).
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as naturally the mirror of the fairest and most interesting qualities of
nature. (258-59)
A change occurs, however, during the period of the composition of the Intimations Ode
~

(1802-04).57 In this work, Wordsworth rewinds the developmental arc back to its

beginning, and in this run-through, the beauty and sufficiency of the physical world are
called into question. In the Ode, the initial stage of life is still beatific, but not because it
marks our closest point of connection with this world, but rather because our lingering
memories of pre-existence are freshest then.
Various theories have been advanced to explain the shift in Wordsworth's poetic
temperament towards nature during this period. In The Hidden Wordsworth, Kenneth
Johnson offers the explanation that at this time Wordsworth's choice of poetic subjects
shifted from the social to the natural, with uneven results that shook the poet's faith in his
own powers.

It has long been acknowledged that the three distinct thematic passages of the poem were composed in
two installments, separated by two years. These thematic passages include: the loss and temporary
recovery of the imaginative vision of childhood (stanzas I-IV), the advancement of the doctrine of pre
existence as an explanation for this loss (stanzas V-VIII), and, fmally, the restorative power of imaginative
episodes recollected from childhood (i.e., the "spots of time" referenced in The Prelude) in enabling a new
vision of nature-again made beautiful, if no longer transcendent-informed by our mortal human
perspective (stanzas IX-XI). Within this general framework, however, the specifics of the poem's
compositional history have been debated back and forth, with claims about the poet's philosophical
progression during this transitional period tied to the dates of completion of these various passages. In
1927, H. W. Garrod, citing Wordsworth's own statements to Isabella Fenwick in 1843, asserted, "The Ode,
so far as it was carried at this time [1802], ended with the fourth stanza; and was not completed in its
entirety until 1806" (113). Four decades later, Russell Noyes challenged that view, stating that "the ode
[was] left unfinished in 1802 with the eighth stanza" (244), a belief seconded by Jared Curtis in
Wordsworth's Experiments with Tradition. This revised view would come under scrutiny nearly two
decades later in Gene Ruoff's Wordsworth and Coleridge, which returns to Garrod's original assessment
and the acceptance of Wordsworth's own account of the poem's dating. Though he feels Curtis is correct
in his assessment that "the crisis of the poem ... comes not at the end of the fourth but the eighth stanza,
and that stanzas I-IV and V-VIII consequently have more in common with one another thematically than
with the rest of the work," still, Ruoff concludes, "Curtis wants more of the Ode to have been composed in
1802 than he can demonstrate" (25).

57
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Wordsworth soon turned from this small cast of poor people [the subjects
of Lyrical Ballads] to a large number of natural objects .... There are
nearly two dozen poems like "To a Cuckoo," "To a Butterfly," and "To
the Daisy," in which the connection between external nature and human
nature is presented in the most uncomplicated manner imaginable ....
Not that there's anything fundamentally wrong with such simple equations
between natural beauty and human happiness .... [But Wordsworth's]
specifically poetic problem ... concerned ... the status of his own
imagination. In 1798 and 1800 he could turn almost anything into a strong
poem, but in 1802 his capacity for invention ... fell mainly on flowers,
birds, and insects, and the results were not nearly as impressive. (774-75)
No one was more sensitive to the diminished quality of the work, Johnston notes, than
Wordsworth himself. The sense of reassessment toward nature that followed was in all
likelihood profound. It was also persistent-by all appearances still in playa decade later
and visible, once again, in that surprising excerpt from Book VIII of The Excursion:
yet do I exult,
Casting reserve away, exult to see
An intellectual mastery exercised

O'er the blind elements; a purpose given,
A perseverance fed; almost a soul
Imparted-to brute matter. (199-204)
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The mastery of nature endorsed here----on the condition that such mastery be morally
driven-does differ from the anti-Romantic notion of nature subdued, but it is still a
concept, I would argue, that the earlier Wordsworth would have hesitated to support.
--

Other possibilities exist to explain Wordsworth's "estrangement from Nature"
around this time, not all of them convincing. One possibility is that he was simply weary
of the pantheism charges and over-compensated in terms of his rhetoric. Or perhaps his
previous uncritical reverence for physical nature came into conflict with the rising tide of
Romantic idealism. Also, there is the possibility that after the Lyrical Ballads of 1798,
1800, and 1802, he was now the de facto leader of the new poetry, which, its gestures of
"conciliation" aside, was still highly critical of science in its public posture (as the 1802
Preface attests). But this would assume that nature for Wordsworth had by this time
become inextricably identified with its scientific study, which is a rather large assumption
to make. Whatever its origin, this sense of unraveling connection with nature becomes
even more pronounced in The Prelude 1805,58 becoming the well-spring of the poet's
feelings of anti-materialist alienation. And it will be in The Prelude 1805 that these
feelings find their final articulation and resolution, in the passages addressing
Wordsworth's revelations at Mont Blanc, Simplon Pass, and Mt. Snowdon, wherein he
most acutely confronts the limits of earthly experience.
In addition to their widely divergent views on the compatibility of the physical
world and the spiritual mind, Wordsworth and Blake hold markedly different views in
regard to the senses that mediate the relationship between these two entities. Indeed, it is
Though, I would note, the initial connection cited in the "Blessed the infant babe" passage from the Two
Part Prelude of 1799 (2.267-310) persists without apparent revision in The Prelude 1805 (2.237-80).
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the physical senses that enable the "fit" that Wordsworth earlier celebrates, giving these
faculties a valued role in Wordsworth that Blake would vehemently disavow. While
Blake describes the senses as innately passive receptors of stimuli-with no conscious
sense of "wise passiveness"s9 required on our part-Wordsworth instead speaks of the
restlessness of the senses:
The eye-it cannot choose but see;
We cannot bid the ear be still;
Our bodies feel, where'er they be,
Against or with our will.
("Expostulation and Reply" 17-20)
But there is a fine line between restlessness and implacability, and all too easily the
ceaseless action of the eye can become oppressive. Reflecting on the limits of such
empiricism-both scientific and artistic-Wordsworth confronts the "tyranny of the
eye,,60 in The Prelude 1805. We catch an early glimpse of it in Book VI, in the poet's
recollection of his arrival at Mont Blanc, the oppression in this instance manifesting itself
in the form of the deflation of the imaginatively born expectations he and his traveling
companion had brought with them to the Alps:
That day we first
Beheld the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved
To have a soulless image on the eye
"Nor less I deem that there are Powers / Which of themselves our minds impress; / That we can feed this
mind of ours / In a wise passiveness" ("Expostulation and Reply" 21-24).
60 It is, however, a~ Wordsworth makes clear, the tyranny of an inferior faculty. It asserts itself over the
imaginative, but it cannot match that which it usurps. More troubling, the tyrannical eye (being inferior)
inevitably diminishes that which it observes-in this instance, nature-forcing a critical re-evaluation.
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Which had usurped upon a living thought
That never more could be. (452-56)61
This sense of disappointment with the "real" as it is visually experienced, measured
It-

against the expectations cultivated in the imagination, is an idea echoed in the subsequent
episode at Simplon Pass (6.501-24), leading Wordsworth to the conclusion that nature is
more powerful in the mind than it is in the world-a foreshadowing of the poet's final
epiphany, occurring the following year on the slopes of Mt. Snowdon, that the natural
world, because of its inescapable materiality, is limited to a symbolic role as a signifier of
transcendence rather than embodying transcendence itself.

The Science of Mind

Concern with the relation of the mental to the material is central to Wordsworth's
poetic philosophy, not only in regard to the mind's interface with the physical world (in
other words, nature), but in regard to the mind's own essence. On this issue,
Wordsworth's position was much more amenable to a scientific approach than Blake's,
but the resulting science-psychology-was a provisional one in Wordsworth's eyes,
separate from the body of general scientific practice in its acknowledgement of the
intangible element of spirit. Wordsworth was not alone in such an opinion. In
"Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science," Gary Hatfield writes
that in the eighteenth century,

61 Later in Book VI, Wordsworth helpfully suggests a somewhat circular means of usurping the tyranny of
the eye over the imagination-and the larger enslavement of the mind to the verifying senses-by the
action of "Imagination ... lifting up itself / Before the eye" (525-26).
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The mind or soul was considered by many to be a natural thing, a thing in
nature.. " Given these understandings, psychology was considered by a
great many eighteenth-century authors to be a science .... Many
considered it to be a natural science based on experience, including those
who considered themselves to be studying an immaterial substance. (187)
But there was a new view of the human mind emerging at this time that would more
intimately connect the realms of mind and matter. Regarding this corporeal theory of
mind, Alan Richardson in British Romanticism and the Science ofMind writes that
Wordsworth came of age ... at a time when the bodily ... nature of the
mind had been boldly asserted by Joseph Priestley, when the medical and
physiological account of mind developed in Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia
had caught the fancy of avant-garde intellectuals, and when sensory and
cognitive deficits gave fuel to arguments for the mind's dependence on, if
not identity with, the brain. . .. Only in the Romantic era, in fact, was the
brain definitively established as the organ of thought, although this
seemingly inevitable notion would continue to be challenged on religious
and other grounds well into the 1820s. (xiii, 1)
For the record, Richardson finds much more accommodation between the corporeal
theory of mind and Romantic poetic philosophy than this study can. 62 Examining the

The "mind" in Wordsworth's poetry appears to be predominantly associated with the spirit. "A Plea for
Authors, May 1838" speaks of "works that came / From mind and spirit" (7-8); indeed, it is like the spirit in
many respects, particularly in its religious aspect: In The River Duddon: A Series ofSonnets, 1820, the
poet longs to advance "in calm of mind / And soul, to mingle with Eternity!" (13-14). The physical
"brain," meanwhile, appears in Wordsworth largely in a pathological sense, as an organ prone to
"ailments," manifested as disturbances and dysfunctions of the thought processes. These range from the
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poetical works of these authors, I find much more evidence of resistance to this notion
than acceptance, and for a reason consistent with the overarching thesis of this project: If
such an embodied view of the mind were accepted as true, it could not help but mark yet

..

another expansion of materialism into the domain of the infinite, and, by extension,
another challenge to the Romantic poetic ideology.
In his essay, Hatfield chooses to define psychology as "the science of mind or of
mental phenomena" and includes under this heading the faculties of "sense perception,
imagination, memory, understanding or reasoning, feeling, and will" (184), and, indeed,
such a "faculty psychology" was dominant during the eighteenth century (and after). But
as Hatfield continues, "An alternative to faculty psychology began to be widely discussed
in the middle of the eighteenth century: the associationist theory of mind. Hume, David
Hartley, and others 63 attempted to explain many or all phenomena of mind by appeal to
laws of association" (188). In the associationist scheme, the various aspects of mental
functioning identified by faculty psychology were brought together under the auspices of

milder aspects, observed within those with "a fretted brain" ("Hark! "Tis the Thrush, Undaunted,
Undeprest" 7), a "distracted brain" ("The White Doe ofRylstone" 894), or "a brain confounded" (The
Prelude 1805 10.378), to more severe manifestations-"the phrenzy-stricken brain" of "To the Moon"
(42) and the tragic, unstable protagonist of "The Thorn" who had "a brain so wild!" (13.4). Mentions ofa
diseased mind are rare in Wordsworth, but there are examples: "The Matron of Jedborough" describes an
ill-fated title character afflicted by "Ill health of body; and ... worse ailments of mind" (73-74). Still, the
overall trend in Wordsworth is toward the depiction of the mind as a non-physical entity. The same holds
for Blake. While it is preeminent within the vegetated human form, the brain-in contrast to the "Eternal
mind"- is presented as fallen, limited, and confined with the "cavern" of the skull (The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell 14).
63 "To these ... theorists of mind must be added Erasmus Darwin, whose Zoonomia; or, the Laws of
Organic Life of 1794-96 was dedicated, among others, to those who 'study the Operations of the Mind as a
Science.' In this work, Darwin presented a sophisticated version of the associationist theory, replete with
novel empirical observations .... Living and sentient things possess a 'spirit of animation,' which is a vital
principle residing in the brain and nerves, and subject to 'general or partial diminution or accumulation'
(and hence material)" (Hatfield 209). It could well be that this materialist view of the mind was what
ultimately alienated Wordsworth from Darwin.
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a single process, "one that promised explanatory unification under a few basic
[reductionist] laws" (Hatfield 188).
Hume signaled his ... intentions in the subtitle to his Treatise ofHuman

Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects; in the introduction to the work, he
explicitly compared his methods and modes of explanation to those of
Newton.... Hume was not unique in claiming to be the Newton of the
mind; he shared [this] invocation of Newton with David Hartley. (208)
Anyone interested in the study of the mind at the turn of the nineteenth century had to
acknowledge-and, in large part, work past-Hartley's model of associationist
psychology, simply because of its influence and popularity. Wordsworth, for one,
certainly did. Hartley's views on the operations of the mind, set forth in his Observations

on Man,64 attempts "to explain association as the result of sympathetic vibrations among
nerve fibers in the brain" (Hatfield 208). In a more practical sense, as a theory it argues
that there is no innate moral sense within humanity, but rather that morality is shaped by
the association of ideas and actions, specifically as episodes of pain and pleasure become
linked with particular behaviors. While this theory did influence Wordsworth and
Coleridge to some extent during the period of Lyrical Ballads,65 in time both would

"Observations on Man," Fred Wilson notes, "is truly the earliest book that, when opened by a practicing
scientific psychologist, will be recognized as a book in his discipline ... so long as he does not read it as
far as part 2," which is given over to "proofs for the existence of God, arguments aimed to justify Christian
beliefs, and exhortations to virtue" (348).
65 As with most matters of science, Coleridge was the conduit by which these ideas reached Wordsworth.
We might date the peak of Coleridge's own attachment to these ideas to 1796, when he named his first
born son after Hartley. Wordsworth's attachment to Hartleian association is less clear. Within the Preface
to Lyrical Ballads, the term "association" appears a number of times, but, in almost all instances,
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distance themselves completely from Hartley's model because of what they perceived as
its mechanistic oversimplification of the human mind. An example of such distancing is
perhaps found in the verse Prospectus to The Recluse, wherein Wordsworth writes,
It-

Not Chaos, not
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus,
Nor aught of blinder vacancy, scooped out
By help of dreams-can breed such fear and awe
As fall upon us often when we look
Into our Minds, into the Mind of ManMy haunt, and the main region of my song. (35-41 )66
The dramatic imagery of the underworld that Wordsworth presents in this passage argues
for a quintessentially Romantic view of the human mind-a darkly poetic psychological
sublime that, it is tempting to speculate, constitutes Wordsworth's answer to Hartley.67
Despite his rejection of the mechanical operation of the mind proposed by the
associationist model,68 Wordsworth did not, as Wilson notes, "reject the notion that there
is a causal [i.e., scientifically accessible] structure to human psychology" (378). On the
contrary, in the 1802 Preface, Wordsworth speaks plainly of his intent to trace "the
primary laws of our nature" (244-45). An important influence on Wordsworth's study of

Wordsworth seems to be referring to the reintegration of thought and feeling rather than any kind of cause
and-effect scheme influencing behavior. In all likelihood, Wordsworth simply appropriated the term for his
own purposes.
66 "Home at Grasmere" (788-94).
67 "The descent into hell," Donald M. Hassler has noted, "is an ancient convention that Wordsworth and
Coleridge returned to in order to image the awesome and ineffable imagination" (26).
68 "Mechanical" in that association psychology attempted to apply explanatory models of mechanist
philosophy to the study of the human mind, by positing that complex mental phenomena are reducible to
basic elements derived from experience.
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the mind in this particular aspect would have been Erasmus Darwin. As I observed in the
earlier section on Wordsworth's scientific researches, critics such as James Averill and
Desmond King-Hele have identified Wordsworth's debt to Darwin's medical treatise
Zoonomia. It was within that volume's discussion of diseases of "Increased Volition"

(i.e., mental illness) that Wordsworth first came across the anecdote of Goody Blake and
Harry Gil1. 69 Wordsworth's contributions to Lyrical Ballads in general reflect the
influence of Darwin's case study approach to psychological phenomena, with poems such
as "Goody Blake and Harry Gill," "The Thorn," "The Last of the Flock," "The Mad
Mother," "The Idiot Boy," and "The Complaint of a Forsaken Indian Woman" all being
memorable chiefly for their presentation of, as Averill puts it, "persons at psychological
extremes" (241). While Wordsworth's softened rhetoric toward the science of mind
indicates that he viewed this branch of scientific knowledge as having the potential to
enlarge humanity rather than diminish it, he suggests at the same time that it is a new and
quintessentially poetic domain-one presently dark and unexplained and requiring the
illumination of the poetic vision.

Appropriated Metaphors

Within his poetical works, particularly the various versions of The Prelude,70
Wordsworth explores a number of schemes of resistance to the worldview advanced by
natural science. As with Blake, this resistance often takes the form of images and

Wordsworth acknowledges this in the Advertisement of the 1798 edition of Lyrical Ballads: "The tale of
Goody Blake and Harry Gill is founded on a well-authenticated fact which happened in Warwickshire" (8).
70 The Two-Part Prelude of 1799, The Prelude of 1805 in Thirteen Books, and The Prelude of 1850 in
Fourteen Books.
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concepts appropriated from the scientific disciplines deemed most at fault and posing the
most direct threat to the poetic enterprise. Wordsworth's recurrent references to objects
geological (the domain of deep time/material eternity) and astronomical (the domain of
..
deep space/material infinity)-the juxtaposition of hills, cliffs, mountains, ridges, valleys,
cataracts, and caverns with sky, sun, moon, planets, and stars-are so numerous and so
conspicuous that they almost certainly signal some larger poetic purpose. These two
most disruptive sciences to the established view-the century's "terrible Muses" as
Tennyson would later call them 71 -certainly provide Wordsworth with a rich source of
visual metaphors throughout The Prelude. In that astronomy and geology, taken
together, encompass both heaven and earth, it could be argued that Wordsworth employs
these paired elements simply as extremes of contrast in his poetic description, and that by
their use he merely intends to signal the expansiveness of his scope. If that is so, then
there may be no deeper meaning to these compounds. On the other hand, an in-depth
examination of these geological/astronomical conjunctions yields the intriguing
possibility that these disconnected episodes and images, taken together, form a narrative
of sorts, limning an arc in the poet's thinking in regard to the natural world as it functions
in issues of human self-definition, perhaps even recording a rejection of the temporally
and spatially expanded universe of the new science and a reassertion of the traditional
terrestrial sublime.

71

In "Pamassus" (1889).
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To address just a few of these geological/astronomical compounds in the order
that they appear: The "moon" and "hoary mountains" pairing of 1.383-84 72 occurs just as
Wordsworth sets out on his famous illicit nocturnal boat trip, with "the huge cliff' and
"the stars" of 1.409-10 arriving precisely at the moment the poet receives his first vision
of the physical sublime. The "presences of Nature, in the sky / Or on the earth"
referenced in 1.490-91 appear in the context of the formative "ministry of fear"
passage.?3 Subsequent compounds appear in the depiction of the "Infant Prodigy" (the
modern student of science), "[who] can read / The inside of the earth, and spell the
stars"(5.332-33) but do little else, particularly when contrasted with the "Boy of
Winander," who commenced his evening communes with nature "when the stars had just
begun / To move along the edges of the hills" (5.391-92), both episodes occurring within
Wordsworth's meditation on the two contrasting paths a developing mind may take.
Finally, there is the description of the poet's ascent of mist-bound Mt. Snowdon at age
twenty-one-with the spectacle of the "moon" and "hundred hills" visible above the
cloud deck (13 .41-45)-a moment that is profoundly revelatory in its vision of unity, but
which is also attended by the hard realization that the scene before him-indeed, all of
material nature-is not in itself transcendent.
Wordsworth's presentation of these thematically constructed geological!
astronomical compounds within The Prelude is at times ingenious, with the poet finding a
way to integrate the two realms even when the immediate context does not seem

72 All line citations in this section are from The Prelude 1805. Some of these geological/astronomical
compounds, such as. this first one, have no equivalent in The Prelude 1850.
73 The tenor of which is established earlier in the work: "Fair seed-time had my soul, and I grew up /
Fostered alike by beauty and by fear" (1.305-06).
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conducive, such as in his description of his own interior mental landscape from Book III:

"Caverns there were within my mind which sun / Could never penetrate" (246-47;
emphasis added). But it is in Book VIII of The Prelude that Wordsworth, drawing once
It

again upon the domains of inner and outer space, happens upon perhaps his most
intriguing expression of the Romantic poetic philosophy-the metaphor of imaginative
vision experienced in material darkness: 74
[W]hen a traveller hath from open day
With torches passed into some vault of earth,

He looks and sees the cavern spread and grow,
Widening itself on all sides, sees, or thinks
He sees, erelong, the roof above his head,
Which instantly unsettles and recedesSubstance and shadow, light and darkness, all
Commingled, making up a canopy
Of shapes, and forms, and tendencies to shape,
That shift and vanish, change and interchange
Like spectres-ferment quiet and sublime,
Which, after a short space, works less and less
Till, every effort, every motion gone,

Wordsworth's employment of an (initially, at least) infmite-seeming material space- again, a cavem
evokes parallels to Blake's vision of a similar domain: the subterranean "infinite Abyss" of The Marriage
ofHeaven and Hell.
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The scene before him lies in perfect view.
Exposed, and lifeless as a written book.
(The Prelude 1805 8.711-27)75

What this passage is describing, of course, is the process of dark adaptation, with
Wordsworth using the instinctive empirical response of the eye at its most heightened
level as an emblem of its limits as compared with the poetic imagination, the same
faculty with which this sense competes, and even attempts to dominate.
But let him pause awhile and look again,
And a new quickening shall succeed, at first
Beginning timidly, then creeping fast
Through all which he beholds: the senseless mass,
In its projections, wrinkles, cavities,
Through all its surface, with all colours streaming,
Like a magician's airy pageant, parts,
Unites, embodying everywhere some pressure
Or image, recognised or new, some type
Or picture of the world ...

A spectacle to which there is no end. (8.728-41)76
Wordsworth's view here is clearly reassertive of the limits of matter, both in terms of its

The Prelude 1850 8.560-75.
The Prelude 185Q 8.577-89. It is worthwhile to note that the original location of this passage was in
Book VI during Wordsworth's alpine travels, between the sobering disappointment at Simplon Pass and the
affirmation of the imaginative over the visual sense that follows that episode.

75

76
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physical boundaries and its need for the animating actions of the human mind. Note how
after the initial phase of sensory apprehension of the physical world, a second phase
begins, one involving mental projection onto the neutral backdrop of nature by means of
~

the active engagement of the imagination. To see beyond, Wordsworth argues, requires
another kind of vision. Further reinforcing the connections between the geological and
the astronomical in this passage is the fact that dark adaptation is the same mechanism by
which one engages the night sky. And the same conclusion may be drawn: The darkadapted eye may be able to discern the individual stars, but it is not sufficient to conceive
the constellations.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion: Romanticism and the Philosophy of Science

In the introduction to this study, I first made mention of Romanticism's role in
conceptualizing, evaluating, and-in the case of Romantic poetry-resisting the effects
of science on culture. Since this study has concerned itself primarily with the works of
William Blake and William Wordsworth, the preceding chapters have taken as their focus
this last point, with a in-depth discussion of the motives behind these poets' resistance
and the forms this resistance eventually took. Here in the concluding chapter, however,
I would like to take the opportunity to examine those first two points in more detail and
deal with Romanticism's role in the long-term conceptualization and evaluation of
science. Throughout this study, I have stressed the role of Romantic thought in revising
the vision of science held at the turn of the nineteenth century, introducing elements
which altered the paradigmatic landscape of the discipline. But in addition to its
contributions to the entity of science itself, there are Romanticism's contributions to the

philosophy ofscience-that branch of the humanities which provides vital critical and
conceptual analysis of the discipline from outside the field. Of particular interest is the
role that Romantic thought played in the formation of two of the key concepts within the
contemporary philosophy of science debate: the institutional acceptance of limits to
scientific knowledge, conclusively established by the work of Werner Heisenberg, and
the acknowledgement of the inexorably compromised nature of objectivity, resident in
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Karl Popper's view that all observation of the universe is "theory laden"-that is, colored
by one's pre-existing theoretical and ideological allegiances.

Observation and Explanation

In the twentieth century, the institution of science was irrevocably transformed by
challenges to a pair of long-held and interrelated assumptions-first, that such a thing as
objective reality exists and, second, that there are virtually no limits on our ability to
know that reality-two views inherited from early Enlightenment science and carried
forward despite the inroads of nineteenth-century researchers. As Lorraine Daston notes,
the Enlightenment view held that even though "facts" were fragile, they were possible:
Experience we have always had with us, but facts as a way of parsing
experience in natural history and natural philosophy are of seventeenth
century coinage .... What made [Enlightenment] facts granular was not
only their specificity but also their alleged detachment from inference and
conjecture. Ideally, at least, 'matters of fact' were nuggets of pure
experience, strictly segregated from any interpretation or hypothesis that
might enlist them as evidence. (Daston 116-1 7) .
But the process of their acquisition did not come naturally or effortlessly. "Francis
Bacon," Daston notes, "thought only the strict discipline of method could counteract the
inborn tendency of the human understanding to suffuse observation with theory" (117).
The objective thus became one of "[c]hiseling out 'matters of fact' from the matrix of
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experience and conjecture in which human perception and understanding automatically
[lodges them]" (Daston 117).1
The Romantics shared the Enlightenment view of the fragility of facts, but their
view differed in two important regards. First, while Bacon had felt that facts could be
gleaned if strict discipline were practiced, the Romantics (particularly Romantic poets
such as Wordsworth and Blake) viewed the overlap of observation and explanation as
inevitable, despite our best efforts. Second, they viewed this inevitable overlap as
actually desirable-a projection of the individual vision over colorless uniformity.

Observation and Reality

Within the scientific establishment, meanwhile, the debate over what constituted
objectively derived evidence had reached a crucial juncture over a century earlier with
the philosophical split between Hobbes and Boyle on the subject of empiricism. The
conservative position (represented by Hobbes) was inclined to accept the results of the
passive observation of nature as objective truth but challenged the validity of artificially
concocted experiments (championed by Boyle) as a source of untainted and generalizable
knowledge: 2 an extremely early acknowledgement of the problem Kuhn identifies when
he writes: "The man who is striving to solve a problem defined by existing knowledge
I In an aside addressing this dynamic at work in the sciences, Daston notes that "even sincere, well-trained
naturalists could inadvertently adulterate observations with imaginings. . .. An errant imagination was ...
Georges Cuvier's diagnosis of how Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had gone astray in natural history: for all his
scientific gifts, Lamarck was one of those minds which 'cannot prevent themselves from mixing true
discoveries [decouverts veritables] with fantastic conceptions ... they laboriously construct vast edifices
on imaginary bases, similar to the enchanted palaces in our old romances [romans] which disappear when
the talisman upon which their existence depends is broken'" (120).
2 "Hobbes noted tha~ all experiments carry with them a set of theoretical assumptions embedded in the
actual construction and functioning of the apparatus and that, both in principle and in practice, those
assumptions could always be challenged" (Shapin and Schaffer 112).
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and technique is not ... just looking around. He knows what he wants to achieve, and he
designs his instruments and directs his thoughts accordingly" (96). In other words, the
questions we choose to ask determine the answers we are going to get. For
this reason,
...
one of the earliest charges that twentieth-century critics of science leveled against
positivism-the scientific culture of empirical and experimental verification-was that,
because of the nature of scientific empiricism as it exists, "one cannot draw the sharp
distinction between observational and theoretical statements that [such a] view requires"
(Eichner 22). The primary point of these analysts was to force the acknowledgement of
the risks we entertain in denying that we habitually view the world through the lens of the
same theories we use to understand it, a realization that led Karl Popper (1902-94),
deeply skeptical of empiricist assumptions, to argue that it is not possible for human
beings to make observations independent of theory-that all worldviews are, in fact,
"theory-laden. ,,3
Blake clearly was not one to separate observation from belief, his vision from his
vIews. Overarching all other issues of its nature, Blake's model of the universe is
essentially an egocentrically constructed one, in that each individual constitutes the center
of his or her own universe. In Blake's subjective, self-created reality, everyone sees
things differently: "A fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees," he writes in The
Marriage ofHeaven and Hell,4 or, as he expresses the same notion in a letter to the Rev.
Dr. Trustler, "As a man is So he Sees."s However, Blake's rhetoric on this point is

Outlined in Objective Knowledge (1966).
Plate 7; E35.
5 23 August 1799; E702.
3

4
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flexible, at times suggesting that the human mind half-creates the world it lives in, at
others taking the hard-line stance that any notion of an external, physical reality is a
delusion. In general, though, Blake's vision is able to escape the most damaging charges
of Berkeleyan solipsism. 6 As Stuart Peterfreund observes, "Blake's article of faith [is]
that the soul ... operates recognizably and similarly in all human beings" (Newtonian
Worldxv).7

Wordsworth expresses a view similar to Blake's in The Excursion when he states,
through the persona of the sage Wanderer, that "We see, then, as we feel" (5.563).
Unlike Blake, however, Wordsworth never completely denies the existence of the
physical world, even rhetorically. He questions only whether any meaning can be
derived from its unimaginative observation. For Wordsworth, the world is objectively
real but can only be subjectively perceived, with nature serving as both a canvas and a
sounding board for the participatory actions of the human mind, a position the poet
affirms in "Tintern Abbey," where he writes:
Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains; and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear ,-both what they half-create,
And what [they] perceive. (102-07)
6 This purest expression of idealism, outlined within Berkeley's A Treatise concerning the Principles of
Knowledge (1710), holds that physical objects exist only to the extent that they are perceived in the mind.
7 Peterfreund holds. that Blake identifies the soul with the "Poetic Genius," a communal, interconnected
entity described in All Religions Are One: "[A]U are alike in the Poetic Genius .... [A]n universal Poetic
Genius exists" (E1).
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Explicit in this passage is Wordsworth's view that not only is there an inescapably
subjective element to what many think of as objective reality, but that this process is at all
times active, engaged, and creative. While such an unbidden process

ca~

produce very

desirable and beautiful poetic results, it should be noted that in "Expostulation and
Reply" Wordsworth seems to consider the merits of a different approach. Indeed, an
interesting consideration here is that Wordsworth's concept of "wise passiveness,"
introduced in this poem,

mi~ht

be construed as the consciously willed interruption of our

own theories upon our observations and, instead, opening ourselves up to the subjective
insights of something larger. 8

Romantic Empiricism
It is in an 1802 letter to Thomas Butts that Blake famously expounds his views on
the topic of vision, empirical and otherwise, outlining its multiple levels: 9
Now I a fourfold vision see
And a fourfold vision is given to me
Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
And three fold in soft Beulahs night
And twofold Always. May God us keep
From Single vision & Newtons sleep.

There are strong parallels here to Keats' negative capability, though Keats viewed such negation of the
self as the opposite of Wordsworth's usual poetic approach-Le., the "egotistical sublime."
922 November 1802; E722.
8
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This last and lowest form of perception-"Single vision"-is interpreted by Damon as
"seeing with the physical eye only the facts before it" (436). However, Blake's own
views, expressed elsewhere, question whether such a level of vision can exist-at least,
independently. For Blake, the four levels of vision outlined are interdependent, with
single vision as the starting point and all higher levels elaborating upon and revising this
basic perspective; hence, his characterization of the Enlightenment claim that the
universe can be viewed objectively-if only we are disciplined in our temperament and
methodology-as "Newtons sleep.,,1o A further enhancement of Blake's position on this
point is found in A Vision ofthe Last Judgment, wherein he writes: "I question not my
Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would Question a Window concerning a
Sight[.] I look thro it & not with it."] I In other words, everything seen is interpreted, and
that interpretation occurs in the mind, not in the eye.
In a similar reflection on the limits of empiricism-both scientific and artisticWordsworth, in another passage from The Prelude 1805, weighs in again on the "tyranny
of the eye," relating an incident from the time when post-Revolutionary disillusionment
had alienated him from "feeling" and had drawn him into the cold embrace of pure
objective rationality:
The state to which I now allude was one
In which the eye was the master of the heart,
When that which is in every stage of life
The most despotic of our senses gained
..
10
11

Though "Bacon's sleep" might be more fitting.
N95; E566.
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Such strength in me as often held my mind
In absolute dominion.
(The Prelude 1805 11.170-75)12
It is important to mark, however, that the scrutinizing and empirical view to which he

was temporarily drawn was anything but genuinely objective in nature, but rather the
self-deluding insight offered by calculating, sense-limited reason, what Blake in There is
No Natural Religion calls "the Ratio."
As outlined in Chapter Two, empiricism was a method inherited and summarily
incorporated by the more mainstream variant of Romantic scientific practice. And for the
most part, this was a stabilizing and productive addition, one which spared this branch of
the new science the damaging excesses experienced by other variants such as
Naturphilosophie. Still, despite its operational independence from the Enlightenment
scientific paradigm, empiricism could not be applied to the new paradigm without some
adjustments. Empiricism, after all, presumed to be about the objective gathering of facts,
but according to the philosophical fundaments of Romanticism-specifically, the view of
humanity as being in subjective communication with a natural system of which it is a
part-this was impossible-and, again, undesirable-in that facts are meaningless
without interpretation. As Levere confirms, adherents of scientific Romanticism realized
that "[m]ere observation"-even ifpossible-"was undiscriminating; the essence of
scientific activity lay in the recognition and selection of significant phenomena" (88).

12

The Prelude 1850 12.127-3l.
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Paradigms and Vision
In this study, I have advanced the argument that Romantic science was that
branch of scientific theorizing and practice which was informed to an important degree
by the tenets of the new cultural paradigm that would come to be called Romanticism, not
simply science that happened to be temporally concurrent with the new paradigm. Still,
many of the groundbreaking discoveries supporting the new paradigm were made in that
same turn-of-the-century timeframe, and this occurrence cannot be written off as purely
coincidental. Indeed, a corollary argument could be made that it was the new way of
thinking that enabled these discoveries. During much of the long eighteenth century,
many poets, like society in general, had seen no reason not to take science at face value
and by its own self-representation, viewing the enterprise, embodied in the work of
Newton, as free of subjective coloring and bias. I3 By the Romantic era, however, a new
generation of poets had become increasing aware of science's occasional lapses in
objectivity. These poets were particularly attuned to the ways in which one's scientific
orientation-might affect one's worldview. I4 Blake particularly, as Peterfreund notes,
grasped how an individual's "metaphysics might precede the physics as well as follow
from it" ("Blake and Newton" 207)-yet another iteration of Blake's observation that

13 There were, of course, notable exceptions. Jonathan Swift and the Scriblerians spring to mind. But even
within that circle, which included Alexander Pope, John Gay, and Dr. John Arbuthnot, there were marked
divisions regarding the level of cynicism toward science. As a case in point, in Book III of The Dunciad,
Pope makes a strong case for the nobility of the scientific enterprise, though its achievements are scorned
and rejected by the Dunces whom he addresses: '''Tis yours, a Bacon, or a Locke to blame, / A Newton's
Genius, or a Serapk's flame" (213-14).
14 And, depending on their level of self-awareness, how one's anti-scientific orientation might affect one's
worldview.
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"As a man is So he Sees." In short, paradigms affect vision. IS Kuhn makes this same
point in an anecdote from The Structure o/Scientific Revolutions, wherein he examines
the historical record and finds
indirect and behavioral evidence that the scientist with a new paradigm
sees differently from the way he had seen before .... [For example,] Sir
William Herschel's discovery of Uranus. . .. A celestial body that had
been observed off and on for almost a century was seen differently after
1781 because ... it could no longer be fitted to the perceptual categories
(star or comet) provided by the paradigm that had previously prevailed .
. . . The shift of vision that enabled astronomers to see Uranus ... helped
to prepare astronomers for the rapid discovery, after 1801 , of the
numerous minor planets or asteroids. . .. The history of astronomy
provides many other examples of paradigm-induced changes in scientific
perception. . .. Can it conceivably be an accident, for example, that
Western astronomers first saw change in the previously immutable
heavens during the half-century after Copernicus' new paradigm was first
proposed? The Chinese, whose cosmological beliefs did not preclude
celestial change, had recorded the appearance of many new stars in the
heavens at a much earlier date. (115-16)

15 Blake, weighing in on the cost of the materialist ontology on perception in An Island in the Moon , writes,
"But, my Good Sir, Voltaire was immersed in matter, & seems to have understood very little but what he
saw before his eyes" eCho 4; E451).
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The Limits of Knowledge
The second assumption inherited from Enlightenment science regarding the
physical realm, that which proposed an ultimately knowable universe, encountered an
intractable complication with the 1927 enunciation of the "uncertainty principle" by
physicist Werner Heisenberg. As Timothy Ferris writes in The Mind's Sky,
Heisenberg found that there is an intrinsic limitation to the amount of
accurate information one can obtain about any subatomic phenomenon.
This limitation arises from the fact that neither we nor anyone else in the
universe can observe subatomic particles without interfering with them in
one way or another. (204)
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has subsequently been generalized to other areas of
the sciences, and the limitations it imposes are now acknowledged to be "fundamental to
every act of observation" (Ferris 204). The epistemological result, Ferris concludes, is
that "[t]he observed universe ... cannot rightly be regarded as having a wholly
independent, verifiable existence, since its apprehension requires the intrusion of an
observer" (205). The consequences such a precept holds for the acquisition of knowledge
are obvious.
The notion that there might be limits to scientific knowledge has deep roots, 16 of
course, but its most striking and relevant origins date back to the Romantic period. As
Marilyn Gaull notes, while many scientists in the late 1700s

16 Pope, for exampl~ in his Essay on Man (1733-34) expresses an acceptance of limits to scientific
knowledge, but, it is worth noting, he does so from the perspective of an Enlightenment poet, not a
scientist.
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continued to argue that science and the machinery that made it possible
enhanced the sense of human power over nature and natural forces, a few
isolated but significant observers were discovering the lil!lits of human
knowledge. The universe began to unfold as vaster and more complex
than anyone had previously conceived. . .. [These] scientists
inadvertently discovered that the unknown may also be unknowable. 17

(English Romanticism 372)
The perception and acceptance of limits to human knowledge was one of the essential
characteristics of all varieties of scientific Romanticism. This reassessment from the
preceding paradigm took the form of an explicitly stated acceptance of the complexity of
the physical universe informed by a realization of the limitations of our human
technology to measure and our human minds to understand.
The period's philosophical acceptance of such limits to knowledge, it might be
argued, arose from a shift in science's objects of inquiry: At the tum of the nineteenth
century, as Gaull notes, "science was increasingly pre-occupied with invisibles,
'imponderables' as they were called, the boundless, the infinitely great, small, and
numerous" ("Romantic Skies" 34). As revealed by the present concepts of relativity and
uncertainty-by-products of the study of the cosmic and subatomic realms,

17 In 1819, William Lawrence, in the Cyclopedia Universal Dictionary ofArts, Sciences, and Literature,
wrote: "So narrow are the limits of human understanding that the knowledge of first causes seem[s] placed
forever beyond our reach. The thick veil which covers them envelopes in its innumerable folds whoever
attempts to break through it" (qtd. in Gaull, English Romanticism 373). Lawrence's wording might well
have influenced Wordsworth in a later poem: "Desire we past illusions to recall? / To reinstate wild Fancy,
would we hide / Truths whose thick veil Science has drawn aside?" (Poems: Composed or Suggested
During a Tour in the Summer of 1833. XIV, 1-3). It is important to note that after these surprising opening
lines, Wordsworth's poem shifts into an attack on science's imaginative limits relative to religious faith.

182

respectively-it has become clear that limits to our human understanding almost
invariably come into play when the discussion turns to considerations of the very large or
the very small. 18
It had been the predictability implied by the mechanical model that had originally

fostered the idea of a universe with no insurmountable barriers to its knowability. The
Enlightenment scientific model, as it was understood and publicly resisted by the first
wave of English Romantic poets, advanced a view of the universe as orderly, unchanging,
and finite in time and space. But as Shapin notes, even Newton himself, though he had
established and endorsed much of what came to be thought of as the mechanist
worldview, "professed contentment with the ultimate inscrutability of nature" on a
number of topics (Revolution 157). This attitude of circumspection and caution in regard
to explanations of the natural world extended to other figures as well. Though
traditionally cast as an opponent to Romantic science because of his specific opposition
to Naturphilosophie, the Swedish chemist Jons Jacob Berzelius was an articulate
representative of trends of thought just emerging at the turn of the nineteenth century.
We have, for example, his documented opinions that a "theory should never go 'further
than the need to explain the phenomena'" and that a theory can be "merely a 'way to
conceptualize' objects and not a true description of them" and still be of value
18 On the scale of the cosmic and the microscopic, there is, Blake seems to argue, a great deal that science
does not yet know:
Thou knowest that the ancient trees seen by thine eyes have fruit;
But knowest thou that trees and fruits flourish upon the earth
To gratify senses unknown? trees beasts and birds unknown:
Unknown, not unpercievd, spread in the infinite microscope,
In;Jlaces yet unvisited by the voyager. and in worlds
Over another kind of seas, and in atmospheres unknown.
(Visions ofthe Daughters ofAlbion 4.l6; E48)
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(Lindroth 21).19 This pragmatic sense of humility in regard to explanations of material
phenomena combined with-and, indeed, engendered by-a sublime appreciation of
nature is conceptually characteristic of the science that emerged in the

er~ of

Romanticism.
The persistent inaccessibility of the "truth," as suggested by Romantic
philosophy, required an eventual adjustment on the part of the scientific enterprise, a
change that finally arrived in the twentieth century in the form of a re-evaluation of the
relevance of such notions to the enterprise's endeavors. 2o As Thomas Kuhn notes, even
within a revised view of science's history-from one positing the orderly and cumulative
acquisition of knowledge to one accepting disruptive and discontinuous revolutions of

· 21 
paradIgm
We may ... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes
of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and
closer to the truth .... Does it really help to imagine that there is some
one full, objective, true account of nature and that the proper measure of
scientific achievement is the extent to which it brings us closer to that
ultimate goal? (170-71)
Many modern analysts of science would agree with Kuhn that it does not. After all, a
scientific principle need not be universally applicable to be of value; it need only be a
19 The Berzelius works cited are "Untersuchung uber die Zusammensetzung der Phosphorsaure," Annalen
der Physik, 1816,54: 44ff. and Larbok i kemien, Vol. III (Stockholm, 1818), pp. 16-22, respectively.
20 Though formally codified in the twentieth century, its roots clearly go back to the early nineteenth
century, at least.
21 In "All Religions are One," Blake presents his own challenge to the cumulative view of scientific
knowledge: "As none by traveling over known lands can find out the unknown. So from already acquired
knowledge Man could not acquire more" (E 1).
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useful, site-specific approximation. Again, though, this is the contemporary view,
possible only after a century of lively debate among scientific historians and
philosophers. It is interesting to consider Blake and Wordsworth's response to such a
sense of instrumentalism, anticipated within Romantic science as a necessary response to
the revealed complexity of nature. We might well intuit that as poets they would have
condemned any cultural entity with an operational indifference to absolute truth. But we
can by no means be certain of this, for within their works there is a wealth of support for
the non-universal view, expressed within both poets' strong support of the individual
imaginative vision.

The Limits of Imagination
Within the field of contemporary Blake studies, there are volumes of commentary
regarding the poet's idiosyncratic approach. This approach also drew comment from
Blake's poetic contemporaries. Wordsworth's famous reaction after reading the Songs of
Innocence and ofExperience is recorded in the Diary of Henry Crabb Robinson: "There
is no doubt this poor man was mad, but there is something in the madness of this man
which interests me more than the sanity of Lord Byron and Walter Scoti!" (281). While
Blake doubtless strove for accessibility, at the same time (most analysts agree) he did not
intend for his work to be immediately understood by everyone. It is the simultaneous
sense of revelation and unknowability that powers Blake's poetic work. But ironically,
instead of finding a sympathetic echo within the operations of the new science, the poet
found only another encroachment on poetry's domain and identity. It is the view of this
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study that Blake likely felt it was poetry's purview alone to incorporate such illuminating
human contradiction.
Blake and Wordsworth both founded their creative careers and po~etic programs
upon a rebellion against the crisis-ridden science of the Enlightenment era-an institution
they indirectly perpetuated by continuing to take seriously, completely untroubled by its
crises-viewing these crises, in fact, as strategic opportunities for artistic response. In
the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth ostensibly argues for a noble role for the
scientist in the social order that is to come. Implicit in this agenda, since the poet is
largely enabling this new role, is an even higher priority: to preserve a valued role for the
poet. If poetry were to survive, particularly their vision of poetry, then its articles of faith
required affirmation---chief among these being the apotheosis of the human imagination
that serves as the nucleus of the Romantic poetic ideology. The humanist notion that all
was knowable, dating back to Bacon, had elevated the faculty of the human imagination
during the Enlightenment, but it had had the opposite effect on the natural world the
human mind sought to know, recasting it, as Peterfreund observes, "as something
instrumental rather than sacramental" ("Ideology" 144). The arrival of Romantic science
changed all that, reinvesting the natural world with a sense of awe-inspiring power and
grandeur but in the process contracting the reach of the human imagination, indeed
recasting the human mind as a tool perhaps inadequate for the work ahead of it-whether
that be comprehending the natural universe or deciphering its own intricate functioning.
The conclusions of Romantic science on this issue were thus at odds with the aims of
Romantic poetry.
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Romantic Idealism and the Issue of Unknowability

Before closing, I would like to take a moment to consider the role of Romantic
idealism as it concerns the central issues of this chapter, since idealism must be factored
into any discussion of Romantic philosophy, particularly as it relates to the limits of
scientific knowledge and the overlap of observation with belief. Kant's distinction of the
realms of phenomena and noumena22 lies at the heart of the Romantic question of
unknowability. Ifthings-in-themselves constitute reality, and these things-in-themselves
are forever inaccessible to us, then logic dictates that reality itself is forever
unknowable. 23 In The Romantic Conception ofLife, Robert Richards observes that
the phenomenal world of our experience arose from ... the reality standing
beyond experience, the noumenal sphere (as Kant called it), of which
nothing could be scientifically known. The proper object of scientific
thought, according to Kant, is the phenomenal world. In our experience of
this realm, we discover both unity and order, whose ultimate foundations
could only be in the mind. (62)
Indeed, the order that we observe in nature constituted for Kant a proof of sorts for
idealism. He was also confidently willing to extend this principle of projected order
further, arguing that since cause and effect exist in the human mind, we can assume their

Experiential appearances versus the presumed underlying reality of "things-in-themselves." Kant, I
would note, usually employs the singular Ding an sieh.
23 It is worth noting,.as does Max I. Baym, that "[fJor Kant ... there was no opposition between art and
science; though they are different modes of intellection, they are both implicated in the contemplation of
phenomena"; thus, they are united in this sense of unknowability (742).
22
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existence in nature as wel1. 24 But despite the best efforts of science in investigating these
perceived instances of order and cause-and-effect relationships, we can know nothing
about reality in itself, but only about reality as it is experienced. Kant's}imiting of
science to knowledge about the world of appearances was one of the first Romantic
limitations placed upon the ambitious Enlightenment scientific viewpoint. It would not
be the last.
In articulating his philosophy, Kant managed to sidestep objections that his view
produced a Berkeleyan form of solipsism; he did so by maintaining that, while the "mind
did construct the features of the natural world of ordinary experience, ... it did so jointly
out of necessary categories of thought, common to all human beings, and raw qualities 25
delivered to sense from a real world beyond experience" (Richards 63). Thus, in Kant's
words: "The existence of things, that which appears, is not destroyed as in real
idealism. ,,26 The influence of this last aspect of Kantian idealism on the philosopher
Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his disciple Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (the father of

Naturphilosophie) would be profound, and it counters the usual stereotypes of German
Romantic science's stand on realism versus idealism. As Richards explains,
Fichte began his analysis with what could not be doubted, the immediate
representations of consciousness. Our immediate experience of the natural
world, upon close inspection, shows itself to be a representation, which we

This has been construed in some quarters as a refutation ofHume's global skepticism, an even earlier
challenge to knowability.
25 Presumably, unprocessed by the senses and perception.
26 Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik dies als Wissenschaft wird auttreten konnen, in Werke
(6: 153) (qtd. in Richards 63).
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assume quite naturally has been forced upon us by things existing outside
the mind. (72-73)
Schelling took this position a step further-some would say a step in the opposite
direction-supporting a metaphysical stance that "accords with our native instincts ...
[which] regard objects of the natural world as completely real and not the shadow of
hidden entities" (165). But despite the modifications that brought his idealism to the
threshold of a realist metaphysics,27 Schelling's interpretation, Richards notes, still
represents "a persistent effort to live without the Kantian thing-in-itself ... [and] if we
are going to explain experience, especially knowledge in science, but must do so without
the aid of the thing-in-itself, then we can have as the objects of our consciousness only
the very structures of subjectivity" (164-65). Nature is thus objectively real but
subjectively perceived-a view that anticipates, among others, that held by Wordsworth.

After the Revolution

In plate 18 of The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, the Angel, representative of
Urizenic reason and restraint, shows Blake his "eternal lot":
By degrees we beheld the infinite Abyss, fiery as the smoke
of a burning city; beneath us at an immense distance was the sun,
black but shining[;] round it were fiery tracks on which revolv'd
vast spiders, crawling after their prey; which flew or rather
swum in the infinite deep, in the most terrific shapes of animals
This characterization might have been lost on Schelling, however, who, as S. R. Morgan notes, saw his
idealism as starkly opposing French materialism (27).
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sprung from corruption. & the air was full of them....28
But now, from between the black & white spiders a cloud and
fire burst and rolled thro the deep blackning all beneath, s*o
that the nether deep grew black as a sea & rolled with a terrible
noise. (E41)
As one of the central images of his defiant response to the view of the universe promoted
by Enlightenment science, as well as his anxiety regarding the new view proposed by
Romantic science, Blake's vision here is a radical nightmare rendered in astronomical
terms, with the Enlightenment view overhauled and the cosmic set redressed. Like
Wordsworth's depiction of the dark landscape of the psyche in "Home at Grasmere,,,29 it
is a scene informed by the chaos that ensues in the aftermath of revolution-in this case,
a nec,essary imaginative one. In the following plate of The Marriage ofHeaven and

Hell, the Angel leaves Blake and the scene changes, and the poet writes: "I found myself
sitting on a pleasant bank beside a river by moon light hearing a harper who sung to the
harp.,,3o The tone of this scene is echoed in the closing lines of Book X of The Prelude
1805, which, having dealt with the turbulent events of the French Revolution, resolves
with Wordsworth's presentation of his own version of Blake's riverbank idyll. In the
aftermath of chaotic change, Wordsworth at long last finds a measure of peace:
Thus I soothe
The pensive moments by this calm fireside,

28 Again, this is usually construed as Blake's unflattering take on the constellations of conventional
astronomy.
29 Lines 788-94, In the Prospectus to The Recluse, lines 35-41.
30 Plate 19; E41-42.
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And find a thousand fancied images
That chear the thoughts of those I love, and mine.
(1027-30)31
It is now 1804, and the Revolution across the channel is over. The scientific revolution,

however, is ongoing, and the partisans of Romantic poetry must pause to assess. They
have succeeded in precipitating the fall of the familiar Enlightenment scientific regime
they so strenuously assailed with their poetic rhetoric, but it is by no means certain that
its direct overthrow was ever their real aim. Meanwhile, the alternative science that they
also opposed (though far more subtly) is on the ascent. It is a mixed outcome for them.
"How is it," Blake asks in his conclusion to The Four Zoas, "[that] we have walkd
thro fires & yet are not consumd? / How is it that all things are changd even as in ancient
times?,,32 The placement of this couplet just ten lines before the climactic mention of
"sweet Science" is provocative. The face of science, the adversarial culture,
unquestionably changed during the poetic lifetimes of Blake and Wordsworth. From this,
one might argue either causation or coincidence. At the very least, it seems likely that
these poets' criticisms of science, joined with those of others, succeeded in giving voice
to widely held cultural concerns and as a result played some role in the discipline's
eventual redefinition-a redefinition, ironically, that was in the long-term interest of the
discipline itself, in that it fostered a realistic and sustainable revisioning of science's
mission. But despite the changes that transpired within science in Blake and
Wordsworth's day, in a century's time the discipline would need to change again, this
31
32

The Prelude 1850 11.448-51.
9.844-45.
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time in regard to formal positions on the knowability of the natural world and our
chances of ever observing that world with anything approaching clarity. Our present
understanding is that there are some questions that may never be answe~ed to our
complete satisfaction. Indeed, science in the present age, and by its revised definition,
requires a certain tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. This represents a radical
change in the underlying philosophy of not only the natural sciences but of Western
culture in general since the days of Blake and Wordsworth-a change to which these
poets were witnesses, if not champions.
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